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ABSTRACT 
After more than a decade of experience in the global marketplace, genetically 
modified (GM) foods continue to be controversial.  Early GM traits were obtained by 
transferring genes across species, largely from soil bacteria, and this transgenic nature is 
one dimension of consumer resistance.  Recently, breakthroughs have occurred using 
intragenic bioengineering where genes are moved long distances within specie and 
without antibiotic markers.  These new intragenic bioengineering methods offer the 
potential for new commercial crop varieties with traits of direct value to consumers (e.g., 
enhanced nutrition) without reliance on outside foreign genetic material.   
To assess the potential market for new intragenic foods, a series of multiple-
round random nth-price experimental auctions were conducted in the spring of 2007 on 
randomly chosen adult consumers with randomized food label and information 
treatments.  Using the data collected through the experimental auctions, this dissertation 
assesses several issues including: (1) consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for GM food 
products with and without enhanced antioxidant and vitamin C levels, (2) the impact of 
controversial and verifiable information on consumers’ WTP, (3) the public good value 
of verifiable information about GM, (4) the welfare impact of alternative labeling policies 
for GM foods, and (5) the impact of outside-the-auction consumer held product 
inventories on bids in food experiments. 
Results indicate that consumers are willing to pay significantly more for 
intragenic GM vegetables with enhanced nutrition than for a conventional product.  This 
suggests that there is potential for new intragenic foods to find acceptance among 
consumers and that the food industry for the first time potentially has an incentive to 
 xi
voluntarily label GM foods as GM.  The consumer welfare gains from labeling policies 
that differentiate intragenic and transgenic are quantified.  However, the information 
available to consumers when making product purchase decisions is shown to have a 
significant impact on private valuations, thus potentially eroding demand for intragenic 
foods.  Verifiable information from independent third-party organizations is shown to 
have value to consumers through enabling more informed product choices.   
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 Since the introduction and deregulation of the first commercially available 
genetically modified (GM) crops in the mid-90s, many GM crops (e.g., canola, corn, 
cotton, and soybeans) have been rapidly adopted by producers, surpassing the one-
billionth globally planted acre milestone in 2005.  Commercial successes of GM during 
the past decade have been primarily in feed, fiber, and oil crops, but not in food crops 
with the exception of refined vegetable oils.1   
Yet, despite the rapid expansion and worldwide market penetration of 
bioengineered field crops, the adoption of GM crop varieties has been slowed (or largely 
stalled in some countries) due in part to the staunch opposition of environmental groups 
and consumer advocacy groups over economic, environmental, and health concerns and 
general uncertainty about future outcomes (for reviews see Herdt, 2006; Van den Bergh 
and Holley, 2002).  This contentious debate over genetic modification encompasses a 
wide array of interested parties who have disseminated information into the public 
domain with positions on GM foods spanning the spectrum from "frankenfoods" to 
"foods to feed the world" (e.g., Lewis, 1992; Gates, 2000).  Given uncertainty and the 
presence of private information by interested parties, it is questionable whether 
consumers can make fully informed decisions regarding GM foods due to the incomplete 
and asymmetric characterization of publicly available information.  However, in this 
                                                 
1 When raw plant oils from crops such as soybean, corn, cotton and canola are refined, 
the resulting product is a pure lipid or fat, and hence, the chemical content is exactly the 
same in oils made from GM and non-GM crops. 
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conflicted information environment, independent third-party information may have value 
to both consumers and producers and serve as a moderating force (Rousu et al., 2007). 
The early GM crops were all transgenic, i.e., genes from a different organism 
(typically soil bacteria) were transferred into commercial crop varieties to introduce a 
trait of interest (e.g., herbicide tolerance or insect resistance).  This transgenic nature of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has been one dimension of consumer resistance 
to GM – raising biodiversity, environmental, ethical, and safety concerns – and has been 
a factor in the larger controversy surrounding GM.  Because of continued opposition to 
transgenic GM crops and foods, a new line of biotech research has emerged to quickly 
transfer genes a long distance across the same species, i.e., intragenic GM technology.  
For example, a potato is very difficult to manipulate with conventional plant breeding 
methods, but biotech methods can be used to rapidly move genes from primate potato 
varieties to commercial varieties.  Thereby genomic and metabolic pathway discoveries 
can be rapidly introduced into established commercial varieties to fast-track the breeding 
processes.  Not only does this new GM technology not transfer foreign DNA, but it also 
does not use antibiotic markers to identify the location of inserted genes.2  These are all 
proffered reasons by biotechnology companies for a low regulatory hurdle. 
A second neoteric development tied to intragenic breakthroughs is a renewed 
interest by some bioengineering companies to develop GM food crops with "product-
enhanced consumer attributes" (henceforth abbreviated PECA) or traits that directly 
benefit consumers.  With the exception of the short-lived marketing attempts in the mid-
                                                 
2 For a more technical overview of intragenic versus transgenic engineering see 
Rommens et al. (2004). 
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90s of the "Flavr-Savr tomato" and a "high solids tomato" produced by Zeneca, 
commercially successful GM crops in the US have possessed input traits (traits that 
reduce either the cost of production or the variance in the cost of production to farmers), 
and hence, have only benefited consumers to the extent that they have lowered food 
prices.3  With new intragenic GM techniques it is feasible to dramatically enhance 
product attributes in horticulture crops, such as antioxidant and vitamin content, thus 
developing new foods with attributes of direct value to consumers.  Although it is 
possible to introduce these attributes using transgenic methods, new intragenic GM 
methods are promising because they only move genes within specie and not across 
species as in transgenic GM methods.  Hence, intragenic GM horticultural crops are free 
of one of the major negative attributes that has hindered transgenic crops.   
The emergence of intragenic engineering opens a new chapter in the scientific 
investigations of consumers’ acceptance of GM foods.  This is the first study to explore 
consumer and regulatory issues related to intragenic engineering.  The central objective 
of this dissertation is to assess consumers’ willingness to pay for food products that 
contain improved nutrient content through genetic modification.  The new food products 
considered are fresh vegetables – russet potato, beefsteak tomato, and broccoli – 
developed using intragenic or transgenic engineering with or without enhanced levels of 
antioxidants and vitamin C.  A set of unique food experiments were designed and 
conducted to gather information to assess consumers’ willingness to pay for these new 
food products. 
                                                 
3 This indirect value of genetic modification to consumers has been estimated to be quite 
sizable by Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson (2000) and Moschini, Lapan, and 
Sobolevsky (2000). 
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To complement the primary aim of the dissertation in assessing consumer 
acceptance of GM foods with enhanced nutrition, a number of additional research 
questions are explored to further our understanding of the existing and potential market 
for transgenic and intragenic foods.  While consumers' view of GM Free food products as 
being weakly superior to transgenic GM foods has been well documented, little research 
has addressed exactly what aspect of the production of GM food products results in this 
inferiority.  Namely, is the inferiority of transgenic GM due to the use of genetic 
techniques for producing a product that likely would not otherwise appear in nature, the 
utilization and presence of foreign genetic content, or a combination of both factors?  
The answer to this question rests squarely on whether consumers place a different value 
on intragenic food products when compared to otherwise equivalent transgenic food 
products.   
Furthermore, while past attempts in marketing GM food products with enhanced 
consumer attributes have been largely unsuccessful, do consumers respond favorably to 
genetic modification that yields more readily understandable and quantifiable attributes 
that are desirable by consumers such as improved nutrition?   
As well, while there is voluminous information regarding the benefits and dangers 
of genetic modification, there is a relative void of information in the public domain, pro 
and con, regarding the differences between intragenics and transgenics.  As the debate 
angles in this new direction, what is the impact of diverging views and information on 
consumer valuations and what is the value of this new information to consumers?   
Finally, as new intragenic food products are introduced into the marketplace, 
regulators will be faced with the question of how these new products should be labeled.  
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Given consumers’ preferences towards different types of genetic modification, what are 
the welfare effects of alternative labeling policies for intragenic foods? 
 This dissertation serves to address these and other questions critical to our 
understanding of the potential market for intragenic GM foods utilizing data collected 
from a unique set of experimental auctions designed to elicit consumers' willingness to 
pay (WTP) for fresh vegetables (broccoli, beefsteak tomatoes, and russet potatoes) 
produced through varying types of genetic modification.  The experimental procedure, 
which is described in detail in chapter 2, is innovative in several regards.  We incorporate 
and refine both standard experimental procedures (e.g., see Shogren et al., 1994; Lusk et 
al., 2001) and the advances of Rousu et al. (2007).  First, we use adult consumers from 
two distinct geographic regions that were drawn from a random phone book sample.  
This ensures our results are not artifacts of a single geographic region.  Second, we chose 
not to endow participants with products and have them bid to upgrade to another product 
(e.g., see Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2003).  Using this method, session monitors have 
potentially induced significant “endowment effects” by emphasizing the personal gift 
nature of the in-kind transfer to them (e.g., Corrigan and Rousu, 2006a; Plott and Zeiler, 
2007).  Third, we use the nth-price auction mechanism (Shogren et al., 2001) which has 
been shown to be a demand revealing mechanism that better engages off-margin bidders 
(e.g., Fox, Hayes, and Shogren, 2002).  Fourth, we randomize all food labels to eliminate 
sequencing effects. Finally, in many previous experiments where information is 
disseminated to participants (e.g., Lusk et al., 2004; Rousu et al., 2007), each "group" 
receives the same information treatment. In our experiment, we disseminate multiple 
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information treatments within the same "group".  This helps ensure that the treatment 
effect is not tainted by a "group effect". 
The experimental auction bid price data, which is summarized in chapter 3, 
reveals several insights into consumers’ valuations for fresh intragenic vegetables.  Most 
notably, we find that consumers are willing to pay a premium for fresh intragenic 
vegetables with enhanced nutritional content over non-GM alternatives without enhanced 
nutrition.  However, the premium is greatly affected by the information available to 
consumers when they are placing their bids. 
While the unconditional analysis of bid prices presented in chapter 3 is suggestive 
of the impact of controversial information (pro- and anti-GM) and verifiable third-party 
information on consumers’ WTP for different types of intragenic and transgenic foods, 
several potential confounding factors are not controlled for.  In order to better isolate the 
impact of controversial and verifiable information on WTP, a Bayesian seemingly 
unrelated regression Tobit model is estimated in chapter 4.  As is discussed in chapter 4, 
the utilized regression model simultaneously incorporates a number of relevant 
econometric features that are typically left unmodeled in studies of auction bid price data.  
Estimates from the econometric model further reveal the impact of information on 
consumers’ WTP and suggests that the success of intragenic foods in the marketplace 
will be greatly affected by the flow and nature of information about the new technology 
injected into the public domain. 
While the analysis of the bid price data in chapters 3 and 4 yields strong evidence 
on the impact of information, a critical question is what the actual value of this 
information is to consumers.   Information is vital for consumers to be able to make 
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optimal purchase decisions maximizing welfare.  Under incomplete or asymmetric 
information, consumers may not, ex-post, make “correct” purchase decisions resulting in 
welfare losses.  In chapter 5 a theoretical and empirical framework is developed to 
estimate the value of independent verifiable information to consumers.  We find that the 
value of verifiable information is small.  However, when viewed as a percentage of the 
product price and extrapolated to multiple products and multiple purchase occasions, the 
public good value of the information is significant.  This indicates that independent 
organizations can not only serve a role informing the public about the benefits and risks 
of intragenic foods, but also help consumers increase their welfare through making 
informed product purchase decisions. 
While the results of the experimental auction reveal that there is potential demand 
by consumers for intragenic foods, a key policy question for regulatory bodies is if and 
how these products should be labeled.  Over the past decade one of the most controversial 
issues surrounding transgenic foods has been labeling.  Interested parties, including the 
biotechnology industry, environmental groups, and domestic regulators, have supported 
conflicting labeling proposals.  This dispute has lead internationally to disparate policies 
for labeling of GM foods.  This labeling issue, which predominately has taken the form 
of a debate over mandatory versus voluntary labeling regimes, will be faced with an 
additional complication as intragenic foods attempt to enter the market.  Namely, the 
primary question that regulators will face is: should producers be permitted to 
differentiate intragenic foods from otherwise equivalent transgenic foods?  In chapter 6, 
the issue of labeling intragenic foods is considered.  Specifically, a model is developed to 
assess consumer welfare under alternative mandatory and voluntary labeling regimes that 
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do and do not permit differentiation of intragenic foods from transgenic alternatives.  
Empirical estimates reveal that policies that allow labeling of intragenic foods are welfare 
improving. 
Finally, while the results presented in this dissertation exploit the unique richness 
of experimental auction data (i.e., auctions directly solicit WTP as opposed to choice 
experiments which indirectly solicit WTP through ex-post analysis of preference 
relationships), there are two potential drawbacks to auctions in general like those used in 
this dissertation (and other similar methods as well such as choice experiments and 
surveys) that have been largely overlooked in the literature.  First, experiments are static 
by nature in that they solicit consumers’ preferences at a single point in time (i.e. 
conditional on the consumers’ “state” at that moment in time).  Failure to recognize this 
feature, as is explored in chapter 7, can potentially lead to incorrect interpretation and 
inference when using experimental data.  The second drawback of experiments is their 
arguably “artificial” nature.  In the case of experimental auctions, while theoretically they 
are demand revealing incentive compatible mechanisms, they clearly do not perfectly 
mimic the standard markets in which consumers typically interact.  This is certainly true 
of the laboratory style auctions conducted for this dissertation.  In chapter 7, we test a 
specific, and previously unaddressed, aspect of experimental auctions: do consumers 
assess their willingness to pay and submit bids conditional on their non-monetary 
endowment arising through transactions outside of the auction?  More simply put, ceteris 
paribus, do consumers who hold inventories of products obtained outside of the auction 
recognize this endowment and submit lower bids accordingly as standard economics 
theory predicts?  The experimental auction data indicates that the answer is indeed yes.  
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This, from a practitioner’s perspective, is a comforting result and further demonstrates 
that, even in the artificial market of a laboratory experimental auction, consumers behave 
as would be expected in a conventional market. 
 
1.2 Dissertation Organization 
The dissertation is organized as follows.  In the following chapter, a description of 
the experimental auction procedures is provided.  Chapter 3 contains a summary of the 
auction data as well as an unconditional analysis of bid prices.  Chapter 4 develops a 
regression model - the Bayesian seemingly unrelated regression Tobit model - for 
conditional analysis of bid prices and the impact of controversial and verifiable 
information on consumers’ product valuations.  Chapter 5 extends the analysis of the 
impact of information on WTP for GM and non-GM foods to assess the value to 
consumers of verifiable third-party information on genetic modification.  Chapter 6 
develops a model to assess the welfare effects of alternative labeling regimes for 
intragenic foods.  The model is calibrated using the experimental auction data.  Chapter 7 
evaluates a previously unanalyzed aspect of consumer decision making in the context of 
an experimental auction – the impact of outside inventories on bidding behavior.  Finally, 
chapter 8 concludes the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER 2: DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENTS 
2.1 Introduction 
 To elicit consumers’ willingness to pay for food products produced through 
different GM and non-GM methods, a series of experimental auctions were conducted in 
the spring of 2007.4  The experiments integrated recognized experimental procedures 
(e.g., Shogren et al., 1994; Lusk et al., 2001; Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2003) and most 
closely followed the methodology of Rousu et al. (2007) with several improvements upon 
their procedures.  Participants for the study were recruited by an independent survey 
agency from the general public.   Using a random sample of adult consumers, as opposed 
to university students or personnel, is critical to ensure that the preference data collected 
through the auctions is representative of the US population.  Experiments were conducted 
in two cities, Des Moines, Iowa and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  Two geographically 
separated urban cities were chosen in order to prevent results from being driven based on 
preferences from individuals in one geographic area.  A total of fourteen experimental 
sessions (eight in Des Moines and six in Harrisburg) were conducted consisting of 
between nine and seventeen participants each.  Across the experiments, a total of 190 
individuals participated in a four round auction with three commodities sold in each 
                                                 
4 The direct financial consequence of consumers’ decisions in experimental auctions is a 
distinct advantage over other commonly utilized methodologies (e.g., contingent 
valuation and surveys).  Many studies (e.g., Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Cummings, 
Harrison, and Rutstrom, 1995; List and Shogren, 1998) have shown that individuals’ 
decisions in a hypothetical setting may not necessarily correspond to decisions with 
actual purchase commitments involving a monetary exchange.  A recent study by 
Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2004) compares hypothetical and non-hypothetical 
approaches specifically for eliciting consumers’ attitudes towards GMOs.  Their findings 
confirm the disconnect between the two approaches and provides strong evidence for 
using non-hypothetical methods such as experimental auctions. 
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round.  This yielded a total of 2,280 observations (bids).  In this chapter a description of 
the recruitment procedure, participant socio-demographics, and experimental protocol is 
provided.  
 
2.2 Participant Recruitment5
 The Center for Survey Statistics and Methodology (CSSM) was contracted to 
recruit participants for the experiments conducted in Des Moines, Iowa and Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania.   The sessions in Pennsylvania were conducted on March 24, 2007 in 
classrooms at the Harrisburg campus of Pennsylvania State University.  Six total sessions 
were conducted at 9:00 am, 11:30 am, and 2:00 pm (two sessions were conducted 
simultaneously during each time slot).  The sessions in Iowa were conducted on April 14, 
2007 at the John and Mary Pappajohn Education Center (JMPEC) which is located in 
downtown Des Moines, Iowa.  Eight total sessions were conducted at 8:30 am, 11:00 am, 
1:30 pm, and 4:00pm (again, two sessions were conducted during each time slot). 
Recruitment goals for CSSM were 196 total participants (190 participants 
completed the experimental sessions, six individuals short of the recruitment goal).  To 
recruit participants, CSSM purchased telephone samples for Iowa and Pennsylvania from 
Survey Sampling, International.  A total of 2,500 phone numbers were purchased in each 
state.  The sample for Pennsylvania was drawn from a frame consisting of census tracts 
within a six mile radius of the experiment location.  The sample for Iowa was drawn from 
a frame consisting of census tracts within a three mile radius of the experiment location.  
                                                 
5 Some of the details on participant recruitment provided in this section are adapted from 
a final report provided to the author by Jan Larson of CSSM who managed the project’s 
recruitment.  
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Both frames were comprised of approximately 18,000-19,000 phone numbers.  Tables 
2.1 and 2.2 provide details for frames and samples in Pennsylvania and Iowa.   
 
Table 2.1 Pennsylvania Frame and Sample 
Census Tract County FIPS Frame Size Sample % Sample Size 
023700 42043 303 1.6% 39 
023800 42043 858 4.5% 112 
023900 42043 1038 5.4% 136 
023600 42043 2067 10.8% 269 
023500 42043 654 3.4% 85 
024001 42043 1426 7.4% 186 
020921 42133 839 4.4% 109 
023400 42043 352 1.8% 46 
022800 42043 1148 6.0% 150 
020220 42133 630 3.3% 82 
024103 42043 2941 15.3% 383 
024400 42043 1239 6.4% 161 
022700 42043 1974 10.3% 258 
022900 42043 1528 8.0% 199 
020910 42133 935 4.9% 122 
023300 42043 743 3.9% 97 
023000 42043 507 2.6% 66 
     
TOTAL  19,182  2,500 
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Table 2.2 Iowa Frame and Sample 
Census Tract County FIPS Frame Size Sample % Sample Size 
005100 19153 468 2.6% 65 
002700 19153 390 2.2% 54 
002600 19153 211 1.2% 29 
005000 19153 423 2.3% 59 
004200 19153 384 2.1% 53 
001200 19153 461 2.6% 64 
004900 19153 337 1.9% 47 
002900 19153 929 5.2% 129 
003200 19153 710 3.9% 99 
004800 19153 417 2.3% 58 
002800 19153 629 3.5% 87 
001100 19153 398 2.2% 55 
005200 19153 475 2.6% 66 
004300 19153 1334 7.4% 185 
004100 19153 780 4.3% 108 
001000 19153 840 4.7% 117 
001700 19153 425 2.4% 59 
004400 19153 712 4.0% 99 
001500 19153 552 3.1% 76 
004001 19153 537 3.0% 75 
000701 19153 432 2.4% 60 
003100 19153 407 2.3% 56 
004002 19153 743 4.1% 104 
000500 19153 864 4.8% 120 
000902 19153 742 4.1% 103 
004502 19153 582 3.2% 80 
000300 19153 692 3.8% 96 
003001 19153 518 2.9% 72 
003002 19153 815 4.5% 113 
000703 19153 804 4.5% 112 
     
TOTAL  18,011  2,500 
 
Telephone interviewing staff were trained in the project protocols by CSSM 
professional staff and utilized a fixed recruitment script.  There are two important aspects 
of the phone recruitment protocol/script to note.  First, to avoid potential 
recruitment/participation bias and to ensure that participants were not affected by 
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possible pre-experiment information, during phone interviews recruiters did not provide 
any specific details regarding the nature of the project.  Potential participants were only 
informed that it was a project on consumer attitudes towards common household products 
being conducted by Iowa State University and Pennsylvania State University.  Second, 
while two individuals from the same household were permitted to attend the experiments, 
they were required to attend during the same experiment time slot and were assigned to 
different session rooms.  This ensured that no potentially biasing information could be 
passed between household members.  Details on recruitment telephone number attempts 
and dispositions are presented in table 2.3.   
 
Table 2.3 Telephone Numbers Attempts and Dispositions 
 Pennsylvania  Iowa 
Answering Machine. 860 36.60% 622 36.80% 
No Answer 131 5.60% 120 7.10% 
Not in Service 130 5.50% 152 9.00% 
Agree 63 2.70% 85 5.00% 
Refuse 873 37.10% 390 23.10% 
Not 18-65 125 5.30% 162 9.60% 
No adult home 72 3.10% 62 3.70% 
Busy 73 3.10% 55 3.30% 
Business/Fax/Other Non-HH 20 0.90% 19 1.10% 
No English 5 0.20% 22 1.30% 
  
TOTAL 2352 100.00% 1689 100.00% 
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2.3 Steps in the Experiment 
 In this section the steps of the experiments are described.  The full packet of 
questions and information treatments provided to participants is reproduced in the 
dissertation appendix.6
 
Auction Step I 
Upon arrival at the experiment site,7 participants were alternately assigned to one 
of two concurrent sessions, and relatives were assigned to different sessions; each session 
consisted of 9-17 individuals and lasted approximately 90 minutes.  They were asked to 
sign a consent form and were paid $45 dollars for their participation.  Next, they were 
asked to complete a short questionnaire soliciting socio-demo-economic information and 
to answer a few questions about agricultural technologies.   
 
Auction Step II 
Participants were informed by the session leader that they would be engaging in 
an auction of food products.  They were told that the auction would consist of four rounds 
                                                 
6 The experimental packet presented in the dissertation appendix was used in the Iowa 
experiments.  The packet is identical to that used in the Pennsylvania experiments with 
one exception.  Three additional questions (questions 25, 26, and 27) were added to the 
post-experiment questionnaire in the Iowa experiments only.  These three questions, 
which are further explored in chapter 7 of the dissertation, were inserted at the very end 
of the experiment questionnaire and would not have affected the preceding components 
of the experiment. 
7 Many experimental studies are now being conducted in settings that are more familiar to 
consumers (e.g., Lusk, Pruitt, and Norwood, 2006; Monchuck et al., 2007).  We also 
considered the possibility of using an intercept sample in a grocery store in a "framed 
field experiment" (Harrison and List, 2004), but the length of the experiment prohibited 
that option. 
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of bidding, but only one round would be binding and it would be randomly chosen after 
all bids were submitted.  This accomplishes two things.  First, it reduces participants’ 
concerns about exceeding their resources (the $45 dollars plus any cash they brought with 
them to the experiment).  Second, it fixes the idea that they are bidding on only one unit 
of each of the auctioned commodities despite multiple bidding rounds.  This eliminates 
potential demand effects associated with multiple purchases. 
 
Auction Step III 
Participants were provided with instructions and examples about the auction 
method utilized in the study: the nth-price auction (Shogren et al., 2001, Huffman et al., 
2007).  In this type of auction, all individuals who bid higher than the randomly selected 
"nth-price" win the auction and pay the nth-price for the commodity.  For example, 
suppose that there are k bidders.  Following the submission of bids, the session leader 
draws the “random n” from a uniform distribution between 2 and k.  The “nth-price” 
would be the nth highest bid.  The n-1 individuals who submitted bids greater than the 
nth-price would win the auction and each would pay the nth-price for one unit of the 
auctioned commodity.    
The nth-price auction has a key advantage over the more common Vickrey sealed 
bid second-price auction mechanism (Vickrey, 1962) in that it has been shown to better 
engage off-margin (i.e., low-value) bidders.  Insincere bidding by low-value individuals 
may occur in Vickrey auctions because the consumer may perceive no realistic 
probability of winning the auction.  Hence, low value-bidders may perceive that they can 
freely alter their bid away from their true private value without repercussion (see Miller 
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and Plott, 1985; Franciosi et al., 1993).  By combining elements of the Vickrey auction 
and the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (1964) random pricing mechanism,8 the nth-price 
auction incorporates a random endogenously determined market clearing price.  This 
feature of the nth-price mechanism has the advantage of yielding all participants 
(including off-margin bidders) a positive probability of winning the auction while 
maintaining the dominant strategy of bidding one’s private value. 
 
Auction Step IV 
Participants engaged in a practice two round nth-price auction with candy, pens, 
and pencils to gain experience with the nth-price auction.  After completion of the 
practice auction, any final questions regarding the mechanism were answered. 
 
Auction Step V 
Participants were randomly provided one of five information treatments.  The 
information treatments included: 9  
1)  No Information - as a control group. 
2) Industry (Pro-Biotech) Perspective - a collection of mainly positive or 
optimistic statements and information on GM provided by a group of leading 
biotechnology companies. 
                                                 
8 The Becker-Degroot-Marshak (1964) mechanism is also demand revealing, but the 
random nth-price auction has been shown to be more accurate at revealing preferences in 
experiments, potentially due to the endogenous clearing price (e.g., Lusk and Rousu, 
2007). 
9 Throughout this dissertation, the following terms will be used synonymously to refer to 
types of information: 1) industry, positive, and pro-biotech, 2) environmental, negative, 
and anti-biotech, and 3) verifiable, independent, and 3rd party. 
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3) Environmental (Anti-Biotech) Perspective - a collection of mainly negative 
statements and information on GM from leading environmental groups. 
4) Industry and Environmental Perspectives - information statements 2 and 3. 
5) Industry, Environmental, and Third-Party (Verifiable Information) 
Perspectives - this included statements 2 and 3 as well as an objective statement 
on GM approved by a third-party group consisting of a variety of individuals 
knowledgeable about GM foods, including scientists, professionals, religious 
leaders, and academics, none of whom has a financial stake in GM foods. 
 
To ensure that the volume of information contained in the perspectives on GMOs was not 
overwhelming to participants, each perspective was limited to one 8 1/2”x11” sheet of 
paper and organized under five common headings: General Information, Scientific 
Impact, Human Impact, Financial Impact, and Environmental Impact.  For information 
treatments consisting of more than one perspective, the order in which the pro-biotech 
and anti-biotech perspectives were presented was randomized.  The verifiable perspective 
was always presented last.  Reproductions of the information treatments provided to 
auction participants are provided in the dissertation appendix. 
 
Auction Steps VI-IX 
Each participant engaged in an auction consisting of four rounds of bidding.  In 
each round, participants were asked to place bids on three dissimilar fresh products: one 
pound of broccoli, one pound of beefsteak tomatoes, and five pounds of russet potatoes.  
Three products were chosen to provide some variety and increase the proportion of useful 
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information, i.e., non-zero bids. We judged that most participants would be willing to 
post a positive bid for at least two of the three products.  
Products were presented in plain packaging similar to how they are found in a 
grocery store, and a simple label was affixed.  In each bidding round, the three 
commodities with labels were revealed on a table in the front of the lab.  In half of the 
sessions (3 in Harrisburg and 4 in Des Moines), the four food labels (one in each round) 
were: GM Free, Intragenic GM, Transgenic GM, and Plain Label.10  See figure 2.1 for 
examples of these labels.  In the other half of the sessions (seven total), the first three 
rounds of the auction11 had products with food labels of either GM, Intragenic GM, or 
Transgenic GM, but they also presented additional information: "Enhanced levels of 
Antioxidants and Vitamin C".  See figure 2.2 for examples of these labels.   
 
Figure 2.1 Examples of Auction Food Labels for Products Without 
Enhanced Consumer Attributes 
 
Russet Potatoes (5 lb.)  Russet Potatoes (5 lb.) 
   
  GM Free Product 
   
Russet Potatoes (5 lb.)  Russet Potatoes (5 lb.) 
   
Intragenic GM Product  Transgenic GM Product 
 
                                                 
10 For each of the labels, the name of the product (e.g. Russet Potatoes) and the product 
weight was listed.  The phrase "Plain label" is used to describe a label that only contains 
this information without any description of genetic modification that may or may not be 
present. 
11 The label treatment in the fourth round of these sessions was a plain label product. This 
alternative always appeared in the fourth round of the auction and does not affect bids in 
the earlier three rounds.  Bidding data for this fourth bidding round is not used in this 
dissertation. 
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Figure 2.2 Examples of Auction Food Labels for Products With Enhanced 
Consumer Attributes  
 
Russet Potatoes (5 lb.) Russet Potatoes (5 lb.) Russet Potatoes (5 lb.) 
   
Enhanced levels of Enhanced levels of Enhanced levels of 
Antioxidants and Vitamin C Antioxidants and Vitamin C Antioxidants and Vitamin C
   
GM Product Intragenic GM Product Transgenic GM Product 
 
All three products within a round of bidding had the same food label, and the 
order in which labels were presented was randomized across sessions. After a set of 
experimental products was revealed, participants were asked to come to the front of the 
room and view the products before writing down their three bids. These bids were then 
collected by the session monitor before proceeding to the next round of bidding. 
 
Auction Step X 
After completion of all bidding rounds, the binding round was drawn, bids were 
posted and ranked on a whiteboard in the front of the lab (no bids were posted prior to 
this point), the random n was drawn to determine the clearing price, and winners were 
identified.  Participants completed a short exit questionnaire.  Winners were told to go to 
an adjacent room to complete their purchases, exchanging money for goods.12  Non-
winners were told that they had completed the project and were free to leave.  
  
                                                 
12 Given the incomplete regulatory status of the intragenic foods, we were unable to 
obtain the product-enhanced GM fresh vegetables to deliver to winners.  As an 
alternative, winners were given plain-labeled food products, which is similar to 
procedures followed by others in similar circumstances, e.g., Alfnes and Rickertsen 
(2003) and Tonsor et al. (2005).  Reception to the experiments was positive, and no 
complaints from participants were received. 
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2.4 Auction Participant Questionnaire Responses 
 The pre- and post-auction questionnaires completed during the experimental 
sessions solicited socio-econo-demographic information from the participants in addition 
to measures of participants’ attitudes towards genetic modification.  A summary of 
responses is provided in table 2.4.  The sample is 68% female, the mean age is 44 years, 
mean education is 14.5 years, and mean household income is $51,000.   
Only 11% of the participants consider themselves well or extremely well 
informed about GM while over 50% of the sample consider themselves not very or not at 
all informed about GM.  Only 17% report an opinion of GM that is supportive or strongly 
supportive while 23% report an opinion of GM that is in opposition or strongly in 
opposition.  Responses to these two questions reflect the general division over genetic 
modification and the great deal of uncertainty among consumers over the benefits and 
risks of these products despite more than a decade of GM cultivation. 
While consumers may be divided and uncertain about GM, 63% did report that 
they often or always read food labels.  This underscores the importance and potential 
impact of food labeling policies on demand for GM foods.  Regarding lifestyle indicators, 
23% report that they smoke, and 51% report exercising regularly.  On a 1 to 10 scale, 
self-assessed healthiness of their diet receives a mean score of 6.7, and for self assessed 
physical health, the mean is 7.2.  
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Table 2.4 Summary Statistics for Auction Participants (N=190) 
Variable Variable Definition Mean Stdev
Gender 1 if female 0.68 0.47
Age Participant's age 44.33 15.80
Income Household income (in 1000s) 51.09 35.23
Education Years of schooling completed 14.47 2.26
Married 1 if married 0.53 0.50
Household Number of people in household 2.74 1.41
Race 1 if participant is white 0.85 0.36
Informed 1 if well or extremely well informed about GM 0.11 0.31
Opinion 1 if opinion towards GM is supportive 0.17 0.38
Read_Labels 1 if often or always read food labels 0.63 0.48
Envi_Mem 1 if member of environmental group 0.04 0.20
Farm 1 if previously/currently engaged in farming 0.04 0.21
Smoke 1 if smoke 0.23 0.42
Exercise 1 if exercise regularly 0.51 0.51
Health_Diet Self assessed healthiness of diet (1-10 scale) 6.73 1.61
Health_Phys Self assessed physical health (1-10 scale) 7.16 1.69
 
2.4.1 Who Do Consumers Trust for Information about Food 
 Since the emergence of genetically modified foods in world markets, information 
campaigns by interested parties have played a role in shaping consumer perceptions about 
the safety and health impacts of GM foods.  Ultimately, through its impact on public 
perceptions, information has influenced GM regulatory decisions internationally.  The 
predominant sources of information about food safety and healthiness, particularly with 
regards to GM, fall into three major categories: biotechnology companies, environmental 
groups, and government organizations.  Groups in each of these general categories have 
disseminated differing perspectives and information on GM into the public domain.  To 
assess who consumers trust for food information, part of the survey instrument completed 
by the 190 participants in the experiments asked respondents to rank different sources of 
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information  based upon who they most trust to provide information about (a) food safety 
and (b) the healthiness of food.  The questions are reproduced below.13
Please rank the following three organizations in order of who you trust most to 
provide information regarding food safety (1 = Most trusted, 3 = Least trusted).  
Please use each number (1, 2, and 3) only once. 
  ____  Leading Environmental groups (ex. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) 
  ____  Leading Biotechnology Companies (ex. Monsanto and Syngenta) 
  ____  Government organizations (ex. USDA and FDA) 
 
Please rank the following three organizations in order of who you trust most to 
provide information regarding the healthiness of food (1 = Most trusted, 3 = Least 
trusted).  Please use each number (1, 2, and 3) only once. 
  ____  Leading Environmental groups (ex. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) 
  ____  Leading Biotechnology Companies (ex. Monsanto and Syngenta) 
  ____  Government organizations (ex. USDA and FDA) 
 
 Survey respondents were largely split between environmental groups and 
government organizations as their most trusted source for providing information about 
food safety (48% and 43% respectively).  Only 9% stated that their most trusted source 
for food safety information is biotechnology companies.  Mirroring these responses, 
respondents overwhelming listed biotechnologies as their least trusted source for food 
safety information (58%) and where divided between environmental groups and 
government organizations (18% and 24% respectively).   
 Rankings of sources for information about the healthiness of food largely match 
the rankings for food safety information.  Government organizations were the most 
trusted source (46%), followed by environmental groups (45%), and then biotechnology 
companies (9%).   
                                                 
13 The order in which these two questions were presented was randomized across surveys.  
As well, the order of the three ranking options was also randomized across surveys. 
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 To assess the individual-specific factors that influence respondents’ choice of 
most trusted information source, a multinomial logit model is estimated.14  The 
multinomial logit model can be derived fundamentally from a random (indirect) utility 
model (RUM) framework.  The utility individual i derives from alternative j is given by 
(1) ij JjxU ijij ,...,2,1,' =+= εβ , 
where ijε  is assumed to be iid extreme value.  The individual chooses the alternative j 
that yields the greatest utility.  Defining this choice as 
(2) 
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 Table 2.5 presents estimates of the model for both the food safety and food 
 
14 Given that there is no variation in attributes across the choice alternatives the full 
information contained in the rankings cannot econometrically be exploited via alternative 
estimation methods (e.g., a ranked logit). 
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to two questions that asked respondents (a) how informed they are about genetic 
modification and (b) their opinion towards genetic modification. 
 
Table 2.5 Estimates for Multinomial Logit Models of Who Consumers 
Trust Most for Food Information (N=190 per model) 
 
 Food Safety Model Food Health Model
Variable Envi Bio Envi Bio 
Age 0.011 0.035 0.009 0.011 
 (.011) (.024) (.011) (.018) 
Gender 0.345 -0.702 0.513 -0.357 
 (.37) (.653) (.377) (.56) 
Income -0.004 0.135 -0.001 -0.014 
 (.054) (.119) (.055) (.089) 
Education 0.113 0.307 0.071 0.205 
 (.12) (.233) (.122) (.196) 
Health Diet 0.064 -0.002 0.049 -0.272 
 (.107) (.22) (.11) (.176) 
Informed 1a -1.084* -1.018 -1.115* 0.929 
 (.579) (.974) (.587) (.81) 
Informed 2b -0.468 -1.061 -0.542 -0.181 
 (.381) (.694) (.381) (.646) 
Opinion 1c -0.398 -0.554 -0.337 -0.893 
 (.514) (.848) (.536) (.789) 
Opinion 2d 1.027** -0.680 1.085** -0.181 
 (.435) (1.141) (.437) (.853) 
Constant -1.543 -1.796 -1.684 -0.252 
 (1.108) (1.093) (1.134) (1.685) 
   
Log-likelihood -158.48 -149.04 
LR Statistic 26.19 31.70 
p-value 0.095 0.024 
a Denotes a response of being well or extremely well informed about GM 
b Denotes a response of being not very or not at all informed about GM 
c Denotes a response of being supportive or strongly supportive of GM 
d Denotes a response of being opposed or strongly opposed to GM 
(*), (**), and (***) denote variable significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
  
While both models are statistically significant at the 10% level, few explanatory 
variables are individually significant.  None of the explanatory variables are able to 
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significantly explain why some individuals have greater odds of trusting biotechnology 
companies over government organizations.  As well, across all of the models and choice 
alternatives, none of the socio-demographic variables offer any statistically significant 
explanation for choices.  However, for both models (food safety and food health 
information), individuals who consider themselves well or extremely well informed about 
genetic modification have a greater odds of trusting government organizations over 
environmental groups for food information.  In contrast, individuals who oppose or 
strongly oppose genetic modification have a much greater odds of trusting environmental 
groups over government organizations.   
 
2.4.2 Prior Opinions and Knowledge about Genetic Modification 
 Despite more than a decade of experience with genetically modified foods and a 
wealth of publicly injected information about the benefits and hazards of GMOs, 
consumer confusion about GM still persists.  Two questions were included in the survey 
instrument to assess how knowledgeable individuals consider themselves about GM and 
their opinion towards GM. 
Regarding genetically modified foods, how informed do you consider yourself? 
  1 = Extremely well informed 
  2 = Well informed 
  3 = Somewhat informed 
  4 = Not very informed 
  5 = Not informed at all 
 
Which statement best describes your opinion towards genetically modified food? 
  1 = Strongly support 
  2 = Support 
  3 = Neutral 
  4 = Oppose 
  5 = Strongly oppose 
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Among the 190 survey respondents, only 11% consider themselves well or extremely 
well informed about GM.  More individuals stated that they were not informed at all 
about GM (15%).  As well, only 40% of respondents stated that they have a non-neutral 
opinion towards GM (17% supportive, 23% opposed, and 60% neutral).  In this section 
we analyze survey responses to assess the impact of individual-specific factors affecting 
opinions towards and knowledge of GM.  To account for the ordinal nature of response 
alternatives, ordered probit models are estimated.  
The ordinal probit model can be motivated via a latent variable specification.  Define 
the latent variable  as *iy
(1) * iii xy εβ += ' . 
An individual’s response of category k is observed if the underlying latent continuous 
response occurs in the k-th interval where 
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and ,, 321 µµµ  denote unobserved threshold parameters.  Assuming that the unobserved 
component of the latent variable is normally distributed, )1,0(~ Niε , it follows that the 
probabilities for each observed ordinal response is 
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An ordered probit model was esti te
ns.  To facilitate interpretation of coefficients, responses were ordere
ng manner:  
Response  Opinion Question  Informed Question 
0   Strongly Opposed  Not Inf
1  Opposed   Not Ve
2  Neutral   Somewhat Informed 
3  Support   Well Informed 
4  Strongly Support  Extremely Well Informed 
Coefficient estimates for both models are presented in table 2.6.  Marginal effects and 
predicted probabilities are presented in tables 2.7 and 2.8.   
First, concentrating on the model of respondents’ opinion of genetic modification, 
we see that, as would be expected, individuals who are members of environmental groups 
have a significantly higher probability of being opposed to GM.  As well, individuals 
who consider themselves poorly informe
p
w
interesting result providing some evidence that in the absence of know
egative outlook on GMOs. 
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Table 2.6 Es  for O  Prob els of Consumers’ 
O nd Kn e of G 190 p el) 
 
on of G
timates rdered it Mod
pinion a owledg M (N= er mod
Model Opini M Knowledge of GM
 Coef S  S  
-0.004 0.006 
td. Err. Coef td. Err.
Age -0.002 0.006 
Gender 0.000 0.192 0.284 83 
- -0.012 0.027 
- 21 63 
t 37** 57 
ead Labels 0.077 0.089 0.122 0.085 
 - ** 
Farm -  
Informed 1a -0.595** 0.290 
Informed 2b
pinion 1c - - -1.013*** 0.238 
- - -0.133 6 
    
2.144 0.804 0.254 0.768 
0.1
Income 0.031 0.028 
Education 0.0 0.0 0.071 0.060 
Health Die 0.1 0.0 0.021 0.054 
R
Envi_Mem 0.393* 0.118 0.017 0.111 
0.246 0.217 0.368* 0.208 
- - 
0.287 0.194 - - 
O
Opinion 2d 0.21
 
 Constant
1µ  0.675 0.149 0.410 0.117 
2µ  2.727 0.205 1.522 0.164 
3µ  3.659 0.249 2.807 0.195 
og-likelihood -182.75 -228.93 
LR Statistic 30.27 32.12 
-value 0.001 0.001 
   
L
p
a Denotes a response of being well or extremely well informed about GM 
notes a response of being not very or not at all informed about GM 
 Denotes a response of being supportive or strongly supportive of GM 
enotes a response of being opposed or strongly opposed to GM 
), (**), and (***) denote variable significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
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Table 2.7 Marginal s and cted Probabilities for Ordered Probit  
Model of mer ion of
 
evel Not Not Som Extremely 
 Effect  Predi
 Consu s’ Opin  GM 
Informed L at All  Very ewhat Well 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gender 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Income 0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.006 -
ducation 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.004 -0.001
- - -
-0.074 -0.028
arm 0.020 0.033 0.011 -0.046 -0.017
a
b
  
0.002
E
Health Diet 0.011 0.018 0.006 0.026 0.010
Read Labels -0.006 -0.010 -0.004 0.015 0.005
Envi_Mem 0.031 0.052 0.018
F
Informed 1 0.070 0.088 -0.035 -0.094 -0.028
Informed 2 0.053 0.020-0.024 -0.039 -0.011
Predicted Pr. 0.036 0.095 0.693 0.145 0.031
a Denotes a response of x l i  GM
tes a response of being y or not formed M
Margina ts an icted Probabilities for Ordered Probit  
Model o mer ledge of GM 
 
evel Not No Som Extr
being well or e tremely wel nformed about  
b Deno not ver  at all in  about G  
 
 
Table 2.8 l Effec d Pred
f Consu s’ Know
Informed L  at All t Very ewhat Well emely 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.001 - -0.001 0.001
Gender - - -
ducation -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 0.013 0.015 
- - -
0.023 0.025 
0.003 0.004 
arm -0.037 -0.030 -0.078 0.069 0.076 
Opinio c
Opinio
0.028 0.023 0.061 0.053 0.059 
Income 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
E
Health Diet 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Read Labels -0.012 -0.010 -0.026
E
F
nvi_Mem -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
n 1 0.175 0.091 0.114 -0.241 -0.139 
n 2d 0.014 0.011 0.027 -0.026 -0.026 
  
Predicted Pr. 0.048 0.057 0.339 0.430 0.126 
c
 
For the model of respondents perceived level of knowledge about GM, two 
similar results are found.  Individuals who are engaged in occupations related to farming 
have a significantly higher probability of considering themselves highly informed about 
 Denotes a response of being supportive or strongly supportive of GM 
d Denotes a response of being opposed or strongly opposed to GM 
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genetic modification.  As well, mirroring the result found in the previous model, 
individuals who have largely negative opinions of GM are more likely to consider 
themselves less informed about GM.  This again reinforces the proposition that 
biotechnology companies have an opportunity to sway public opinion by raising 
consumer awareness of GM and reducing the still prevalent uncertainty about the 
technology.
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CHAPTER 3: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF BID PRICES 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter we present a first look and analysis of the bid price data obtained 
through the experimental auctions.  Unconditional analysis of consumers’ willingness to 
pay reveals several key results.  We find that informed consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for intragenic fresh vegetables when compared to otherwise equivalent 
transgenic alternatives.  As well, we find that consumers are willing to pay a premium for 
intragenic fresh vegetables with enhanced nutrition over conventional plain labeled 
alternatives.  This is perhaps the most critical finding of real-world importance in that it 
indicates that intragenic foods with attributes of direct value to consumers such as 
enhanced nutritional content have the potential to find acceptance among consumers and 
offer a viable alternative in the market place to conventional products.  Yet, as is 
abundantly clear in the subsequent presentation, information has a significant impact on 
relative bid prices.  The bidding data indicates that in a conflicted information setting 
consumers may not consider that the additional benefit of enhanced nutrition sufficiently 
outweighs the perceived detractors of genetic modification. 
It is important to note that while the unconditional analysis of relative bid prices 
presented in this chapter is suggestive of the potential for intragenic foods, the simple 
analytic methods employed in this chapter do not control for individual-specific attributes 
or the methodological features of the experiments.  In chapter 4, conditional analysis via 
an econometric model that controls for these potentially confounding features is 
presented reaffirming the conclusions drawn in this chapter. 
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3.2 Summary of Bid Prices 
In tables 3.1 and 3.2 participants’ bids from the experimental auctions are 
summarized.  Table 3.1 contains the mean and standard deviation of bids for products 
without product enhanced consumer attributes (PECA) broken down by information 
treatments.  Table 3.2 presents similar results for products with enhanced consumer 
attributes.  To better visualize the distribution of bid prices, figures 3.1 – 3.6 present the 
inverse CDF of bid prices for each of the auctioned commodities (i.e., the graphs show 
the percentage of individuals willing to pay a given price for a particular commodity). 
Comparing across labeling treatments, it can be seen that in general for all 
information treatments the preference rela io Free  t n GM f  LabelPlain  f  
GMTransgenic  holds for products without enhanced attributes, but the relationship 
between the Plain Label and Intragenic GM products is not consistent and varies across 
information treatments.  For products with tes, the preference relation  enhanced attribu
fGMIntragenic  GMTransgenic  in general holds, but the relationship between GM 
and Intragenic GM fluctuates across information treatments.  The absence of a consistent 
pattern in the relative willingness to pay between the Plain Label and Intragenic products 
without enhanced attributes and the GM and Intragenic GM products with enhanced 
attributes across the different information treatments is to be expected given the 
dichotomous views contained in these perspectives.  The following section and chapter 4 
will further explore the preference relations between the different labeling treatments for 
roducts with and without enhanced nutrition. p
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Table 3 d Prices for F nhanced Con tes  
Broccoli (1 lb.) Tomato (1 lb.) Potato (5 lb.) 
.1 Mean Bi oods Without E sumer Attribu
Plain GMF Intra Trans P s Plain GMF Intra Translain GMF Intra Tran
 
All Treatments (N=92) 
1.28 1.46 1.42 1.20 1.38 1.52 1.36 1.18 2.16 2.34 2.16 2.00 
(0.76) (0.77) (0.86) (0.78) (0 7) (1.16) (1.16) (1.23) (1.22)
 
n
1.38 1.69 1.54 1.37 1.39 1.47 1.35 1.25 1.99 2.36 2.03 2.07 
.98) (0.91) (0.97) (0.8
No I formation (N=17) 
(0.61) (0.82) (0.70) (0 4) (1.05) (0.79) (0.88)
 
 a 2
1.30 1.37 1.74 1.24 1.49 1.46 1.62 1.29 2.33 2.33 2.54 2.21 
.66) (1.08) (1.04) (0.88) (0.83) (0.8
Pro-biotech Inform tion only (N= 0) 
(0.90) (0.71) (0.83) (0 2) (1.15) (0.99) (1.23)
 
- n
1.21 1.60 1.07 1.14 1.24 1.67 0.95 0.98 2.19 2.71 1.84 1.81 
.83) (1.16) (0.88) (1.01) (1.06) (1.2
Anti biotech Information o ly (N=17) 
(0.72) (0.73) (0.8 .96) (1.20) (1.13)
 
c
1.45 1.58 1.56 1.22 1.48 1.73 1.60 1.25 2.34 2.43 2.45 2.18 
3) (0.84) (0.93) (0.97) (0.81) (0.74) (0.85) (0
Pro-biote h & Anti-biotech Information (N=21) 
(0.79) (0.76 1.42) (1.22)
 
1.03 1.07 1.08 1.03 1.23 1.22 1.19 1.09 1.86 1.86 1.83 1.66 
) (0.99) (0.76) (0.86) (0.87) (1.11) (0.83) (1.19) (1.14) (
Pro-biotech, Anti-biotech, and Verifiable Information (N=17) 
(0.73) (0.76) (0.78) (0.84) (0.93) (0.82) (0.87) (0.88) (1.56) (1.42) (1.51) (1.59)
            
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis 
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Table 3.2 Mean Bid Prices for Foods With Enhanced Consumer Attributes 
Broccoli (1 lb.) Tomato (1 lb.) Potato (5 lb.) 
GM Intra Trans GM Intra Trans GM Intra Trans 
 
All Treatments (N=98) 
1.51 1.67 1.45 1.42 1.76 1.41 2.45 2.61 2.27 
(1.01) (1.14) (1.01) (0.86) (1.26) (0.97) (1.76) (1.84) (1.96) 
 
No Information (N=20) 
1.91 1.86 1.83 1.65 1.95 1.73 3.18 3.20 3.23 
(1.54) (1.16) (1.28) (1.23) (1.34) (1.32) (3.06) (2.73) (3.40) 
 
Pro-biotech Information only (N=18) 
1.63 2.52 1.79 1.81 2.64 1.90 2.73 3.49 2.65 
(0.65) (1.20) (0.68) (0.70) (0.94) (0.68) (1.00) (1.89) (1.35) 
 
Anti-biotech Information only (N=18) 
1.25 1.07 1.06 1.23 1.10 0.98 2.12 1.92 1.71 
(0.82) (0.89) (0.89) (0.69) (0.66) (0.63) (1.46) (1.34) (1.37) 
 
Pro-biotech & Anti-biotech Information (N=20) 
1.67 1.84 1.63 1.36 1.74 1.43 2.54 2.64 2.34 
(0.87) (1.15) (1.04) (0.67) (1.32) (1.04) (1.14) (1.45) (1.24) 
 
Pro-biotech, Anti-biotech, and Verifiable Information (N=22) 
1.10 1.16 0.97 1.11 1.44 1.05 1.74 1.90 1.48 
(0.77) (0.70) (0.74) (0.75) (1.38) (0.72) (0.98) (0.87) (0.97) 
         
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis  
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Figure 3.1 Inverse CDF of Bid Prices for Broccoli Without PECA 
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Figure 3.2 Inverse CDF of Bid Prices for Tomato Without PECA 
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Figure 3.3 Inverse CDF of Bid Prices for Potato Without PECA 
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Figure 3.4 Inverse CDF of Bid Prices for Broccoli With PECA 
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Figure 3.5 Inverse CDF of Bid Prices for Tomato With PECA 
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Figure 3.6 Inverse CDF of Bid Prices for Potato With PECA 
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3.3 Unconditional Analysis of Bid Prices 
Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present differences in mean bid prices across a selection 
of different labels.  Table 3.3 is a comparison between bid prices for GM Free vs. 
Intragenic GM and GM Free vs. Transgenic GM labeled products, all without product 
enhanced consumer attributes (PECA).  Under all information treatments consumers are 
willing to pay a premium for GM Free over Transgenic GM labeled products.  Average 
oli, $0.34 per 
ound of tomatoes, and $0.34 per five pound of potatoes, all statistically different from 
i i  w o y F  I c GM 
products n g sma r e e ative  un e pro-
hnology tre   l n  s, ium 
5 und ccol 18 atoes, but are not 
statistically different from zero. Participants receiving anti-biotech information are 
willing
 
premiums across all information treatments are $0.26 per pound of brocc
p
zero.  The prem ums partic pants are illing t pa  for GM ree over ntrageni
labeled  are i eneral ller, o v n neg  (e.g., der th
biotec atment). Averaging across al i formation treatment  the prem
ranges from $0.0  per po  of bro i to $0. per five pounds of pot
 to pay the greatest premium for GM Free labeled products.   
 
Table 3.3 Difference in Mean Bid Prices for Foods Without PECA 
 GM Free w/o PECA GM Free w/o PECA 
 vs. Intragenic w/o PECA vs. Transgenic w/o PECA 
Info Treatment Broccoli Tomato Potato  Broccoli Tomato Potato 
ALL $0.05 $0.15 $0.18  $0.26** $0.34** $0.34** 
No info $0.15 $0.12 $0.33  $0.32 $0.22 $0.29 
Anti $0
Pro $-0.36 $-0.16 $-0.21  $0.13 $0.17 $0.13 
.53** $0.72** $0.87**  $0.46** $0.69** $0.90** 
Pro & Anti $0.01 $0.13 $-0.01  $0.36 $0.49* $0.25 
Pro,Anti,& Ver $-0.01 $0.02 $0.03  $0.03 $0.13 $0.20 
(*) and (**)  denote variable significant at 10% and 5% respectively 
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The first part of table 3.4 compares average bid prices for Intragenic GM labeled 
products with and without PECA.  Across all three commodities the differences are 
positive—consumers value enhanced antioxidants and vitamin C.  Pooling all 
information treatments, the mean WTP differences are positive, significantly different 
from zero, and range from $0.26 per pound of broccoli to $0.45 per five pounds of potato.  
are nti-
iotech treatment.  
n  p ev e e iff in bid 
r Transge  lab odu an   PE ere the differences 
aller and i se biot orm ti the pro, anti and third-party 
m he d es a tly e ut ificantly different 
from zero.  Combined, these results show that consumers do value enhanced nutrition in 
fresh v
 
Premiums  the greatest under the pro-biotech treatment and least under the a
b
The seco d part of table 3.4 rovides id nce on th  mean d erence 
prices fo nic GM eled pr cts with d without CA.  H
are sm n the ca of anti- ech inf a on and 
information treat ents, t ifferenc re sligh  n gative b not sign
egetables, but are willing to pay a greater premium when these traits are obtained 
through intragenics instead of transgenics. 
 
Table 3.4 Difference in Mean Bid Prices for Foods With and Without PECA 
 Intragenic w/ PECA Transgenic w/ PECA 
 vs. Intragenic w/o PECA vs. Transgenic w/o PECA 
tment Broccoli Tomato Potato  Broccoli Tomato Potato Info Trea
ALL $0.26* $0.40** $0.45**  $0.25* $0.23* $0.27 
No info
Pro $0.78** $1.02** $0.95*  $0.55** $0.61** $0.44 
Pro & Anti $0.27 $0.14 $0.19  $0.41 $0.18 $0.16 
 $0.32 $0.60 $1.17*  $0.46 $0.48 $1.16 
Anti $0.00 $0.14 $0.08  $-0.08 $-0.01 $-0.10 
Pro,Anti,& Ver $0.09 $0.25 $0.06  $-0.06 $-0.04 $-0.18 
(*) and (**)  denote variable significant at 10% and 5% respectively 
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Finally, the first part of table 3.5 compares average bid prices for Intragenic GM 
labeled products with PECA versus Plain Label products without PECA.  Across all 
information treatments, except for the anti-biotechnology perspective, consumers are 
pay  
verage values ranging from $0.38 per pound of tomato to $0.45 per five pounds of 
otato.  
The secon  t is een eni labeled 
ucts with PE  P l w t A the des of 
ces a ller, nifi dif r m z  n  in the 
able-information.  Hence, table 
3.5 provides additional evidence on the positive value placed by consumers on nutrition 
derived through intragenics. 
 
for Foods With PECA and Plain Label 
willing to  a premium for the Intragenic GM labeled products with PECA with
a
p
d part of able 3.5  a comparison betw  Transg c GM 
prod CA versus lain Labe  products i hout PEC .  Here magnitu
the differen re sma  not sig cantly fe ent fro ero, and egative
conflicted information setting with anti-, pro-, and verifi
Table 3.5 Difference in Mean Bid Prices 
Foods Without PECA 
 
 Intragenic w/ PECA  Transgenic w/ PECA 
 vs. Plain Label w/o PECA vs. Plain Label w/o PECA 
Info Treatment Broccoli Tomato Potato  Broccoli Tomato Potato 
ALL $0.39** $0.38** $0.45**  $0.17 $0.03 $0.11 
No info $0.48 $0.56 $1.21*  $0.45 $0.34 $1.24 
Anti $-0.14 $-0.14 $-0.27  $-0.15 $-0.26 $-0.48 
Pro,Anti,& Ver $0.13 $0.21 $0.04  $-0.06 $-0.18 $-0.38 
Pro $1.22** $1.15** $1.16**  $0.49* $0.41 $0.32 
Pro & Anti $0.39 $0.26 $0.30  $0.18 $-0.05 $0.00 
(*) and (**)  denote variable significant at 10% and 5% respectively 
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3.4 A Note on Zero Bids 
 Experimental auctions have become a common mechanism for eliciting 
willingness to pay (WTP) due to their non-hypothetical, incentive compatible, and 
demand revealing nature.  From a practitioner’s perspective, one of the drawbacks of 
experimental auctions for value elicitation is the presence of bids of zero by some 
individuals.  Bids of zero are problematic for two primary reasons.  First, depending upon 
the application, zero bids may simply be unusable because in certain contexts they 
provide no information to the researcher regarding demand, and hence reduce the 
study has addressed the question of whether bids of zero are an artifact of negative latent 
                                                
experiment’s useable sample size.15  Second, zero bids present an additional, but minor, 
hurdle for econometric analysis of auction data.  Since auctions typically restrict bids to 
the non-negative interval, zero bids are typically interpreted as reflecting censoring of 
latent demand by consumers with a negative WTP for the commodity (i.e. these 
consumers would prefer to be net sellers of the commodity and net purchasers of the 
numeraire).  The Tobit model and related variants have been used in the literature for 
econometric analysis of auction bids in order to avoid the well-known bias in estimates 
that arises when censoring is present in the data, but not modeled. 
 While negative WTP for a commodity is consistent with standard demand theory 
and its manifestation as bids censored at zero can be easily managed econometrically, no 
 
15 For example, consider a standard endow-and-upgrade auction where consumers are 
endowed with a product X and asked to bid to upgrade to a superior product X with some 
desirable attribute Y (e.g., upgrade from an apple to an organic apple).  If the consumer 
does not value product X, they may bid zero for the upgrade even though they value the 
attribute Y.  Hence, no preference information for attribute Y is revealed.  This is why 
many studies engage in pre-screening to ensure that consumers value the product X. 
 43
WTP or simply a failure of the auction to engage some consumers in truthfully revealing 
their positive demand.  While this is seemingly an innocuous question, its answer is 
 
e.  Hence, 
ese individuals should likely submit positive bids if the experimental auction 
emand.  Conversely, individuals who do not eat or purchase 
the vegetables at market prices should be more likely, but not necessarily, to have a 
                                                
critical to ensure that researchers are employing the correct regression model for analysis 
of auction data and that the auction mechanism is properly eliciting demand.  If zero bids 
do not represent a censoring problem, but merely a failure of the auction to engage some 
consumers to truthfully reveal their positive WTP, a censored regression model is no 
longer appropriate and will yield biased estimates.  Furthermore, if the “failure to 
engage” is not at random, but systematic along some individual-specific characteristics, a 
two-stage sample selection model would be appropriate. 
This note provides evidence on the consistency of zero bids using bidding data 
from a random sample of adult consumers.  Participants engaged in a multi-round random 
nth-price auction of fresh produce (broccoli, russet potatoes, and beefsteak tomatoes) 
carrying Plain label16 and Genetically Modified (GM) Free labels.  To test whether zero 
and positive bids are consistent with participants’ underlying preferences, several 
additional pieces of information were solicited.  In particular, participants were asked to 
report whether they eat or purchase fresh potatoes, tomatoes, and broccoli.   
We would expect that consumers who historically eat or purchase the vegetables 
have a true WTP for GM Free (and likely Plain label) vegetables that is positiv
th
appropriately elicits their d
 
16 “Plain label” denotes a product that carried a label listing only the product name and 
weight with no reference to GM that may or may not be present. 
 44
negative WTP.  Hence, this set of bidders should be the most likely to submit zero bids if 
the experimental auction properly engages them to truthfully reveal their preferences.  If 
these expectations are not met, this would give rise to the supposition that zero bidders 
are simply unengaged in the auction and not truthfully revealing their demand. 
 
3.4.1 Data and Analysis 
 Fifty-seven individuals submitted bids for the three GM Free vegetables and the 
three Plain label vegetables for a total of 342 bids.  Of the 171 bids for GM Free 
vegetables, 8.8% were zero.  Among those individuals bidding zero, 66.6% reported that 
they do not purchase and eat the commodity regularly.  Among individuals who 
submitted positive bids, only 25% reported the same.  Of the 171 bids for Plain label 
vegetables, 12.3% of bids were zero.  Among those individuals bidding zero, 70% 
reported that they do not purchase and eat the commodity regularly.  Among individuals 
who submitted positive bids, only 23.3% reported the same.  For individuals who 
reported that they do purchase and eat the commodities, only 5.7% and 4.1% bid zero for 
Plain label and GM Free respectively.  While, for non purchasers or eaters, 71.4% and 
79.6% bid zero for Plain label and GM Free vegetables respectively.   
As a whole, the incidence of zero bids conditional on purchase and eating habits 
indicates that the experimental auction is properly eliciting demand.  Individuals who do 
not purchase or eat the vegetables are much more likely to submit a zero bid while a very 
small percentage of their counterparts do so.  To further evaluate the consistency of zero 
bids while controlling for other potential confounding factors, two Probit models are 
estimated using bids for GM Free and Plain label broccoli, tomato, and potato.  In each 
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regression, the dependent variable is a dummy constructed from bids prices and is equal 
to 1 if the participant submitted a positive bid and 0 if the participant submitted a zero 
bid.  Dependent variables include socio-demographic variables and information treatment 
dummies to potentially capture individual-level characteristics that affect the likelihood 
f subm
the 10% level.  The coefficient for the dummy 
ariable indicating that participants eat and purchase the product is negative and 
gnificant at the 5% level in both regressions (p-values 0.016 and 0.011 respectively).  
his indicates that individuals who eat and purchase the commodities are significantly 
ree and Plain label bids fails 
 reject a constraine ing only of the Purchase & Eat dummy variable in 
r of the full unc ned m
                                                
o itting a zero bid.  Given the nature of the commodities up for auction, we would 
not expect these consumer-specific attributes to have strong explanatory power for zero 
bids.  Additionally, a dummy variable “Eat & Purchase” is constructed taking a value of 
1 if the participant indicated that they regularly purchase and eat the vegetable up for 
auction.17  If the auction is properly eliciting demand, we would except that this variable 
would have strong explanatory power for the occurrence of zero bids.   
 Table 3.6 provides estimates of the Probit models for GM Free and Plain Label 
products.  In both regressions, none of the socio-demographic variables or information 
treatment variables are significant at 
v
si
T
less likely to bid zero.  A likelihood ratio test for both GM F
to d model consist
favo onstrai odel. 
 
 
 
 
17 Note that responses to purchasing and eating are nearly identical. 
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Table 3.6 Esti or Pr odels of Z ids  
Free 
mates f obit M ero B
 GM Bids Plain Label Bids
Variable Coeff. Std. Err.  Std. Err. Coeff.
Pro 0.093 0.658 0.251 0.590 
Anti 0.153 0.591 0.154 0.562 
Pro & Anti -0.700 0.772 -0.774 0.814 
Pro,Anti,Ver 0.609 0.685 0.948 0.629 
Income -0.006 0.006 -0.006 0.006 
Informed 0.419 0.613 0.259 0.625 
-0.001 -0.004 
0.422 0.134 
ender -0.215 0.549 0.110 0.536 
0.248 
 0.094 
0.539 
6 
ealth_Diet -0.123 0.143 -0.120 0.132 
urch & Eat -0.820** 0.342 -0.814** 0.319 
onstant -2.070** 1.835 -3.637** 1.844 
  
-48.57 
a
Age 0.014 0.013 
Opinion 0.519 0.548 
G
Education 0.119 0.110 0.109 
Read Labels 0.628 0.552 0.480 
Smoke 0.120 0.536 0.054 
E
H
xercise 0.054 0.471 -0.069 0.44
P
C
  
Log-likelihood  -41.20 
LR Statistic  19.25 30.24 
    
Constrained log-likelihood -45.66 -56.12 
Constrained LR Statistica 10.33 15.15 
(*) and (**)  denote variable significant at 10% and 5% respectively 
a Constrained model of only the “Purch & Eat” dummy variable and a constant. 
 
 
3.4.2 Concluding Remarks 
 The conditional and unconditional analyses of zero bids presented in this note 
yield a comforting result for researchers who employ experimental auctions for demand 
uggests that experimental auctions are properly eliciting 
preferences and that zero bids are not an artifact of either a systematic or random failure 
of the experimental auction to induce bidders to truthfully reveal their demand.  As well, 
given this result, further support is provided for the widespread practice of using censored 
solicitation.  The analysis s
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demand models (e.g., a Tobit model) to account for zero bids when analyzing auction bid 
 
price data. 
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CHAP
to have a common term.  While for some 
experim
ation.  Hence, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model 
ed to account for correlation across rounds of bidding. 
TER 4: CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF BID PRICES 
4.1 Introduction 
Although the data and unconditional analysis presented in the previous chapter 
are suggestive of the impact of information on the valuation of various types of genetic 
modification, it is necessary to undertake a more rigorous analysis of bid prices in order 
to identify label and information effects.  In this chapter, a multivariate regression model 
is constructed for this task.    
Before deriving the econometric model, it is beneficial to summarize several of 
the pertinent econometric issues that need to be addressed in modeling bid prices.  The 
first issue, which is common to all analyses of multiple round auctions, is whether it is 
appropriate to assume that bid prices by an individual in two different rounds are 
uncorrelated.  While this is a common assumption in the experimental economics 
literature, it is a questionable assumption.  First, it requires that unmodeled individual 
factors affecting bid prices in one round are uncorrelated with bid prices in other rounds.  
Second, ignoring potential correlation across rounds of bidding for a given individual 
reduces the efficiency of the estimators.  While individual effects can be easily included 
in standard single and system of equation models, they have the drawback of restricting 
correlation across different rounds (or labels) 
ents this may be a fair assumption, given the potential diversity of relative 
preferences for our experimental products, a general error specification is a more natural 
starting place for estim
(Zellner 1962) is select
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A second important issue affecting the choice of modeling approach is the 
commo ile
product presents a censoring problem
interval.  In our sample, across all of the experimental sessions, less than 8% of bids were 
equal to zero.  In the case of single equation models, censoring can be easily managed 
(e.g., a Tobit model).  In the case of a system of equations with censoring, there are a 
number of classical estimation techniques that have been proposed, but they suffer from a 
variety of econometric issues and diminished tractability, particularly for systems with 
er numbers of equations and cross-equation correlation (e.g., a SUR Tobit model).  
Difficulty in estimating the SUR Tobit model arises because multiple integrals are 
required for maximum likelihood estimation, hence requiring simulation algorithms (e.g., 
 Huang 1999).  An 
alternative, which is selected for this study, is to estimate the model via Bayesian 
niques with data augmentation.  In a Bayesian framework, appealing to well 
established data augmentation techniques (e.g., Albert and Chib 1993), the complication 
ightforward Gibbs samp  es
syste
ce, in order o address simultaneously these three relevant econometric issues, 
 
n d mma in experimental auctions of bid prices of zero.  A zero bid for a 
, i.e., bids were restricted to the non-negative 
larg
Huang, Sloan and Adamache, 1987, Meng and Rubin, 1996, and
tech
of multiple integrals in the SUR Tobit model is alleviated and replaced with a 
stra ler that is fast to timate and easily scaled to larger order 
ms.   
Hen  t
Huang’s (2001) model is adapted and extended to develop a Bayesian SUR Tobit model 
of individual bid prices. 
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4.2 Econometric Model 
Let denote the bid price by an individual ijy Ni ,...,2,1=  for a food product with 
thout PECA andlabel Jj ,...,2,1=  ( 4=J for the auctions wi  3=J  for the auctions with 
tent WTP of the  individual for the food product under label  can be 
expressed as 
+= εβ  
0 *⎪⎩ ≤ijij yif
 is the observed bid price,  is the latent bid price, and 
N
iid
iJi εε   For individual , we can express a system of equations, one 
equation for each label , as 
(3) ⎥
⎥
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In stacked notation, for each individual  we can express the system of WTP equations as 
,...,2,1,* =+= εβ , where  is a  vector  is 
a m trix, and a ve a
e
 od .  Chib 
1993), it follows that the augmented posterior is proportional to 
PECA).  The la thi j
(1) = ,,...,2,1,,...,2,1,'* JjNixy ijjijij =
where 
(2) ,
0**⎪⎨⎧ >= ijij yifyy  0
ijy
*
ijy
).,0(~)',...,( 1 Ω
and 
i
Jj ,...,2,1=
=iε
.
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1
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1
*
*
2
*
1i
y
y
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⎥⎢⎢⎥⎥⎢⎢ MMMOMMM
i
Nixy ii
'**
1
* ),...,( iJii yyy =  1Jx , ),...,( ''1 iJii xxdiagx =
Jxk  
i
a 1 ),...,( Jβββ =  is  1Jkx  ctor.  Finally, stacking over ll N  
individuals we have a compl te system of equations .εβ += Xy  
Treating latent bid prices as additional m el parameters (e.g , Albert and
'''
*
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(4) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),,,|,,||,, *** ΩΩΩ∝Ω ββββ pypyypyyp  
where the conditional for y  is directly predicted by the latent bid price 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ },000,,| ***
11
* =≤+=>∏∏=Ω
== ijijijijij
J
j
N
i
yIyIyyIyIyyp β  (5) 
and the conditional for  is proportional to *y
 (6) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
2
1exp,| *1
'*2/
1
*
⎪
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪
⎪⎨
⎧
⎥⎥
⎤
⎢⎢
⎡ −Ω−−Ω∏∝Ω ∑ −−= iiiiNNi xyxyyp βββ  
(7) 
),,(~1 εε
1 ⎭⎩ ⎦⎣ =
N
i
 Assuming independent priors of the form  
0 β ),(~ ββ
VaW−Ω  
where N  and W  denote the multivariate normal and Wishart distributions respectively, 
the conditional posterior distribution for 
VN
β  and 1−Ω  are given by standard results: 
(9) 
),,(~,| 1 ββββ DdDNy−Ω  (8) 
where 
( )( )
,0( )
111'
βββ
−−−
+⊗Ω= VyIXd N
and 
⎠
⎞
⎝
⎛
⎦⎣
−
=
N
i
The posterior conditional for latent bids is a multivariate truncated normal and given by 
(11) 
11'
ββ
−−
+⊗Ω= VXIXD N  
(10) .))((,~,| '11 ⎟⎟⎜⎜ ⎥
⎤⎢⎡ −−++Ω −− ∑ iiii XyXyVaNWy βββ εε  
1
1
( ) ,0..,~,| 2||]0,[1* =∀Ω −−−∞− ijjjjjij ytsijTNy ωµβ  
where 
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(12) 
jjjjjj
−
−−− ΩΩΩ−ω
 
,
)(
'
*'1'
|
jjjj
jjjjjjjjj y
−−
−−
−
−−−−
=
−ΩΩ+=
ω
µµµ
1'22
|
βµ iX= , jµ is the thj  row element of µ  and j−µ  is obtained by deleting the thj  row 
element of µ .  The matrix jj−−Ω  is derived from Ω  by eliminating the thj  column and 
thjrow, jj−Ω  is the vector derived from n of  the  colum Ω  by remo  row 
term. 
 Iteratively sampling from the posterior conditionals for 
thjving the 
β , 1−Ω , and  yields a 
 are specified so 
that th
of each individual commodity (e.g., broccoli without PECA, tomato with PECA, etc.).  
As well, to concentrate the results, two models (one for products without PECA and one 
for products with PECA) are estimated where the model is further stacked over the three 
*y
set of draws from the joint posterior density. 
 
4.3 Regression Estimates 
Several different specifications of the Bayesian SUR Tobit model developed in 
the previous section are estimated for both the cases of with and without PECA.  In all 
models, the prior probability density functions for unknown parameters
ey are slightly informative to allow the sample information to be the main 
determinant of the parameters in the posterior probability density function.  Following the 
tradition of Bayesian econometrics, results are presented for the posterior mean (or 
regression coefficients) of key parameters and their standard deviations and posterior 
probability of the estimated parameter being greater than zero (e.g., Koop, Poirier, and 
Tobias, 2007).  The tables presented in section 4.5 include posterior estimates for models 
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commodities (broccoli, tomatoes, and potatoes) and commodity specific effects are 
included.  Tables of marginal effects (abbreviated henceforth M.E.) are also presented.  
Additionally, to aid in evaluating the relative impact on WTP of different labeling 
treatments, posterior estimates of bid differences are also included.18   In all of the 
models, assumed values of key parameters of the priors were chosen to impose minimal 
structure: 00 =β , JIeV )410(=β , kJa *=ε , and JIeV )410(=ε .  A total of 10,000 draws 
from the Gibbs sampler were used following a 1,000 iterate burn-in.  Given the volume 
of different model specifications and estimates presented in this chapter, in the 
subsequent discussion the more compact specification of the stacked models for with and 
withou
.E. $0.120 and 
$0.082
t PECA are considered. 
Table 4.1 presents estimates of the stacked Bayesian SUR Tobit model for 
products without PECA.  The signs of the estimated posterior means of the information 
treatment dummy variables fall in line with expectations.  Individuals who receive anti-
biotech information are willing to pay a premium for the GM Free label (M.E. $0.054) 
and discount both Intragenic GM and Transgenic GM foods (M.E. $-0.120 and $-0.228 
respectively).19  For individuals who receive only pro-biotech information, the situation is 
reversed with higher WTP for Intragenic GM and Transgenic GM (M
 respectively) and lower WTP for the GM Free (M.E. $-0.066).   
                                                 
18 Some readers may find this form of estimate presentation easier to digest, particularly 
since relative impacts on WTP of different factors are of key interest.  However, please 
note that some care is needed in interpreting the impact of the information treatments on 
relative WTP since models were estimated with the dummy variable for the “no 
information” treatment omitted.   
19 Note that the excluded information treatment is the one where no information is 
disseminated to participants. 
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Individuals who receive the package of pro- and anti-biotech information 
treatments have greater WTP for all four types of labels.  However, the impact on relative 
WTP fo
 to the demographic variables, we can see that individuals who are older, 
of whi
counterparts for, in particular, Transgenic GM and Plain Label foods.  However, the 
posterior mean across the four labeling treatments for individuals with a positive opinion 
of GM coming into the experiments is close to zero.  This indicates that the provided 
information treatments in part confounded prior opinions towards GM.   
r Intragenic GM vs. GM Free and Transgenic GM vs. GM Free labels is less than 
when pro-biotech information is received in isolation.  This indicates that, in 
combination, the anti-biotech information dampens the augmenting impact on WTP of 
pro-biotech information for GM labels relative to the GM Free.  WTP for all four labels 
by individuals who received the combined pro, anti, and third party perspectives is 
reduced.  While the marginal impact is similar for each of the four labels, the largest 
reduction occurs for the GM Free label. 
Turning
te ethnicity, have larger households, and have higher household incomes are 
willing to pay more for products under each of the four labels.  For individuals who are 
members of an environmental group the posterior mean for each label is negative and, as 
expected, the marginal decrease in WTP is most pronounced for the Transgenic GM and 
least for the GM Free label (M.E. $-0.592 and $-0.174 respectively).   
The results for the opinion variables present an interesting picture.  Individuals 
who typically read food labels have lower WTP for all four labels, but the marginal effect 
is most pronounced for the Intragenic and Transgenic GM labels.  Individuals who are 
more informed about GM coming into the experiments are willing to pay more than their 
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The results for the health proxies are mixed.  While the signs of the posterior 
means for smoking, regular exercise, and highly rated physical and diet healthiness are 
consistent across the four food labels, there is little variation in the magnitude of the 
marginal effect across the different products.  While a priori one might expect that those 
individ
supports the more general SUR error 
specific
uals who are healthier would be willing to pay a higher premium for the GM Free 
(and maybe the Intragenic GM) than for Transgenic GM, the data cannot support this 
conclusion. 
Finally, the results show a significant first round bidding effect – i.e., participants 
bid relatively more in the first round for some labels – and these coefficients have high 
posterior probabilities of being positive.20  Our results also show that bid prices to a 
varying degree are significantly correlated across labels.  For example, the estimated 
correlation between bid prices for Plain and Intragenic GM labels is 0.51 and between 
Plain and Transgenic GM labels is 0.31.  Despite the greater modeling burden, the 
variability in correlation across different labels 
ation. 
Table 4.10 presents results for the stacked econometric model of bid prices for the 
three commodities under the three label treatments with PECA.  The posterior mean is 
positive across all three labels for individuals receiving the pro-biotech information 
treatment with the greatest relative increase for the Intragenic GM label.21  Individuals 
                                                 
20 Alte
considered.  Tests revealed that
21 Again, note that the excluded information treatment is the one where no information is 
disseminated to participants. 
rnative dummy specifications to capture potential round order effects were 
 bids in the first round were affected by the type of label 
presented, but no significant order effect arose in subsequent bidding rounds (e.g., round 
2 versus round 3). 
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who receive anti-biotech information have reduced WTP for all three labels.  In 
combination, individuals receiving both the pro- and anti-biotech information have a 
wer WTP for the GM and Transgenic GM labels, but higher for the Intragenic GM.  
tives in combination largely counterbalance each 
ormed about GM before the experiments or typically read food 
labels 
lo
This indicates that these two perspec
other in terms of their impact on valuations, but the positive impact on WTP for 
Intragenic GM marginally still holds.  Finally, when verifiable information is injected, 
valuations for all three products are lower, indicating that verifiable information bolsters 
the negative impact of anti-biotech information on WTP for GM food products with 
enhanced consumer attributes. 
Turning to the demographic variables, individuals who are environmental group 
members, have experience in farming, are white, and have higher household incomes 
have lower WTP for all three GM labels.  Consumers who are older or have larger 
households have a higher WTP.  Consistent with the results for products without PECA, 
individuals who were inf
are willing to pay more under each of the three labels.  Interestingly, individuals 
with a favorable prior opinion towards GM are willing to pay more for both the GM and 
Transgenic GM labels, but the posterior is flat and centered at zero for the Intragenic 
GM.  This indicates that prior perceptions toward GM did not carry over into valuations 
of Intragenic GM foods with enhanced nutrition. 
As in the estimates for products without PECA, the signs of the posterior 
estimates for health variables do not present a clear relation between "healthiness" and 
WTP for foods with enhanced nutrition obtained through genetic modification.  
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Individuals who regularly exercise, have higher self-assessed physical healthiness, or 
smoke are willing to pay more under each of the three labels, while those with self-
assessed healthier diets are willing to pay less. 
Finally, as in the case of products without PECA, there was a significant first 
round l
rks 
While the controversy over the balance between the benefits and hazards of 
 foods continues to unfold in the arenas of global politics and public 
w 
 value 
 
modification.  But, consumers are more accepting of foods with PECA obtained through 
we find that a significant share of 
s with enhanced nutrition compared 
 voluntary private sector labeling of 
ls and groups that have historically 
re 
palatable form of bioengineering compared to transgenics, our laboratory experiments 
indicate that there is the potential for an even greater crowding out of non-GM foods.  
abel effect and correlation in bid prices across labels.  The correlation coefficients 
across the different labels is approximately 0.5, which is large and consistent with the 
cross-label correlations in bid prices for products without PECA. 
 
4.4 Concluding Rema
 
genetically modified
information campaigns, the advancements in intragenic bioengineering present a ne
piece to the puzzle.  Overall, we find in our experiments that consumers do
enhanced nutrition attributes (antioxidants and vitamin C) obtained through genetic
intragenics compared to transgenics.  Most notably, 
consumers is willing to pay more for intragenic food
to conventional products.  This opens the door for
GM foods with PECA.   
These results pose a dilemma for individua
taken a position of staunch opposition to GM.  While intragenics may present a mo
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t
b umer 
acc information available to consumers when 
k nd 
n mation disseminated by 
ffects on consumer valuations for GM 
o sly 
onometric 
et
ud t may bias bid 
earch on consumer acceptance of foods as 
TP analysis.   
 
4.5 Tables 
Given the volume of tables presented in this section, below is a brief description of the 
corresponding specification of the Bayesian SUR Tobit model that was estimated. 
• Table 4.1– Stacked bid prices for all products (broccoli, tomato, and potato) without 
PECA. 
• Table 4.2 –Bid prices for broccoli without PECA. 
• Table 4.3 –Bid prices for tomato without PECA. 
Although our findings present a mildly positive picture for the potential of intragenics to 
ob ain a foothold in the food market, they also suggest that information injected into the 
pu lic domain will continue to play an important role in determining cons
eptance.  Our findings reveal that the 
ma ing purchase decisions has a significant effect on relative valuations for GM a
co ventional products.  While pro-biotechnology infor
agribusiness in isolation has significant positive e
fo ds, this effect is reduced when anti-biotechnology information is simultaneou
injected into the market.   
Finally, the refinements of the experimental procedures and the ec
m hods employed in this study advance the frontier of food experiments research.  This 
st y has sought to minimize and control for a number of factors tha
elicitation and reduce the usefulness of res
reflected in W
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• Table 4.4 –Bid prices for potato without PECA. 
•  4.5 ffere  stac
without PE
• Bid price differences (relative to GM Free) for broccoli without PECA. 
• T  4 ffere  tom
• Table 4.8 – ffere  pota t PECA. 
•  4 ffect
•  4 id  toma tato) of 
products with PECA. 
• Tabl –Bid price occoli with PECA. 
•  f
• Table 4.13 –Bid prices for potato with PECA. 
• differ cked ith PECA. 
• Table 4.15 – iffe l A. 
• T  4 iffe ato w A. 
• T  4 iffe . 
• ble 4.18 – Marginal effects for stacked model products with PECA. 
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 Table 4.1 Bayesian Estimates of Bid Price Equations for All Products Without PECA (N=92, Obs=1104) 
     in      nic  
 
Dep Var          LaPlaY                     Int geY              bel FreeGMY ra TransgenicY
    Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr
  
Information Treatment Dumm nformation Dummy Omitted) y Variables (No I
Pro 0.116     0.185 0.74 -0.140 0.187 0.23 0.284 0.195 0.93 0.105 0.183 0.79
Anti -0.119      
       
       
ographic Variables 
0.209 0.28 0.191 0.212 0.82 -0.171 0.219 0.21 -0.257 0.207 0.11
Pro & Anti 0.252 0.169 0.93 0.212 0.170 0.89 0.369 0.180 0.98 0.112 0.169 0.75
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.108 0.195
 
0.29 -0.243 0.197 0.11 -0.013 0.205 0.53 -0.112
 
0.194 0.28
Dem
Gender -0.130 0.146 0.058 0.1530.19 -0.067 0.146 0.33 0.65 -0.228 0.145 0.06 
Race 0.176 0.99 0.240 0.179 0.91 0.292 0.183 0.95 0.239 0.173 0.92 
Age 0.021 0.004 1.00 0.0 1.00 0.016 0.004 1.00 
Income 0.004 0.002 0.98 0.005 0.002 1.00 
Educ 0.42 . 10 0. 0.32 0.90 0.028 0. 0.92 
Married 0.131 0.14 .071 .30 -0.1 0.136 0.11 
0.047
Iowa -0.182 0.118 0.06 -0.169 0.121 0.08 -0.115 0.125 0.17 0.127 0.118 0.86 
Farm 0.014 0.138 0.54 0.105 0.139 0.78 0.095 0.144 0.75 0.131 0.137 0.83 
Envi_Mem -0.495 0.313 0.06 -0.250 0.318 0.22 -0.315 0.328 0.17 -0.628 0.310 0.02 
  
Opinion Variables 
0.432 
19 0.004 1.00 0.017 0.004
0.002 1.00 0.005 0.002 0.99 0.005
-0.004 0.020
-0.137 
 -0
 -0
0 021
0.131 0
0.028 0.022
80 
 
0.09 -0.159
020
0.130
Household 0.139 0.045 1.00 0.178 0.045 1.00 0.095 0.98 0.086 0.044 0.98 
Informed 0.392 0.213 0.97 0.236 0.214 0.86 0.025 0.220 0.54 0.263 0.212 0.89 
Opinion -0.046 0.160 0.39 0.055 0.162 0.63 0.064 0.166 0.65 -0.114 0.159 0.24 
Read_Labels -0.289 0.154 0.03 -0.091 0.153 0.28 -0.183 0.155 0.12 -0.436 0.148 0.00 
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 Table 4.1 (Continued) 
  
Dep Var               LabelPlain            FreeGM             Intragenic             Y  Y  Y  TransgenicY  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mea P Stdev Pr Mea Pr n Stdev r Mean n Stdev
  
e arH alth V iables 
Smoke 0.381 0.145 0.97 0.147 1.00 0.437 0.149 1.00 0.274 0.152 0.96 0.262
Exercise   
h_Diet       
s       
 
Label 0.96 0.148 1.00 0.218
      
ter d la ff
0.043 0.140 0.63    0.105 0.141 0.78 0.386 0.146 1.00 0.162 0.138 0.88
Healt 0.055
-
0.047 0.88 0.075 0.047 0.95 -0.016
-
0.048 0.37 0.071 0.046 0.94
Health_Phy 0.047 0.041 0.13 -0.053 0.041 0.10 0.052 0.043 0.11 -0.080 0.041 0.03
 
Round 1 
 
0.066
  
0.97 0.282 
 
0.095
 
0.115 0.082 0.061 1.00 
 
  
In -Roun  Corre tion Coe icients 
 GMFPlain,ρ  IntraPlain,ρ  TPlain, ransρ  IntraGMF ,ρ  TransGMF ,ρ  TIntra, ransρ  
 0.46 .51 1 1 .13 4  0 0.3 0.5  0 0.2
Mean, Stdev, and Pr r ly h rio |(espective denote t e poste r mean E )y⋅ , poste nda io yrior sta rd deviat n |(Std )⋅ , and pos bab  b eater 61 terior pro ility of eing gr
than zero )|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
   
able 4.2 Bayesian Estimates ofT
 
 Bid Price Equations for Broccoli Without PECA (N=92, Obs=1104) 
 Dep Var               LabelPlainY             FreGMY              IntrageY             TransgeY  e nic nic
  r Mean r Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev P Stdev P
  
y bleInform  Tr t D fo n m ed)ation eatmen umm Varia s (No In rmatio  Dum y Omitt  
Pro -0.096      0.403 0.40 -0.394 0.202 0.03 -0.067 0.493 0.45 -0.232 0.321 0.22
Anti -0.224      
 0.10 -0.550 0.10 -0.444
ographic Variables 
0.458 0.30 -0.084 0.229 0.35 -0.915 0.634 0.06 -0.334 0.363 0.16
Pro & Anti 
ro,Anti,Ver
0.165 
-0.550 
0.339
0.447
0.69 -0.011 0.191
0.226
0.48 0.120 
0.01 -0.660 
0.417
0.556
0.62 -0.175 0.277
0.352
0.25 
0.09 P
  
Dem
Gender -0.152 0.320 0.32 -0.076 0.163 0.32 0.009 0.391 0.53 -0.484 0.295 0.03 
Race 0.137 0.421 0.64 0.0 0.19 -0.273 0.340 0.20 
Age 0.025 0.011 0.93 0.013 0.009 0.94 
Income 0.004 0.0 1.00 0.013 0.006 0.0 1.00 
Educ 0.064 0.13 .055 0. 0.05 -0.059 0.081 0.04 
Househol  0.053 0.132 0.67 0.142 0.060 0.99 -0.094 0.180 0.31 -0.075 0.109 0.24 
owa -0.292 0.260 0.12 -0.048 0.131 0.35 -0.257 0.313 0.19 0.198 0.208 0.85 
Farm -0.312 0.349 0.18 -0.031 0.158 0.43 -0.577 0.495 0.09 -0.244 0.261 0.16 
Envi_Mem -0.334 0.585 0.27 -0.009 0.330 0.49 -0.406 0.722 0.28 -0.341 0.463 0.22 
  
Opinion Variables 
76 0.203 0.65 -0.423 0.527
0.005 1.00 0.018 0.0130.99 0.016
0.008 
-0.068 
0.98 0.006
 -0
02
034
1.00 0.009
0.22 -0.088
04
0.057
Married -0.043 0.275 0.42 -0.123 0.145 0.19 0.089 0.348 0.59 -0.031 0.230 0.43 
d
I
Informed 0.655 0.443 0.94 0.264 0.235 0.88 0.379 0.629 0.74 0.246 0.381 0.77 
Opinion -0.097 0.338 0.39 0.052 0.171 0.62 -0.107 0.416 0.41 -0.106 0.265 0.34 
Read_Labels -0.156 0.333 0.31 -0.129 0.170 0.22 -0.370 0.419 0.17 -0.397 0.261 0.06 
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 Table 4.2 (Continued) 
  
Dep Var                                                  LabelPlainY  FreeGMY  IntragenicY  TransgenicY  
 Mean Stdev Pr M Stdev Pr Mea Pr M Stdev Pr ean n Stdev ean
  
e arH alth V iables 
Smoke 0.466 0.275 0.38 0.317 0.94 0.289 0.164 0.96 -0.084 0.440 0.46 -0.092
Exercise   
h_Diet       
s       
 
Label 0.59 0.126 0.91 0.326
      
ter d lati ff
-0.011 0.276 0.49    0.104 0.150 0.76 0.316 0.337 0.85 0.080 0.222 0.65
Healt 0.079
-
0.095 0.80 0.062 0.051 0.88 -0.012
-
0.113 0.45 0.095
-
0.078 0.90
Health_Phy 0.045 0.079 0.29 -0.019 0.045 0.35 0.051 0.099 0.30 0.081 0.068 0.10
 
Round 1 
 
0.209
  
0.74 0.408 
 
0.319
 
0.029 0.188 0.165 0.98 
 
  
In -Roun  Corre on Coe icients 
 GMFPlain,ρ  IntraPlain,ρ  TPlain, ransρ  IntraGMF ,ρ  TransGMF ,ρ  TIntra, ransρ  
 0.60 .41 3 3 .23 6  0 0.5 0.4  0 0.3
Mean, Stdev, and Pr r ly h rio |(espective denote t e poste r mean E )y⋅ , poste nda io yrior sta rd deviat n |(Std )⋅ , and pos ba b eater 
63 
terior pro bility of eing gr
than zero )|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
 
 Table 4.3 Bayesian Estimates of Bid Price Equations for Tomato Without PECA (N=92, Obs=368) 
 
Dep Var               LabelPlainY              FreGMY             IntrageY               TransgeYe nic nic
  r Mean r Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev P Stdev P
  
y blesInform  Tr t D fo n my ed)ation eatmen umm Varia  (No In rmatio  Dum  Omitt  
Pro 0.157      0.707 0.59 -0.078 0.232 0.37 0.235 0.458 0.72 0.320 0.430 0.78
Anti -0.444      
      
 0.27 -0.381
ographic Variables 
0.831 0.29 0.041 0.264 0.56 -0.434 0.527 0.19 -0.139 0.472 0.36
Pro & Anti 
ro,Anti,Ver
0.331
-0.460 
0.647
0.774
0.70 0.193 0.223
0.256
0.81 0.412
0.07 -0.188 
0.429
0.505
0.85
0.35 
0.137
0.026
0.415
0.483
0.63
0.52 P
  
Dem
Gender -0.166 0.579 0.39 0.195 0.189 0.85 0.371 0.387 0.84 -0.304 0.351 0.18 
Race 0.263 0.742 0.64 0.2 0.92 0.881 0.558 0.96 
Age 0.024 0.016 0.94 0.011 0.011 0.94 
Income 0.007 0. 0.87 0.007 0.005 0. 1.00 
Educ 0.126 0.00 .107 .00 -0.1 0.075 0.15 
0.369
s old -0.380 0.244 0.05 -0.018 0.069 0.40 -0.150 0.160 0.16 -0.023 0.136 0.43 
Iowa -0.761 0.470 0.05 -0.335 0.149 0.01 -0.288 0.305 0.15 0.317 0.316 0.85 
Farm -0.480 0.548 0.19 0.111 0.179 0.73 0.054 0.363 0.57 -0.017 0.341 0.50 
Envi_Mem 0.227 0.989 0.59 0.080 0.385 0.59 -0.088 0.667 0.44 -0.527 0.615 0.18 
  
Opinion Variables 
01 0.233 0.81 0.688 0.526
0.006 0.98 0.010 0.010 0.84 0.016
0.009 
-0.366 
0.90 0.003
 -0
003
0.039 0
0.94 0.011
0.06 -0.069
005
0.07008 
Married 0.649 0.542 0.89 0.179 0.173 0.85 0.216 0.73 0.027 0.343 0.53 
Hou eh
Informed 0.756 0.740 0.86 0.125 0.268 0.68 -0.050 0.522 0.47 0.571 0.472 0.90 
Opinion 0.128 0.588 0.58 0.144 0.198 0.77 0.238 0.371 0.75 -0.007 0.342 0.49 
Read_Labels -0.461 0.514 0.18 -0.088 0.192 0.32 -0.268 0.344 0.20 -0.504 0.324 0.06 
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 Table 4.3 (Continued) 
  
Dep Var                                                  LabelPlainY  FreeGMY  IntragenicY  TransgenicY  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mea P Stdev Pr Mea Pr n Stdev r Mean n Stdev
  
e arH alth V iables 
Smoke 0.790 0.329 0.92 0.511 0.95 0.405 0.188 0.98 0.245 0.343 0.78 0.441
Exercise   
h_Diet       
s       
 
l 
      
ter d la ff
0.405 0.505 0.79    -0.108 0.176 0.27 0.380 0.321 0.89 0.133 0.311 0.67
Healt 0.203 0.176 0.88 0.155 0.058 1.00 0.119
-
0.119 0.85 0.126
-
0.109 0.88
Health_Phy -0.204 0.150 0.08 -0.142 0.053 0.00 0.230 0.104 0.01 0.229 0.098 0.01
 
Round 1 Labe
 
0.403
 
-0.008
 
0.345 
 
0.356
 
0.264-0.320 0.21 0.216 0.47 0.85 0.260 0.85 
 
  
In -Roun  Corre tion Coe icients 
 GMFPlain,ρ  IntraPlain,ρ  TPlain, ransρ  IntraGMF ,ρ  TransGMF ,ρ  TIntra, ransρ  
 0.55 .32 1 2 .25 5  0 0.6 0.5  0 0.2
Mean, Stdev, and Pr r ly h rior |(espective denote t e poste mean E )y⋅ , poste nda io yrior sta rd deviat n |(Std )⋅ , and post ba b eater 
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erior pro bility of eing gr
than zero )|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
 
 mates of Bid Price Equations for Potato Without PECA (N=92, Obs=368) 
 
Table 4.4 Bayesian Esti
 
Dep Var               LabelPlainY             FreGMY e              IntrageY nic             TransgeY nic  
  r Mean r Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev P Stdev P
  
y bleInform  Tr t D fo n my ed)ation eatmen umm Varia s (No In rmatio  Dum  Omitt  
Pro 0.570      0.354 0.95 -0.002 0.298 0.49 0.432 0.450 0.84 0.233 0.456 0.70
Anti 0.335      
      
 0.39 -0.184 0.38 -0.573
ographic Variables 
0.396 0.80 0.473 0.335 0.93 -0.531 0.592 0.18 -0.215 0.516 0.32
Pro & Anti 
ro,Anti,Ver
0.425
-0.130 
0.333
0.418
0.90 0.233 0.286
0.341
0.80 0.460
0.29 -0.185 
0.433
0.564
0.86 0.186 0.434
0.590
0.68
0.15 P
  
Dem
Gender -0.867 0.319 0.00 -0.457 0.238 0.03 -0.203 0.414 0.31 -0.875 0.428 0.01 
Race 0.334 0.385 0.81 0.0 0.89 0.074 0.518 0.56 
Age 0.029 0.009 0.93 0.019 0.011 0.95 
Income 0.004 0.0 1.00 0.015 0.006 0.0 1.00 
Educ 0.059 0.45 .002 0. .51 0.0 0.079 0.52 
Household 0.175 0.118 0.93 0.250 0.089 1.00 0.004 0.158 0.54 0.068 0.155 0.69 
Iowa -0.189 0.239 0.21 -0.308 0.194 0.05 -0.097 0.338 0.36 0.194 0.337 0.71 
Farm -0.291 0.294 0.15 0.024 0.230 0.54 -0.641 0.459 0.06 0.000 0.380 0.51 
Envi_Mem -1.175 0.581 0.02 -0.703 0.499 0.08 -0.918 0.756 0.11 -0.990 0.746 0.09 
  
Opinion Variables 
84 0.299 0.61 0.659 0.574
0.007 1.00 0.015 0.0111.00 0.019
0.010 
-0.007 
1.00 0.010
 0
03
050 0
1.00 0.014
0.62 0.003
05
0.07921 
Married -0.067 0.264 0.39 -0.088 0.218 0.34 -0.348 0.335 0.14 -0.219 0.347 0.25 
Informed 0.629 0.410 0.94 0.371 0.342 0.86 0.310 0.612 0.71 0.138 0.617 0.61 
Opinion -0.374 0.339 0.13 -0.087 0.255 0.37 -0.192 0.421 0.32 -0.557 0.443 0.09 
Read_Labels -0.135 0.313 0.33 -0.061 0.253 0.40 -0.426 0.395 0.13 -0.495 0.393 0.10 
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 Table 4.4 (Continued) 
  
Dep Var                            Y Labn elPlai       FreeGMY              Y Intragenic       TransgenicY  
 Mea Pr ean Stdev Prn Stdev Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr M  
  
H ariables ealth V
Smoke 0.345 0.289 0.89 0.483 0.245 0.98 -0.057 0.398 0.46 0.134 0.42 .651 0  
Exercise 0.005 0.274 0.52 0.226 0.232 0.84 0.533 0.349 0.94 0.28 0.
Health_Die 3 0 0 0. 0.
Health_Phy 1 0 3 0. 0.
 
Round 1 La 4 0 2 0. 8 0.
   
nter- s 
7
5
9
1
0.363
0.121
0.103
80
16
24
88
 
 
 
 
 
 
t 
s 
bel 
-0.1
-0.0
5 
2 
0.
0.
09
07
6
8
0.08 -0.030
0.44 -0.045
.07
.06
5
6
0.3
0.2
4
5
 
 
-0.
-0.
098
030
 
 
0
0
.12
.10
20
38
 
 
-0.
-0.
11
06
 
20
  
0.
 
 
.31
 
 
0.
 
0.2 8 0. 3 0.90 0.242 .234 0.86 238 0 80 25 0.22
  
I Round Correlation Coefficient
 GMFPlain,ρ  IntraPlain,ρ  TransPlain,ρ  IntraGMF ,ρ  TransGMF ,ρ  TransIntra,ρ  
 0.49 0.56 0.25 0.31 0.18 0.25 
Mean, Stdev, and ct st yPr respe ively denote the po erior mean )|(E ⋅ , posterior standard deviation S )| y(td ⋅ , b n
than zero ⋅ .
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and posterior proba ility of bei g greater 
)|0 y>Pr(
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Table 4.5  Bayesian Estimates of Differences of Bid Price Equations for Products  
Without PECA (N=92, Obs=828) 
 
Dep Var    ainGMF YY  LabelPl−    IntragenicGMF YY −      Transgenic−GMF YY
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
  
Information Treatment Dummy Variables (No Info. Dummy Omitted) 
Pro -0.255 0.103 0.01 -0.422 0.135 0.00 -0.137 0.131 0.14 
Anti 0.309 0.116 1.00 0.364 0.150 0.99 0.448 0.145 1.00 
Pro & Anti -0.042 0.095 0.33 -0.161 0.122 0.09 0.097 0.117 0.80 
Pro,Anti,Ver - -0.135 0.110 0.11 0.255 0.140 0.03 -0.132 0.137 0.17 
  
Demographic Variables 
Gender 0.063 0.081 0.78 -0.126 0.104 0.11 0.164 0.102 0.95 
Race -0.189 0.100 0.03 -
- - -
-
-
0.053 0.128 0.34 0.002 0.126 0.51 
Age -0.002 0.002 0.14 0.001 0.003 0.69 0.003 0.003 0.87 
Income 0.001 0.001 0.88 0.001 0.001 0.67 0.000 0.001 0.50 
Educ 0.006 0.012 0.32 0.038 0.015 0.00 0.038 0.014 0.00 
Married 0.068 0.074 0.82 0.108 0.095 0.87 0.089 0.094 0.83 
Household 0.039 0.025 0.94 0.082 0.032 1.00 0.091 0.031 1.00 
Iowa 0.012 0.066 0.57 0.053 0.084 0.26 -0.296 0.081 0.00 
Farm 0.093 0.079 0.88 0.009 0.098 0.54 0.027 0.096 0.39 
Envi_Mem 0.250 0.172 0.93 0.063 0.221 0.61 0.384 0.214 0.96 
  
Opinion Variables 
Informed -0.154 0.122 0.10 0.213 0.154 0.92 -0.023 0.153 0.45 
Opinion 0.099 0.087 0.87 -0.010 0.112 0.46 0.166 0.110 0.94 
Read_Labels 0.198 0.086 0.99 0.096 0.108 0.81 0.346 0.105 1.00 
  
Health Variables 
Smoke 0.053 0.082 0.74 0.160 0.106 0.94 0.172 0.103 0.96 
Exercise 0.062 0.077 0.78 -0.282 0.098 0.00 -
-
0.057 0.097 0.28 
Health_Diet 0.021 0.026 0.79 0.090 0.034 1.00 0.003 0.033 0.54 
Health_Phys 0.006 0.023 0.40 0.000 0.029 0.50 0.027 0.029 0.83 
      
Round 1 Label 0.035 0.111 0.62 -0.136 0.126 0.14 -0.067 0.104 0.26 
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean E )|( y⋅ , (posterior standard deviation )| yStd ⋅ , 
and posterior probability of being greater than z | yero 0Pr( > )⋅ . 
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Table 4.6  Bayesian Estimates of Differences of Bid Price Equations for Broccoli  
Without PECA (N=92, Obs=828) 
 
Dep Var    ainGMF YY  LabelPl−    IntragenicGMF YY −      Transgenic−GMF YY
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
  
Information Treatment Dummy Variables (No Info. Dummy Omitted) 
Pro -0.298 0.326 0.17 -0.328 0.419 0.19 -0.162 0.264 0.25 
Anti 0.139 0.369 0.66 0.830 0.559 0.96 0.250 0.301 0.82 
Pro & Anti -0.176 0.255 0.24 -0.131 0.335 0.33 0.164 0.217 0.79 
Pro,Anti,Ver 0.000 0.363 0.48 0.110 0.473 0.57 -0.106 0.291 0.32 
  
Demographic Variables 
Gender 0.075 0.252 0.60 -0.085 0.328 0.36 0.408 0.254 0.97 
Race -0.061 0.348 0.42 0.499 0.455 0.89 0.349 0.290 0.91 
Age -0.010 0.010 0.15 -
-
0.002 0.011 0.47 0.003 0.008 0.71 
Income -0.002 0.004 0.30 -0.007 0.006 0.08 -0.003 0.004 0.20 
Educ 0.014 0.050 0.59 0.004 0.068 0.48 0.033 0.049 0.75 
Married -0.080 0.217 0.36 -0.212 0.295 0.22 0.092 0.194 0.31 
Household 0.089 0.111 0.81 0.236 0.161 0.96 0.216 0.096 0.99 
Iowa 0.244 0.207 0.90 0.208 0.263 0.81 -0.247 0.171 0.06 
Farm 0.280 0.295 0.84 0.545 0.445 0.93 0.213 0.221 0.86 
Envi_Mem 0.325 0.430 0.79 0.397 0.586 0.77 0.332 0.365 0.83 
  
Opinion Variables 
Informed -0.391 0.347 0.12 -0.115 0.552 0.43 0.018 0.323 0.51 
Opinion 0.150 0.270 0.72 0.160 0.352 0.68 0.159 0.220 0.78 
Read_Labels 0.027 0.268 0.54 0.241 0.361 0.76 0.268 0.217 0.90 
  
Health Variables 
Smoke -0.177 0.257 0.24 0.373 0.389 0.85 0.381 0.240 0.97 
Exercise 0.114 0.213 0.72 -0.212 0.279 0.20 0.024 0.179 0.57 
Health_Diet -0.017 0.073 0.41 0.074 0.093 0.81 -0.034 0.064 0.30 
Health_Phys 0.026 0.058 0.68 0.032 0.080 0.66 0.062 0.056 0.89 
      
Round 1 Label 0.097 0.267 0.63 -0.283 0.379 0.21 -0.200 0.264 0.21 
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean E )|( y⋅ , (posterior standard deviation )| yStd ⋅ , 
and posterior probability of being greater than z | yero 0Pr( > )⋅ . 
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Table 4.7  Bayesian Estimates of Differences of Bid Price Equations for Tomato  
   ainGMF YY  
Without PECA (N=92, Obs=828) 
 
Dep Var LabelPl−    IntragenicGMF YY −      Transgenic−GMF YY
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
  
Information Treatment Dummy Variables (No Info. Dummy Omitted) 
Pro -0.235 0.611 0.34 -0.313 0.387 0.19 -0.398 0.369 0.13 
Anti 0.484 0.730 0.76 0.475 0.444 0.87 0.180 0.398 0.69 
Pro & Anti -0.138 0.552 0.41 -0.220 0.359 0.27 0.055 0.358 0.58 
Pro,Anti,Ver 0.079 0.669 0.55 - -0.193 0.422 0.30 0.407 0.416 0.15 
  
Demographic Variables 
Gender 0.362 0.503 0.77 -0.176 0.331 0.29 0.499 0.308 0.96 
Race -0.062 0.649 0.47 -0.487 0.461 0.12 -
-
-
-
-
0.680 0.516 0.08 
Age -0.013 0.013 0.16 0.002 0.009 0.57 0.004 0.009 0.32 
Income 0.006 0.006 0.15 -0.004 0.004 0.16 -0.008 0.005 0.01 
Educ 0.259 0.111 0.99 0.001 0.062 0.49 -0.038 0.060 0.24 
Married -0.470 0.480 0.16 0.037 0.325 0.47 0.152 0.302 0.71 
Household 0.362 0.221 0.96 0.132 0.143 0.84 0.005 0.119 0.51 
Iowa 0.427 0.411 0.86 -0.047 0.260 0.41 -0.652 0.285 0.01 
Farm 0.591 0.476 0.90 0.057 0.311 0.56 0.128 0.301 0.66 
Envi_Mem 0.148 0.786 0.43 0.168 0.525 0.64 0.606 0.499 0.89 
  
Opinion Variables 
Informed -0.631 0.607 0.14 0.175 0.433 0.66 -0.446 0.402 0.12 
Opinion 0.016 0.501 0.53 -0.094 0.306 0.38 0.151 0.287 0.72 
Read_Labels 0.374 0.421 0.82 0.181 0.275 0.76 0.416 0.270 0.94 
  
Health Variables 
Smoke - -0.385 0.425 0.17 0.160 0.287 0.73 0.036 0.285 0.46 
Exercise -
-
-
0.513 0.423 0.10 -0.489 0.262 0.03 -0.241 0.264 0.16 
Health_Diet 0.048 0.152 0.38 0.036 0.101 0.66 0.029 0.093 0.63 
Health_Phys 0.062 0.126 0.69 0.088 0.087 0.86 0.087 0.084 0.86 
      
Round 1 Label 0.313 0.465 0.75 0.353 0.432 0.20 -0.272 0.365 0.21 
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean E )|( y⋅ , (posterior standard deviation )| yStd ⋅ , 
and posterior probability of being greater than z | yero 0Pr( > )⋅ . 
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Table 4.8  Bayesian Estimates of Differences of Bid Price Equations for Potato  
Without PECA (N=92, Obs=828) 
 
Dep Var    Y −     LabelPlainGMF IntragenicGMF YY −     TransgenicGMF YY −Y  
 M td Pr a ev Pr ean S ev Me n Std Pr Mean Stdev
  
Information Treatment Dummy Variables (No Info. Dummy Omitted) 
Pro -0.572 0.258 0.01 -0.434 0.359 0.10 -0.235 0.369 0.25 
Anti 0.138 0.274 0.70 1.004 0.504 0.98 0.688 0.415 0.95 
Pro & Anti -0.192 0.227 0.20 -0.227 0.338 0.23 0.047 0.345 0.56 
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.055 0.329 0.43 0.001 0.484 0.47 0.389 0.499 0.79 
  
Demographic Variables 
Gender 0.410 0.246 0.96 -0.254 0.349 0.21 0.418 0.364 0.89 
Race -0.249 0.297 0.19 -0.575 0.504 0.11 0.011 0.438 0.52 
Age -0.010 0.007 0.06 0.004 0.009 0.68 0.000 0.010 0.51 
Income 0.000 0.003 0.52 -0.005 0.005 0.13 -0.005 0.005 0.16 
Educ 0.008 0.041 0.58 -0.020 0.064 0.36 -0.001 0.066 0.48 
Married -0.022 0.188 0.46 0.259 0.271 0.85 0.130 0.285 0.69 
Household 0.075 0.091 0.80 0.246 0.135 0.98 0.182 0.136 0.92 
Iowa -0.120 0.170 0.23 -0.211 0.283 0.22 -0.502 0.292 0.03 
Farm 0.315 0.219 0.93 0.665 0.407 0.97 0.024 0.325 0.52 
Envi_Mem 0.472 0.388 0.89 0.216 0.597 0.64 0.287 0.596 0.70 
  
Opinion Variables 
Informed -0.258 0.287 0.18 0.061 0.526 0.55 0.233 0.540 0.66 
Opinion 0.288 0.254 0.88 0.105 0.342 0.62 0.470 0.384 0.91 
Read_Labels 0.074 0.253 0.62 0.365 0.322 0.88 0.434 0.327 0.91 
  
Health Variables 
Smoke 0.138 0.209 0.75 0.539 0.329 0.96 0.349 0.373 0.84 
Exercise 0.221 0.214 0.85 -0.306 0.283 0.13 -0.061 0.305 0.43 
Health_Diet 0.105 0.075 0.92 0.068 0.099 0.76 0.085 0.100 0.81 
Health_Phys -0.033 0.054 0.27 -0.015 0.082 0.42 0.024 0.085 0.61 
      
Round 1 Label -0.006 0.295 0.48 0.005 0.400 0.49 -0.009 0.352 0.49 
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅ , posterior standard deviation )|( yStd ⋅ , 
and posterior probability of being greater than zero )|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
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Table 4.9 Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Bid Prices for Products 
=92,Obs=1104) 
Dep V Y  GMY
Without PECA (N
 
ar Labelo ree  IntragenicY  TransgenicY  N F
 Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
 Information Treatment Dummy Variables (No Info Dummy Omitted) 
Pro 0.048 0.090 -0.066 0.090 0.120 0.084 0.082 0.132
Anti -0.084 0.132 0.054 0.066 -0.120 0.150 -0.228 0.198
Pro & Anti 0.108 0.072 0.066 0.054 0.156 0.072 0.060 0.108
Pro,Anti,ver -0.072 0.120 -0.120 0.114 -0.006 0.114 -0.102 0.156
 Demographic Variables 
Gender -0.060 0.066 -0.018 0.054 0.036 0.090 -0.132 0.084
Race 0.330 0.174 0.120 0.102 0.204 0.150 0.210 0.168
Age 0.012 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.012 0.000
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000
Educ 0.000 0.012 -0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.012
Married -0.072 0.072 -0.024 0.048 -0.096 0.078 -0.108 0.090
Household 0.060 0.024 0.060 0.018 0.048 0.024 0.054 0.030
Iowa -0.090 0.060 -0.060 0.042 -0.060 0.066 0.090 0.090
Farm 0.000 0.072 0.030 0.048 0.042 0.072 0.078 0.084
Envi_Mem -0.474 0.390 -0.174 0.222 -0.288 0.324 -0.592 0.522
 Opinion Variables 
Informed 0.138 0.066 0.060 0.060 -0.006 0.120 0.132 0.108
Opinion -0.036 0.090 0.012 0.060 0.024 0.084 -0.096 0.132
Read_Labels -0.138 0.078 -0.030 0.054 -0.090 0.078 -0.270 0.096
 Health Variables 
Smoke 0.150 0.054 0.120 0.042 0.120 0.060 0.150 0.078
Exercise 0.024 0.072 0.036 0.054 0.198 0.084 0.108 0.096
Health_Diet 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.018 -0.006 0.024 0.042 0.030
Health_Phys -0.024 0.018 -0.018 0.012 -0.024 0.024 -0.048 0.024
   
Round 1 Label 0.054 0.030 0.048 0.030 0.114 0.036 0.138 0.036
Mean and Stdev denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅  and posterior standard deviation )|( yStd ⋅ . 
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Table 4.10 Bayesian Estimates of Bid Price Equations for Products With PECA  
(N=98,Obs=882) 
 
Dep Var          GMY  IntragenicY  TransgenicY  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
  
Information Treatment Dummy Variables (No Info. Dummy Omitted) 
Pro 0.198 0.256 0.78 0.982 0.267 1.00 0.479 0.341 0.93 
Anti -0.109 0.266 0.34 -0.478 0.279 0.05 -0.387 0.355 0.13 
Pro & Anti -0.085 0.258 0.36 0.152 0.270 0.72 -0.250 0.349 0.24 
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.718 0.243 0.00 -0.566 0.256 0.01 -0.506 0.325 0.06 
  
Demographic Variables 
Gender -0.045 0.164 0.39 0.224 0.173 0.91 0.252 0.220 0.87 
Race -0.419 0.232 0.03 -0.488 0.243 0.02 -0.476 0.305 0.06 
Age 0.023 0.006 1.00 0.016 0.006 0.99 0.017 0.008 0.98 
Income -0.008 0.003 0.01 -0.008 0.003 0.01 -0.012 0.004 0.00 
Educ -0.022 0.035 0.27 0.073 0.036 0.98 -0.001 0.048 0.50 
Married -0.072 0.199 0.03 0.021 0.264 0.53 
Household 0.265 0.062 1.00 0.215 0.065 1.00 0.156 0.083 0.97 
Iowa -0.170 0.161 0.14 -0.265 0.170 0.06 0.352 0.224 0.95 
Farm -0.473 0.206 0.01 -0.518 0.221 0.01 -0.298 0.282 0.14 
Envi_Mem -0.323 0.419 0.22 -0.458 0.445 0.15 -0.213 0.562 0.35 
  
Opinion Variables 
0.35 -0.413 0.207
Informed 0.169 0.291 0.72 0.178 0.304 0.72 0.284 0.380 0.77 
Opinion 0.448 0.262 0.95 -0.025 0.282 0.46 0.804 0.348 0.99 
Read_Labels 0.483 0.184 1.00 0.348 0.194 0.97 0.068 0.249 0.60 
  
Health Variables 
Smoke 0.308 0.189 0.94 0.201 0.200 0.84 0.154 0.244 0.73 
Exercise 0.146 0.164 0.81 0.551 0.176 1.00 0.408 0.224 0.97 
Health_Diet -0.046 0.074 0.27 -0.134 0.078 0.05 -0.112 0.098 0.13 
Health_Phys 0.179 0.074 0.99 0.132 0.079 0.95 0.171 0.100 0.96 
      
Round 1 Label -0.210 0.110 0.02 0.342 0.138 1.00 0.626 0.159 1.00 
      
 Inter-Round Correlation Coefficients 
 IntraGM ,ρ  TransGM ,ρ  TransIntra,ρ    
 0.49 0.46 0.54   
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅ , posterior standard deviation )|( yStd ⋅ , 
and posterior probability of being greater than zero )|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
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Table 4.11 Bayesian Estimates of Bid Price Equations for Broccoli With PECA  
(N=98,Obs=294) 
 
Dep Var          GMY  IntragenicY  TransgenicY  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
  
Information Treatment Dummy Variables (No Info. Dummy Omitted) 
Pro -0.026 0.272 0.46 0.936 0.280 1.00 0.460 0.388 0.88 
Anti -0.162 0.284 0.28 -0.462 0.297 0.06 -0.235 0.403 0.28 
Pro & Anti 0.012 0.269 0.51 0.259 0.279 0.82 0.008 0.386 0.51 
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.814 0.256 0.00 -0.687 0.259 0.00 -0.559 0.362 0.06 
  
Demographic Variables 
Gender -0.054 0.173 0.38 0.159 0.181 0.81 0.278 0.242 0.88 
Race -0.564 0.241 0.01 -0.523 0.251 0.02 -0.373 0.340 0.13 
Age 0.012 0.007 0.96 0.002 0.007 0.63 0.008 0.010 0.81 
Income -0.003 0.003 0.19 -0.003 0.003 0.20 -0.006 0.005 0.08 
Educ -0.098 0.045 0.01 -0.041 0.047 0.19 -0.081 0.064 0.10 
Married -0.079 0.204 0.35 -0.307 0.213 0.07 0.016 0.284 0.52 
Household 0.089 0.074 0.89 0.020 0.076 0.61 0.057 0.106 0.71 
Iowa -0.114 0.166 0.24 -0.081 0.170 0.32 0.348 0.241 0.93 
Farm -0.288 0.217 0.09 -0.315 0.232 0.09 -0.244 0.321 0.22 
Envi_Mem -0.281 0.444 0.26 -0.227 0.465 0.31 0.034 0.608 0.52 
  
Opinion Variables 
Informed 0.172 0.297 0.72 0.375 0.317 0.88 0.476 0.415 0.88 
Opinion 0.253 0.275 0.82 -0.296 0.290 0.15 0.401 0.381 0.86 
Read_Labels 0.450 0.195 0.99 0.359 0.202 0.96 0.149 0.270 0.71 
  
Health Variables 
Smoke 0.304 0.210 0.93 0.019 0.219 0.54 0.139 0.286 0.69 
Exercise 0.211 0.170 0.89 0.559 0.181 1.00 0.481 0.245 0.98 
Health_Diet -0.043 0.078 0.29 -0.095 0.080 0.12 -0.083 0.107 0.21 
Health_Phys 0.013 0.079 0.56 -0.040 0.084 0.31 0.003 0.109 0.50 
      
Round 1 Label -0.136 0.118 0.12 0.302 0.134 0.99 0.485 0.177 1.00 
      
 Inter-Round Correlation Coefficients 
 IntraGM ,ρ  TransGM ,ρ  TransIntra,ρ    
 0.55 0.58 0.58   
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅ , posterior standard deviation )|( yStd ⋅ , 
and posterior probability of being greater than zero )|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
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Table 4.12 Bayesian Estimates of Bid Price Equations for Tomato With PECA  
(N=98,Obs=294) 
 
Dep Var          GMY  IntragenicY  TransgenicY  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
  
Information Treatment Dummy Variables (No Info. Dummy Omitted) 
Pro 0.205 0.217 0.83 0.921 0.318 1.00 0.875 0.405 0.99 
Anti -0.101 0.224 0.33 -0.352 0.329 0.14 -0.078 0.411 0.42 
Pro & Anti -0.324 0.218 0.07 -0.039 0.315 0.45 0.108 0.397 0.60 
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.512 0.207 0.01 -0.446 0.299 0.07 -0.069 0.380 0.42 
  
Demographic Variables 
Gender -0.212 0.138 0.06 0.019 0.198 0.54 0.117 0.250 0.68 
Race -0.448 0.194 0.01 -0.719 0.287 0.01 -0.511 0.349 0.07 
Age 0.017 0.005 1.00 0.017 0.008 0.99 0.021 0.010 0.98 
Income -0.002 0.003 0.17 -0.003 0.004 0.20 -0.010 0.005 0.02 
Educ -0.110 0.036 0.00 -0.093 0.052 0.04 -0.104 0.065 0.05 
Married 0.064 0.164 0.65 -0.183 0.240 0.22 0.053 0.292 0.57 
Household 0.086 0.058 0.93 0.067 0.083 0.79 0.073 0.103 0.77 
Iowa -0.051 0.133 0.35 -0.424 0.190 0.01 0.239 0.239 0.84 
Farm -0.382 0.174 0.01 -0.434 0.255 0.04 -0.515 0.323 0.05 
Envi_Mem -0.509 0.358 0.08 -0.824 0.520 0.06 -0.503 0.625 0.21 
  
Opinion Variables 
Informed 0.081 0.244 0.63 0.100 0.357 0.61 0.115 0.419 0.61 
Opinion 0.253 0.222 0.87 -0.022 0.324 0.48 0.626 0.389 0.95 
Read_Labels 0.258 0.159 0.95 0.304 0.229 0.91 -0.020 0.279 0.47 
  
Health Variables 
Smoke -0.036 0.171 0.42 -0.015 0.247 0.47 -0.253 0.296 0.19 
Exercise -0.155 0.136 0.13 0.098 0.200 0.69 0.331 0.247 0.91 
Health_Diet -0.125 0.062 0.02 -0.175 0.090 0.03 -0.159 0.111 0.08 
Health_Phys 0.177 0.063 1.00 0.094 0.092 0.85 0.128 0.112 0.88 
      
Round 1 Label -0.254 0.102 0.00 0.254 0.174 0.93 0.464 0.182 0.99 
      
 Inter-Round Correlation Coefficients 
 IntraGM ,ρ  TransGM ,ρ  TransIntra,ρ    
 0.51 0.58 0.41   
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅ , posterior standard deviation )|( yStd ⋅ , 
and posterior probability of being greater than zero )|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
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Table 4.13 Bayesian Estimates of Bid Price Equations for Potato With PECA 
(N=98,Obs=294) 
 
Dep Var          GMY  IntragenicY  TransgenicY  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
  
Information Treatment Dummy Variables (No Info. Dummy Omitted) 
Pro -0.235 0.428 0.29 0.554 0.471 0.88 0.130 0.686 0.58 
Anti -0.487 0.447 0.14 -0.853 0.500 0.04 -0.746 0.708 0.14 
Pro & Anti -0.471 0.423 0.13 -0.264 0.468 0.29 -0.643 0.690 0.18 
Pro,Anti,Ver -1.397 0.406 0.00 -1.179 0.447 0.01 -0.988 0.647 0.06 
  
Demographic Variables 
Gender 0.220 0.273 0.79 0.412 0.307 0.91 0.629 0.446 0.92 
Race -0.525 0.381 0.08 -0.758 0.427 0.04 -0.498 0.620 0.21 
Age 0.008 0.011 0.78 0.000 0.012 0.51 0.007 0.016 0.66 
Income -0.009 0.005 0.04 -0.006 0.006 0.16 -0.015 0.008 0.04 
Educ -0.132 0.070 0.03 -0.009 0.080 0.46 -0.060 0.112 0.29 
Married 0.144 0.323 0.67 -0.371 0.359 0.15 0.091 0.506 0.56 
Household 0.219 0.115 0.97 0.096 0.127 0.78 0.144 0.186 0.78 
Iowa -0.377 0.261 0.08 -0.361 0.288 0.11 0.411 0.436 0.83 
Farm -0.450 0.342 0.09 -0.435 0.382 0.13 -0.596 0.585 0.15 
Envi_Mem -0.099 0.718 0.45 -0.300 0.792 0.35 -0.071 1.117 0.47 
  
Opinion Variables 
Informed 0.432 0.484 0.81 0.226 0.541 0.67 0.461 0.747 0.74 
Opinion 0.814 0.439 0.97 0.226 0.487 0.68 1.431 0.685 0.98 
Read_Labels 0.562 0.311 0.96 0.343 0.348 0.84 -0.140 0.493 0.40 
  
Health Variables 
Smoke -0.036 0.333 0.46 -0.254 0.373 0.25 -0.073 0.508 0.44 
Exercise 0.192 0.270 0.76 0.880 0.307 1.00 0.683 0.435 0.94 
Health_Diet -0.084 0.123 0.24 -0.297 0.135 0.01 -0.252 0.190 0.09 
Health_Phys 0.094 0.126 0.77 0.048 0.139 0.64 0.138 0.195 0.77 
      
Round 1 Label -0.201 0.181 0.13 0.352 0.228 0.94 0.873 0.331 0.99 
      
 Inter-Round Correlation Coefficients 
 IntraGM ,ρ  TransGM ,ρ  TransIntra,ρ    
 0.45 0.46 0.59   
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅ , posterior standard deviation )|( yStd ⋅ , 
and posterior probability of being greater than zero )|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
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Table 4.14 Bayesian Estimates of Differences of Bid Price Equations for Products  
With PECA (N=98,Obs=588) 
 
Dep Var       IntragenicGM YY −  TransgenicGM YY −  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
                 Information Treatment Variables 
Pro -0.786 0.183 0.00 -0.282 0.226 0.10 
Anti 0.365 0.202 0.97 0.279 0.244 0.88 
Pro & Anti -0.237 0.183 0.10 0.171 0.234 0.77 
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.150 0.173 0.19 -0.211 0.213 0.16 
 Demographic Variables
Gender -0.268 0.119 0.01 -0.293 0.147 0.02 
Race 0.066 0.163 0.66 0.056 0.195 0.62 
Age 0.007 0.005 0.93 0.006 0.006 0.85 
Income -0.001 0.002 0.39 0.004 0.003 0.94 
Educ -0.094 0.026 0.00 -0.020 0.034 0.27 
Married 0.337 0.134 0.99 -0.096 0.170 0.28 
Household 0.050 0.044 0.87 0.109 0.054 0.98 
Iowa 0.096 0.111 0.80 -0.517 0.147 0.00 
Farm 0.044 0.145 0.62 -0.171 0.186 0.18 
Envi_Mem 0.133 0.295 0.68 -0.096 0.356 0.39 
 Opinion Variables 
Informed -0.010 0.204 0.48 -0.118 0.239 0.31 
Opinion 0.474 0.186 1.00 -0.355 0.223 0.06 
Read_Labels 0.128 0.134 0.83 0.404 0.167 0.99 
 Health Variables 
Smoke 0.107 0.134 0.79 0.156 0.157 0.84 
Exercise -0.402 0.119 0.00 -0.257 0.147 0.04 
Health_Diet 0.087 0.053 0.95 0.066 0.063 0.85 
Health_Phys 0.046 0.053 0.80 0.006 0.063 0.54 
    
Round 1 Label -0.550 0.207 0.00 -0.839 0.233 0.00 
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅ , posterior 
standard deviation , and posterior probability of being greater than 
zero 
)|( yStd ⋅
)|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
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Table 4.15 Bayesian Estimates of Differences of Bid Price Equations for Broccoli  
With PECA (N=98,Obs=588) 
 
Dep Var       IntragenicGM YY −  TransgenicGM YY −  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
                 Information Treatment Variables 
Pro -0.962 0.201 0.00 -0.485 0.284 0.04 
Anti 0.300 0.220 0.92 0.073 0.295 0.61 
Pro & Anti -0.247 0.200 0.11 0.004 0.281 0.51 
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.127 0.187 0.24 -0.255 0.262 0.16 
 Demographic Variables
Gender -0.213 0.128 0.05 -0.332 0.174 0.03 
Race -0.041 0.173 0.41 -0.191 0.241 0.21 
Age 0.010 0.005 0.97 0.004 0.007 0.71 
Income 0.000 0.002 0.53 0.003 0.003 0.85 
Educ -0.057 0.035 0.05 -0.017 0.047 0.35 
Married 0.228 0.145 0.94 -0.095 0.198 0.31 
Household 0.069 0.053 0.90 0.032 0.077 0.66 
Iowa -0.034 0.116 0.38 -0.462 0.170 0.00 
Farm 0.028 0.158 0.57 -0.043 0.236 0.41 
Envi_Mem -0.054 0.313 0.43 -0.315 0.412 0.21 
 Opinion Variables 
Informed -0.203 0.213 0.17 -0.304 0.278 0.13 
Opinion 0.549 0.195 1.00 -0.148 0.262 0.28 
Read_Labels 0.091 0.143 0.74 0.300 0.192 0.94 
 Health Variables 
Smoke 0.284 0.153 0.97 0.165 0.194 0.81 
Exercise -0.348 0.125 0.00 -0.271 0.175 0.06 
Health_Diet 0.052 0.058 0.82 0.040 0.074 0.71 
Health_Phys 0.053 0.059 0.82 0.010 0.074 0.56 
    
Round 1 Label -0.438 0.208 0.01 -0.621 0.246 0.01 
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅ , posterior 
 standard deviation , and posterior probability of being greater than 
zero 
)|( yStd ⋅
)|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
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Table 4.16 Bayesian Estimates of Differences of Bid Price Equations for Tomato  
With PECA (N=98,Obs=588) 
 
Dep Var       IntragenicGM YY −  TransgenicGM YY −  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
                 Information Treatment Variables 
Pro -0.716 0.246 0.00 -0.670 0.308 0.01 
Anti 0.251 0.254 0.84 -0.023 0.310 0.47 
Pro & Anti -0.285 0.243 0.12 -0.433 0.298 0.07 
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.066 0.233 0.39 -0.443 0.287 0.06 
 Demographic Variables
Gender -0.231 0.153 0.06 -0.329 0.187 0.04 
Race 0.271 0.219 0.89 0.062 0.258 0.59 
Age 0.000 0.006 0.50 -0.004 0.008 0.30 
Income 0.001 0.003 0.61 0.007 0.004 0.98 
Educ -0.017 0.040 0.33 -0.006 0.049 0.45 
Married 0.246 0.183 0.91 0.011 0.213 0.53 
Household 0.019 0.065 0.61 0.013 0.078 0.57 
Iowa 0.373 0.146 0.99 -0.290 0.179 0.05 
Farm 0.052 0.196 0.60 0.132 0.246 0.70 
Envi_Mem 0.315 0.401 0.78 -0.005 0.447 0.49 
 Opinion Variables 
Informed -0.020 0.270 0.46 -0.034 0.301 0.46 
Opinion 0.275 0.251 0.86 -0.373 0.284 0.09 
Read_Labels -0.046 0.175 0.39 0.278 0.206 0.92 
 Health Variables 
Smoke -0.022 0.188 0.46 0.216 0.214 0.85 
Exercise -0.253 0.154 0.05 -0.487 0.185 0.00 
Health_Diet 0.049 0.070 0.76 0.034 0.082 0.66 
Health_Phys 0.083 0.071 0.88 0.049 0.081 0.74 
    
Round 1 Label -0.507 0.224 0.01 -0.718 0.240 0.00 
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅ , posterior 
standard deviation , and posterior probability of being greater than  
zero 
)|( yStd ⋅
)|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
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Table 4.17 Bayesian Estimates of Differences of Bid Price Equations for Potato  
With PECA (N=98,Obs=588) 
 
Dep Var       IntragenicGM YY −  TransgenicGM YY −  
 Mean Stdev Pr Mean Stdev Pr 
                 Information Treatment Variables 
Pro -0.789 0.292 0.00 -0.364 0.464 0.21 
Anti 0.367 0.317 0.88 0.260 0.475 0.71 
Pro & Anti -0.207 0.294 0.24 0.171 0.472 0.64 
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.218 0.279 0.22 -0.409 0.433 0.17 
 Demographic Variables
Gender -0.191 0.193 0.16 -0.409 0.302 0.08 
Race 0.233 0.271 0.80 -0.027 0.420 0.48 
Age 0.008 0.007 0.85 0.001 0.011 0.54 
Income -0.003 0.004 0.19 0.006 0.006 0.84 
Educ -0.123 0.052 0.01 -0.073 0.075 0.16 
Married 0.516 0.225 0.99 0.054 0.335 0.56 
Household 0.123 0.079 0.94 0.074 0.129 0.73 
Iowa -0.015 0.184 0.47 -0.787 0.298 0.00 
Farm -0.015 0.249 0.48 0.147 0.427 0.64 
Envi_Mem 0.201 0.495 0.65 -0.028 0.733 0.47 
 Opinion Variables 
Informed 0.206 0.336 0.73 -0.029 0.477 0.48 
Opinion 0.588 0.307 0.97 -0.618 0.458 0.09 
Read_Labels 0.219 0.218 0.84 0.701 0.330 0.98 
 Health Variables 
Smoke 0.218 0.231 0.83 0.037 0.324 0.55 
Exercise -0.687 0.203 0.00 -0.491 0.302 0.05 
Health_Diet 0.213 0.085 0.99 0.168 0.121 0.92 
Health_Phys 0.046 0.087 0.71 -0.044 0.125 0.36 
    
Round 1 Label -0.553 0.345 0.05 -1.074 0.449 0.01 
Mean, Stdev, and Pr respectively denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅ , posterior  
standard deviation , and posterior probability of being greater than  
zero 
 
)|( yStd ⋅
)|0Pr( y>⋅ . 
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Table 4.18 Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Bid Prices for Products  
With PECA (N=98,Obs=882) 
 
 
Dep Var GMY  TransgenicY  IntragenicY  
 Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
 Information Treatment Variables (No Info Omitted) 
Pro 0.040 0.056 0.140 0.034 0.136 0.094 
Anti -0.034 0.072 -0.122 0.080 -0.142 0.132 
Pro & Anti -0.026 0.068 0.026 0.050 -0.092 0.122 
Pro,Anti,Ver -0.226 0.092 -0.142 0.074 -0.182 0.122 
 Demographic Variables 
Gender -0.010 0.040 0.048 0.038 0.084 0.074 
Race -0.086 0.046 -0.080 0.038 -0.138 0.084 
Age 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.010 0.004 
Income -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.006 0.002 
Educ -0.006 0.012 0.020 0.010 -0.002 0.026 
Married -0.018 0.050 -0.082 0.042 0.008 0.086 
Household 0.082 0.022 0.058 0.020 0.082 0.044 
Iowa -0.042 0.040 -0.052 0.034 0.118 0.076 
Farm -0.140 0.070 -0.128 0.064 -0.106 0.100 
Envi_Mem -0.118 0.146 -0.140 0.144 -0.098 0.202 
 Opinion Variables 
Informed 0.030 0.066 0.026 0.056 0.078 0.112 
Opinion 0.088 0.048 -0.012 0.060 0.216 0.084 
Read_Labels 0.132 0.056 0.076 0.046 0.024 0.082 
 Health Variables 
Smoke 0.068 0.040 0.036 0.038 0.046 0.076 
Exercise 0.038 0.042 0.116 0.042 0.136 0.076 
Health_Diet -0.014 0.024 -0.036 0.022 -0.060 0.054 
Health_Phys 0.056 0.024 0.036 0.022 0.092 0.056 
    
Round 1 Label -0.054 0.030 0.064 0.026 0.188 0.048 
Mean and Stdev denote the posterior mean )|( yE ⋅  and posterior standard deviation  
 
 )|( yStd ⋅ .
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CHAPTER 5: THE VALUE OF VERIFIABLE INFORMATION  
5.1 Introduction 
While in the previous chapter it was shown that information has an impact on 
both absolute and relative valuations of food products produced through different 
bioengineering methods, these results alone are not sufficient to assess the welfare impact 
or "value" of information to consumers.  The seminal paper by Foster and Just (1989) 
asserts that information has value to consumers if, from an ex-post perspective, the 
information has an impact on purchasing behavior.  In the following section a simple 
methodology in the spirit of Foster and Just is developed for estimating the value of 
information in the context of a market with close substitutes.   
 
5.2 Theoretical Model 
Consider a market with Nn ,...,2,1=  consumers who may consume at most one unit 
of one product from a selection of three alternatives A , , and .  Let B C AP , BP , and CP  
denote the respective prices of the three products.  Let  denote the information set 
consumer  possesses prior to making his or her purchase decision.  In this simple 
market, consumers choose the product (or none) that maximizes consumer surplus 
(13) 
nI
n
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0,,,max ,,, CCInBBInAAInn PWTPPWTPPWTPS nnn −−−= . 
Now consider the same scenario, but suppose the consumer receives new information and 
is operating under a different information set .  Surplus under the new information set 
is 
(14) 
'
nI
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0,,,max ''' ,,,' CCInBBInAAInn PWTPPWTPPWTPS nnn −−−= . 
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Using these two equations, we can express the "direct" change in consumer surplus 
resulting from the different sets of information as 
(15) . 
The problem with this as a measure of the value of information, as argued by Foster and 
Just, is that it leads to the paradox of "blissful ignorance" in that by solely comparing 
welfare under different "information states", information may have a negative impact on 
welfare (i.e. the consumer may be better off without the new information).  Hence, Foster 
and Just argue that welfare measures should be assessed under the new information state 
only.  Their proposed measure, the cost of ignorance (COI), compares welfare of 
informed and uniformed purchases measured in terms of the informed state.22  Let 
 denote the product that for consumer  yields the highest surplus under 
information set .  Then, from an ex-post perspective, the "indirect" impact of 
information is 
(16) 
nnn SSS −=∆ '
{ }0,,, CBAZ
nI = n
nI
n
ZZ
Inn
SPWTPS nInI
n
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=∆ ',
~ , 
where  denotes WTP under information set  for the product the individual 
would have purchased under the previous information set .  Finally, the welfare impact 
of information, the COI, is given by 
(17) 
nI
n
Z
In
WTP ',
'
nI
nI
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=∆−∆= nInI
n
ZZ
Innnnn
PWTPSSSCOI ',
'~ . 
                                                 
22 An incomplete list of studies utilizing the COI or a related variant for analysis of 
information within the context of food products include Hu, Veeman, and Adamowicz 
(2005), Mazzocchi, Stefani, and Henson (2004), Teisl and Roe (1998), and Teisl, 
Bockstael, and Levy (2001). 
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Within the context of the considered market, it can be seen that information has value to 
consumers iff the information leads to a change in the product purchased. 
 
5.3 Empirical Model 
To estimate the value of information using the described methodology, several 
values are required including WTP before and after receipt of information and market 
prices.  In the conducted experimental auctions, participants' WTP was only obtained 
after receiving information treatments.  To proceed, in lieu of making restrictive 
assumptions,23 the regression model derived in the previous section is used to generate 
WTP forecasts.  This permits controlling for confounding factors that affect WTP other 
than the information treatment.  More explicitly, suppose one seeks to estimate the value 
of information .  For those individuals with information set i I  where , a forecast is 
generated of their WTP under the information set 
Ii∈
iI¬ .  As well, for those individuals 
who received information set iI¬ , a forecast of their WTP under information set I  is 
generated.  Using these forecasts (denoted by ∧ ), the direct change in surplus from 
information  for those individuals who received information treatments i I  or iI¬  can be 
expressed as 
(18) 
{ }{ } { }{ }
{ }{ } { }{ }.0,max0,ˆmaxˆ
0,ˆmax0,maxˆ
,,,,,,,,,,
,,,,,,,,,,
CBAZ
ZZ
iInCBAZ
ZZ
IniInInIiIn
CBAZ
ZZ
iInCBAZ
ZZ
IniInIniIIn
PWTPPPTWSSS
PPTWPWTPSSS
=¬=¬¬
=¬=¬¬
−−−=−=∆
−−−=−=∆
 
The indirect impact of information on consumer surplus for an individual who received 
treatment I  and  are 
                                                
iI¬
 
23 For example, one could assume that participants who receive an information treatment 
have relative preferences that are uniformly distributed across the subset of individuals 
who did not receive the information treatment. 
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(19) 
where  denotes the forecasted product that would have yielded individual  the 
greatest surplus under information set 
( ) ,ˆ~
ˆ~
,,,,
,
ˆˆ
,,,
,,
,,
iIn
ZZ
InIiIn
iIn
ZZ
IniIIn
SPPTWS
SPWTPS
iIniIn
iIniIn
¬¬
¬¬
−−=∆
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=∆
¬¬
¬¬
 
iInZ ¬,ˆ n
iI¬  and  denotes the observed product that 
yielded the greatest surplus under information set 
iInZ ¬,
iI¬ . 
Putting the two pieces together, we can express the value of information for each 
type of individual as 
(20) 
Finally, we can express the estimated average value of information  per individual per 
product as 
(21) 
( ).ˆˆ~
~
,,
,,
,,,,,,,,
ˆˆ
,,,,,,,,
iIniIn
iIniIn
ZZ
InInIiInIiInIiIn
ZZ
InIniIIniIIniIIn
PPTWSSSCOI
PWTPSSSCOI
¬¬
¬¬
−−=∆−∆=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=∆−∆=
¬¬¬
¬¬¬  
i
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++= ∑∑
¬
=
¬
=
¬
¬
iII N
n
IiIn
N
n
iIIn
iII
i COICOINN
COI
1
,,
1
,,
1 , 
where  and  denote the number of individuals in the sample who received 
treatments 
IN iIN ¬
I  and  respectively. 
For estimating the value of information, three different market scenarios are 
considered.  Scenario 1 is a market with GM Free, intragenic, and Plain Label products, 
scenario 2 is a market with GM Free, intragenic, and transgenic products, and scenario 3 
is a market with GM, intragenic, and transgenic products all with enhanced consumer 
attributes.  For each market scenario, we consider the value of verifiable information in a 
conflicted information setting (i.e., 
iI¬
=I {Pro, Anti, Ver} and =i Ver}).  Market prices for 
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the products are assumed to be the average bid by participants in the experimental 
auctions (see the bid summary tables in chapter 3 for specific values).   
 
5.4 Value of Information Estimates 
Tables 5.1-5.3 present for each scenario the following: (1) the percentage of 
individuals who switch to purchasing a different product after receipt of the verifiable 
information, (2) the value of verifiable information (COI measure) for those individuals 
who switch purchases, and (3) the total value of verifiable information across all 
individuals (switchers and non-switchers).   
From table 5.1 we can see that under market scenario 1 a small number of 
consumers (11.2% for broccoli, 17.6% for tomato, and 11.8% for potato) switch products 
from receipt of the verifiable information treatment.  The value of the verifiable 
information (COI measure) to the switching set of consumers is small, ranging from eight 
to eleven cents.  Across all consumers, the public value of the verifiable information is 
slightly less than one-percent of the average valuation of the product. 
 
Table 5.1 Value of Verifiable Information: Scenario 1 
 
Product Percent Switcha  Switcher Valueb  Total Valuec
Broccoli 11.2%  $0.094  $0.011 
Tomato 17.6%  $0.079  $0.013 
Potato 11.8%  $0.110  $0.013 
a Percentage of individuals who purchase a different product after receiving the information. 
b  The value of information (COI) for individuals who switch products. 
c  The value of information (COI) across all individuals (switchers and non-switchers). 
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Under product scenario 2 (table 5.2), which models a market with both intragenic 
and transgenic alternatives in addition to a GM Free product, verifiable information has a 
greater impact on purchase decisions and has a greater public good value.  The 
percentage of switching consumers (17.1% for broccoli, 22.4% for tomato, and 14.5% for 
potato) and the public value of the verifiable information ($0.023 for broccoli, $0.04 for 
tomato, and $0.024 for potato) is larger for each of the three commodities compared to 
scenario 1. 
 
Table 5.2 Value of Verifiable Information: Scenario 2 
 
Product Percent Switcha  Switcher Valueb  Total Valuec
Broccoli 17.1%  $0.133  $0.023 
Tomato 22.4%  $0.180  $0.040 
Potato 14.5%  $0.163  $0.024 
a Percentage of individuals who purchase a different product after receiving the information. 
b  The value of information (COI) for individuals who switch products. 
c  The value of information (COI) across all individuals (switchers and non-switchers). 
 
Finally, under scenario 3 (table 5.3), which considers a market with three different 
GM alternatives with enhanced consumer attributes, we find that verifiable information 
yields the lowest benefit to all consumers.  While for individuals that switch products the 
value of the verifiable information is between ten and thirteen cents (i.e., between 4 and 7 
percent of the product price), the total percentage of switchers is low. 
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Table 5.3 Value of Verifiable Information: Scenario 3 
 
Product Percent Switcha  Switcher Valueb  Total Valuec
Broccoli 8.48%  $0.101  $0.009 
Tomato 10.6%  $0.113  $0.012 
Potato 9.09%  $0.130  $0.012 
a Percentage of individuals who purchase a different product after receiving the information. 
b  The value of information (COI) for individuals who switch products. 
c  The value of information (COI) across all individuals (switchers and non-switchers). 
 
Overall, the simulation estimates presented in this chapter indicate that while 
verifiable information has value to consumers through enabling informed product 
choices, the percentage of benefiting consumers is relatively small (less than 22.4% 
across all products and all scenarios).  Hence, the per-individual, per-product, per-
purchase occasion value of the information is low.  However, if the value of verifiable 
information is viewed in the context of a repeated choice setting (e.g., annual purchases) 
and considered across multiple products (i.e., all fresh produce instead of a single 
vegetable), the benefit grows substantially.  For example, consider a population of 
consumers who makes bi-monthly purchases of each of the three commodities considered 
in scenario 2.  Per individual, on an annual basis, the value of verifiable information is 
$2.26.  When this individual value of verifiable information is extrapolated to the adult 
U.S. population (approximately 228 million in 2009), the total public value of verifiable 
information is roughly 500 million dollars annually.  Hence, when viewed at the 
population level, it is evident that there are significant potential welfare gains by 
consumers from information campaigns by credible 3rd-party organizations. 
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CHAPTER 6: ESTIMATES OF THE WELFARE IMPACT OF 
INTRAGENIC AND TRANSGENIC GM LABELING POLICIES  
6.1 Introduction 
Since the commercialization of the first genetically modified foods, a diverse set 
of interested parties including environmental groups, biotechnology companies, and 
government and health organizations have disseminated to the public and policymakers 
conflicting information on the benefits and risks of GM.  A central issue in the larger 
debate between critics and advocates of GM has been if and how GM foods should be 
labeled.  Given that genetic modification is a product attribute not directly observable by 
consumers pre- or post-purchase/consumption, a market with GM and non-GM products 
will result in a pooled equilibrium ala Akerlof’s (1970) lemons model with too great a 
proportion of the weakly inferior GM product.  In markets characterized by this form of 
information asymmetry, labeling requirements and credible certification schemes can 
alleviate the undesirable welfare properties of the lemons market. 
While there are numerous potential labeling policies that facilitate informed GM 
product purchases by consumers (for discussions see Caswell, 1998 and 2000; Sheldon, 
2001), globally two divergent policies have primarily been implemented.  Countries 
including the EU, Australia, and Japan have adopted a “mandatory” labeling policy that 
requires all GM foods to be clearly labeled as such.  In the United States and Canada 
(among other countries), a “voluntary” labeling policy has been adopted where producers 
in most circumstances may label their products as GM on a voluntary basis.  From a 
welfare perspective, the optimal choice of labeling policy by a governmental regulatory 
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body depends in part upon the balance between compliance and labeling costs and 
consumer preferences towards genetically engineered foods. Several analyses, including 
Berwald, Carter, and Gruere (2006), Crespi and Marette (2003), Kirchhoff and Zago 
(2001), and Lapan and Moschini (2004), have considered the implications resulting from 
the imposition of these two disparate labeling policies in a variety of contexts. 
While the contentious debate over labeling policies for GM foods continues, a 
new feature is beginning to be introduced.  To date, all commercially available GM food 
products have relied upon "transgenic" engineering techniques in which genes from a 
different organism (typically soil bacteria) are transferred into a commercial crop variety 
in order to yield a new product with a desired trait.  Yet, a new line of research has 
emerged around so-called "intragenic" engineering techniques in which genes from an 
alternative variety of the same species are transferred into a commercial crop variety.  
These new intragenic engineering techniques have the potential for genomic and 
metabolic pathway discoveries to be rapidly introduced into established commercial 
varieties to fast-track the breeding processes without introducing foreign DNA or 
antibiotic markers and to deliver new varieties that were previously impossible through 
conventional cross-breeding techniques.  For a more technical overview of intragenic 
versus transgenic engineering see Rommens et al. (2004). 
While consumers' view of non-GM as being weakly superior to GM has been well 
documented, little research has addressed exactly what aspect of the production of GM 
food products results in this inferiority.  Namely, is it the use of genetic techniques for 
producing a product that would otherwise not appear in nature, the presence of foreign 
genetic content, or a combination of both factors?  The answer to this question manifests 
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in whether consumers place a different value on intragenic foods when compared to 
otherwise equivalent transgenic foods (i.e., to what extent is intragenics weakly/strictly 
superior to transgenics).  Furthermore, if consumers do have non-equivalent preferences 
towards intragenic and transgenic food products, the debate over mandatory versus 
voluntary labeling policies is augmented with a new question: is it socially optimal to 
impose a labeling regime that differentiates between intragenic and transgenic GM? 
This chapter serves to address these questions, but takes a distinctly different 
approach from previous works studying the provision of quality in agriculture markets.  
In this chapter a model is developed where GM Free, intragenic GM, transgenic GM, and 
generically labeled GM foods are modeled as "vertically differentiated" goods ala Mussa 
and Rosen (1978).  In the model, consumers differ with respect to two taste parameters - 
dislike for genetic modification and dislike for foreign genetic content - as opposed to the 
typical assumption of a single taste parameter.24  In models of vertically differentiated 
goods, the typical approach for arriving at a tractable solution is to assume that consumer 
tastes are uniformly distributed along some interval.25,26  While this assumption may be 
appropriate in some contexts, this is highly questionable when considering tastes 
                                                 
24 The author is unaware of previous studies addressing the provision of quality in 
agricultural markets where consumers in a vertically differentiated product setup are 
modeled using more than one continuously distributed taste parameter. 
25 An exhaustive list of papers utilizing the assumption of uniformly distributed 
consumers within a vertically differentiated product model is extensive.  A sampling of 
relevant papers addressing product quality or labeling include: Berwald, Carter, and 
Gruere (2006), Crespi and Marette (2003), Giannakas (2002), Giannakas and Fulton 
(2002), Hamilton and Zilberman (2006), Hollander, Monier-Dilhan, and Ossard (1999), 
Moschini, Bulut, and Cembalo (2005), Scarpa (1998), Stivers (2003), and Valletti (2000). 
26 A notable exception is Lapan and Moschini (2007) where the assumption of uniformly 
distributed consumer tastes is only used in order to derive unambiguous comparative 
statics.  The authors show analytically that the reduced modeling burden from assuming 
uniform tastes does not come without a cost. 
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involving GM foods because, by construction, uniformity implies that the fraction of 
individuals who are indifferent between GM Free and GM alternatives is relatively 
minor.   
This chapter strives to move in the opposite direction away from an emphasis on 
tractability towards a more realistic characterization of consumer preferences.  To that 
end, the actual distributions of consumers’ taste preferences are estimated using data 
from a unique series of multiple-round random nth-price experimental auctions with 
randomly chosen adult consumers in two geographically separated cities.  In addition to 
randomized labeling treatments, biased and verifiable information on GM are injected 
into the experiment.  Using the estimated taste distributions and numerical methods it is 
possible to derive and evaluate a set of complex welfare functions under 
mandatory/voluntary labeling policies with/without labeling of intragenic and transgenic 
products.  Finally, these welfare estimates are compared to those found under the typical 
assumption in the literature of uniformly distributed consumer tastes. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In the following section a model with a 
vertically differentiated market structure for GM food products is developed.  Section 6.3 
derives consumer surplus functions under different government policies.  Section 6.4 
provides a brief overview of the conducted experimental auctions.  Section 6.5 develops 
and estimates a model of consumer taste distributions.  Section 6.6 evaluates welfare 
under different government labeling policies under the assumption of uniformly 
distributed tastes and using the distributions estimated in section 6.5.  Finally, section 6.7 
concludes the chapter. 
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6.2 Model of the Market for GM Foods 
In this section a theoretical model of the market for genetically modified food 
products is developed.  Firms are assumed to be able to produce three different products: 
GM Free (GMF), Intragenic GM (IGM), and Transgenic (TGM) with marginal costs 
, ,  (where ) respectively.27  Firms act 
competitively.  Depending upon the imposed government policy, food products may bear 
one of the following labels: GM Free, Intragenic GM, Transgenic GM, or GM (note, the 
generic GM label arises when intragenic/transgenic is not allowed to be included on the 
label).   
 
6.2.1 Compliance Costs 
Depending upon the government labeling policy imposed on the market, 
producers incur a number of compliance costs related to “identity preservation” activities 
(e.g. segregation, testing, and labeling costs).  We assume that compliance costs per unit 
of production (if they are incurred under the considered government policy) are 
, and  for intragenic, transgenic, and GM Free products respectively (where 
).28  While intragenic foods may face lower compliance costs 
foods, it is assumed that , else transgenic 
foods would completely exit the market. 
                                                
GMFC IGMC TGMC 0>>> TGMIGMGMF CCC
IGMt , 
TGMt GMFt
0≥≥≥ IGMTGMGMF ttt
compared to transgenic TGMTGMIGMIGM tCtC +>+
 
27 Implicitly in this specification it is assumed that a product cannot be intragenically and 
transgenically modified.  Relaxing this assumption is trivial, and would only modify the 
later described assumed setup for compliance costs. 
28 The assumed compliance cost relationship   reflects speculation that 
intragenic foods may face a lower regulatory hurdle. 
IGMTGM tt ≥
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6.2.2 Government Labeling Policies 
This chapter considers four alternative labeling policies.  Mandatory Policy 1, 
which corresponds to a modified29 version of the current policy of the EU (among other 
nations), mandates that all GM products must be labeled as GM.  No labeling of 
intragenic or transgenic is allowed.  Hence, the only GM product produced will be 
transgenic since .  Under this policy, GM Free products incur a 
compliance cost of and transgenic products incur a compliance cost of .  Under 
Mandatory Policy 2, again all products must be labeled, but now labeling of intragenic 
GM and transgenic  is permitted.  Compliance costs for GM Free, intragenic GM, and 
transgenic GM are , and  respectively.  Under Voluntary Policy 1, which 
corresponds to a modified version of the current policy in the US (among other nations), 
only products that seek the GM Free label incur a compliance cost of .  No labeling 
of intragenic or transg ic is allowed.  Hence no intragenic products will be produced.30  
Finally, under Volun  Policy 2, only products seeking the GM Free or intragenic GM 
labels incur comp  and  respectively.  In the perfectly competitive 
setting, equilibrium prices under each policy are given by table 6.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
TGMTGMIGMIGM tCtC +>+
GMFt TGMt
 GM
GMFt , IGMt TGMt
GMFt
en
tary
liance costs of GMFt IGMt
 
29 This policy is "modified" because no current governmental policy considers intragenic 
content since these products have not yet reached the market. 
30 Note that since , no producer would produce GM Free products and 
attempt to sell them under the inferior label. 
TGMIGMGMF CCC >>
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Table 6.1  Product Prices Under Different Government Policies 
 
 GMFP  IGMP  TGMP  GMP  
Mandatory Policy 1 - - GMFGMF tC +  TGMTGM tC +  
Mandatory Policy 2 - 
Voluntary Policy 1 - - 
Voluntary Policy 2 - 
GMFGMF tC +  IGMIGM tC +  TGMTGM tC +  
GMFGMF tC +  TGMC  
GMFGMF tC +  IGMIGM tC +  TGMC  
 
6.2.3 Consumers 
The impetus for labeling of food products derives from consumers' preferences 
towards GM food products.  As previously discussed, it is assumed that the preference 
ordering GM Free f  intragenic GM f  transgenic GM holds across consumers.  
Consumer preferences are modeled using a vertically differentiated demand structure.  
Typically in a model of this nature, consumers are differentiated according to a single 
"taste parameter".  In order to address the market at hand, it is necessary to partition the 
taste parameter into two components.  Let  denote a consumer's type with regards to 
"dislike" for genetic modification and let  denote a consumer's type with regards to 
"dislike" for foreign genetic content in food.  The first type parameter, , applies to 
preferences for both intragenic GM and transgenic GM products since bo lve some 
form of "unnatural" genetic production methods.  The second type param , applies 
only for the transgenic GM product since it is the only product that is produced with the 
additional negative attribute of aterial.  This specification of 
consumer types allows for differentiating th o components that make up "dislike" for 
transgenic food products.  Without loss of generality, consumer types are normalized to 
the unit interval, 
GMθ
Fθ
GMθ
th invo
eter, Fθ
containing foreign genetic m
e tw
[ ]1,0, ∈FGM θθ . 
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    Consumers are assumed to purchase at most one unit of one type of product 
depending upon those available under the imposed regulatory policy.  The indirect utility 
for a consumer of type { }FGM θθ ,  is 
(1) 
where  denotes the fixed utility from consuming a food product, 
FGMGMGM
FGMTGMTGM
GMIGMIGM
GMFGMF
PUU
PUU
PUU
PUU
γδθαθ
δθαθ
αθ
−−−=
−−−=
−−=
−=
 
U P  denotes price, α  
and δ  are non-negative intensity parameters, and [ ]1,0∈γ  is a parameter capturing 
consumers' expectation that a generically labeled GM product is transgenic.31
 
6.3 Welfare 
In this section, consumer surplus functions under policies allowing and not 
allowing labeling of intragenic GM and transgenic GM are setup, but not explicitly 
solved.  Due to the complexity of modeling two taste parameters with generic 
distributions, the explicit solution is quite lengthy, intractable, and uninformative.  In a 
later section, where the distributions of and  are empirically estimated using data 
collected through experimental auctions, it is feasible to numerically solve for welfare 
under different government policies.  Before solving for the consumer surplus functions it 
                                                
GMθ Fθ
 
31 Technically, under full information of labeling policies consumers should infer that a 
generically labeled GM product is in fact a transgenic product (i.e. 1=γ )
acilitate later discus
.  However, this 
is a source of contention and a feature of the argument by GM opponents for mandatory 
labeling.  To keep the model as general as possible and to f sion this 
expectation parameter is included throughout the derivations.  Later analysis is 
considered under both the full information setting in which 1=γ  and a partial information 
setting where [ )1,0∈γ . 
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is necessary to specify notationally the taste parameter distributions.  Let ( )GMGMk θ   and 
( )FFk θ  denote the probability distribution functions and ( )GMGMK θ  and ( )FFK θ
 and 
 is not allowed.  Given the 
tly preferred
 denote 
the cumulative distribution functions.32
 
6.3.1 Welfare when Labeling of Intragenic GM and Transgenic GM is Not Allowed 
In this section, welfare is considered under Mandatory Policy 1 Voluntary 
Policy 1 where labeling of intragenic GM and transgenic GM
specification of consumer preferences, the GM Free product will be stric  if 
 and vice versa for the GM product.  Given this preference 
 and  under which the GM Free product (or GM product) 
are strictly preferred is not uniquely defined.  Figure 6.1 provides a graphical 
representation of the four possib e cases that may arise.  The area above each line 
represents the set 
GMGMFFGM PP −>+ γδθαθ
structure, the ranges of GMθ Fθ
l
{ }Fθ,GMθ  under which the GM Free product is strictly preferred and 
below the line is where the GM product is strictly preferred.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 In an earlier version of this paper, a joint distribution function for and was 
considered in order to incorporate possible correlation between these two parameters. 
However, the experimental auction data used to calculate these parameters revealed less 
correlation than expected.  Hence the previous joint distribution approach was abandoned 
in favor of a relatively simpler independent specification. 
GMθ Fθ
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Figure 6.1 Bounds of Integration for Consumer Surplus Under Mandatory 
and Voluntary Policies 1 
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For the four possible cases, the conditions under which they may occur can be 
characterized by 
(2) 
Through a bit of algebra, the consumer surplus functions under each of the four possible 
cases can be expressed as: 
γδα
γδα
γδα
γδα
≤−≥−
≥−≥−
≥−≤−
≤−≤−
GMGMFGMGMF
GMGMFGMGMF
GMGMFGMGMF
GMGMFGMGMF
PPandPPDCase
PPandPPCCase
PPandPPBCase
PPandPPACase
:
:
:
:
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{ } { }
{ } { } FGMGMHFGM
G
GM
J
H
GM
FGMGMF
J
FGM
G
GMF
J
H
GMF
ddddCS
ddddCS
θθθθ
θθθθ
∫∫∫∫
∫∫∫∫
•+•=
•+•=
1
0
},0max{
0
1}1,min{
},0max{
1
0
1
}1,min{
1}1,min{
},0max{  (3) 
where ( ) ( )FFGMGMGMFGMF kkU θθ=• , ( ) ( )FFGMGMGMGM kkU θθ=• , ( )FGMGMF PPG γδθα −−= 1 , 
( )αγδ −−= GMGMF PPH 1 , and ( )GMGMF PPJ −= γδ1 . 
 As is evident from these consumer surplus functions, given the general 
specification of the model there is little intuition to be gained.  As well, it can be seen that 
in order to solve for an explicit solution would require a distributional assumption over 
tastes that the CDF is twice integrable with a closed form, severely restricting the class of 
distributions which could be utilized. 
 
6.3.2 Welfare when Labeling of Intragenic GM and Transgenic GM is Allowed 
In this section, welfare is considered under Mandatory Policy 2 and Voluntary 
Policy 2 where labeling of intragenic GM and transgenic GM is allowed.  Given the 
specification of consumer preferences, the following are the sufficient conditions on the 
taste parameters for each product to be strictly preferred. 
(4) 
δθδθαθ
δθαθ
δθαθαθ
TGMIGM
FTGMGMFFGM
TGMIGM
F
IGMGMF
GM
TGMGMFFGM
IGMGMF
GM
PPandPPTGM
PPandPPIGM
PPandPPGMF
−<−<+
−>−<
−>+−>
:
:
:
 
To this point, given the assumed competitive market setting, the only assumption built-up 
for prices is TGMIGMGMF PPP >> .  Without further restrictions, the ranges of and GMθ
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Fθ
genera
under which each product is strictly preferred are not characterized by a single set of 
conditions.  This significantly increases the complexity at hand, but allows for more 
lity.  To illustrate, figure 6.2 provides a graphical representation of the sets of 
{ }FGM θθ ,  under which each product is strictly preferred assuming that 1<−α
TGMGMF PP  
and 1<−δ
TGMIGM PP
Figure 6.2 
.   
 
Bounds of Integration for Consumer Surplus Under Mandatory 
and Voluntary Policies 2 Assuming ( ) 1/ <− αTGMGMF PP  
and ( ) 1/ <− δTGMIGM PP   
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Without placing price or parameter restrictions six feasible cases may occur.  Figure 6.3 
presents each of the possible cases.  In this graph, depending upon the parameters, the 
point at which the preference lines "cut the axis at 1" changes. 
 
Figure 6.3 Bounds of Integration for Consumer Surplus Under Mandatory 
and Voluntary Policies 2 
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While the presence of six possible cases increases the complexity in deriving expressions 
for consumer surplus, they can be expressed as 
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(5)  
where 
{ } { }
{ }
{ } { } FGML TGMQ
XR
FGM
Y
TGM
XR
TGM
FGM
Y
IGM
X
IGM
FGMGMF
Q
FGM
L
GMF
QXR
XR
GMF
ddddCS
ddCS
ddddCS
θθθθ
θθ
θθθθ
∫∫∫∫
∫∫
∫∫∫∫
•+•=
•=
•+•=
0
},1min{
}},max{,1min{
},1min{
0
}},max{,1min{
0
1
},1min{
},1min{
0
1
0
1
}1,min{
1}},1min{,,max{
},max{
  
( ) ( )FFGMGMGMFGMF kkU θθ=• , ( ) ( )FFGMGMIGMIGM kkU θθ=• , 
( ) ( )FFGMGMTGMTGM kkU θθ=• , δ αθ
GMTGMGMF PPL −−= , α
TGMGMF PPQ −= , 
α
δ−−=
TGMGMF PPR , α
IGMGMF PPX −= and δ
TGMIGM PPY −= . 
Again, as in the case of the welfare functions under policies without labeling of 
intragenic GM and transgenic GM, tractability is certainly not present in this model 
design.  Even under the assumption of uniform distributions, as opposed to the utilized 
generic setup, little intuition is to be gained due to the dual taste parameters.  But, as will 
be shown in later sections, the generality of the presented market design yields a much 
richer characterization of the welfare impact of different government labeling policies. 
 
6.4 Empirical Model 
Utilizing the bids from the experimental auctions, it is possible to estimate the 
distribution of the taste parameters  and .  Let  denote the bid by an 
individual  for a food product 
GMθ Fθ fLiB ,
Ii ,...,2,1= { }PotatoTomatoBroccolif ,,∈  with label 
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{ }GMTGMIGMGMF ,,,∈l .
model, consumer utility
(6) 
33  Using these conventions and following from the theoretical 
 can be restated as 
In the experimental auction, consumers were not faced with a choice based upon 
market prices, but instead submitted bids for what they are willing to pay for a product.  
The utilized auction mechanism, the nth-price auction, is incentive compatible meaning 
that an individual's optimal strategy is to submit a bid for a product equal to their 
willingness to pay (i.e. the price at which they would be indifferent between consuming 
the product or not).  Given the specification of preferences, the bid submitted by an 
individual is the price at which purchase would yield a utility equal to zero.  Thus we can 
express utility in terms of bids as 
(7) 
Rearranging these expressions we can solve for the relationship between bids and taste 
parameters 
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33 In the series of experimental auctions used for this chapter, participants did not bid on 
products labeled as GM (instead they were faced with a plain label case).  The absence of 
this information prevents explicit calculation of the expectation parameter γ  at the 
individual level.  In a second set of similar but modified experime
conducted in 2007, consumers did bid on products with a GM label.  
average value of 
ntal auctions also 
Using this data, an 
γ  across individuals was calculated and found to be equal to 
approximately 0.68.  While this estimate is not as robust as the estimates for and 
it is evidence that consumers are not characterized by the full information case (
GMθ Fθ  
1=γ ). 
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 (8) 
As can be seen in the above expression, given the information available from the 
experimental auction it is not possible to individually identify , , and 
.  But, given the generic space over which  and  are defined, if we assume 
these parameters are constrained to the unit interval  it must hold that 
(9) 
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in order to ensure that tastes are properly mapped to the dollar space. Thus, while we 
cannot explicitly solve for the parameters  and , we can place a lower bound on 
their values, which, as will be shown, is sufficient and revealing for subsequent 
analysis.34
Finally, while given the data available it is possible to consider each food product 
 separately, to simplify the analysis and concentrate the results reducing potential noise 
across products, consumer types are averaged across the three products (
fα  fδ
f
∑=
f
fGM
i
GM
i
,
3
1 θθ  
                                                 
34 Please note that clearly, given the information contained in bid differences, we could 
simply reformulate the model by combining intensity and type parameters into a single 
variable (for example fIGMifGMFifGMiffGMi BB ,,,,
~ −=≡ θαθ ) thereby dropping the 
normalization of consumer types to the unit interval.  We purposely choose not to in 
order to keep our model consistent with the structure typically used in theoretical and 
empirical applications and to facilitate comparisons. 
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Distribution
In both the theore
).35  This yields a composite calculation of each consumer's aversion to 
reign genetic content. 
6.4.1  of Taste Parameters 
tical and empirical models it was assumed that ]1,0[, ∈FiGMi θθ , 
ion governing these
 to fit.  One 
tion which can characterize a 
 CDF.  An 
cs the beta distribution but 
he PDF for the 
but no assumption was made regarding the specific distribut  
parameters.  Given the data provided by the experimental auction, we can actually 
estimate the governing distributions, but we require a distributional form
potential flexible form candidate would be the beta distribu
wide variety of potential forms, but suffers from not having a closed form
alternative, but less frequently utilized distribution which mimi
with a closed form PDF and CDF, is the Kumaraswamy distribution.  T
Kumaraswamy distribution is  and the CDF is  where 
One of the drawbacks of the Kumaraswamy distribution (and similarly the beta 
distribution) is that it, by construction, has zero probability at the endpoints 0 and 1 
).  Hence, while the distribution is flexible over the internal interval (0,1) it 
does not allow for potential masses of individuals at 0 or 1.  This is highly unsatisfactory 
in that it does not allow for individuals to have preferences such that products are weakly 
superior (i.e. it forces strict superiority).  To remedy this shortcoming, a piecewise 
                                                
11 )1( −− −= baa xabxf baxF )1(1 −−=
0, >ba . 
( 0)1()0( == ff
 
35 Conducted sensitivity analysis showed that averaging across types did not qualitatively 
change the results of the model and had a minor impact on quantitative estimates. 
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distribution is defined.  Let },{ FGM=Ψ , Ψ0  denote the fraction of individuals with 
0=Ψiθ , and  denote the fraction of individuals with Ψ1 1=Ψiθ .  Define the piecewise 
Kumaraswamy CDF as  
(10) 
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iF θwhere  denotes the standard Kumaraswamy CDF.  With this piecewise modified 
version of the Kumaraswamy distribution we have an extremely flexible distribution over 
the interval (0,1) that will allow for nontrivial positive masses at the endpoints. 
 
6.4.2 Estimates of Taste Parameter Distributions 
For estimating the distribution of individuals with 10 << Ψiθ  the likelihood 
function is 
(11) 
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Since there is no closed form solution to the likelihood function, the parameters  and 
 are estimated using numerical simulations.  Table 6.2 presents the estimated 
parameters of the piecewise defined Kumaraswamy distribution for participants receiving 
different information treatments (“All” denotes all participants and all information 
treatments). 
 
 
Ψa
Ψb
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Table 6.2  Parameter Estimates of Piecewise Kumaraswamy Distribution 
 
 GM0  Fb  F0GMa GMb Fa
ALL 0.51 0.75 1.13 0.51 0.80 2.82 
No Info 0.53 1.01 1.40 0.59 0.90 5.40 
Pro-Biotech 0.70 1.50 15.20 0.45 1.12 2.27 
Anti-Biotech 0.29 0.98 0.82 0.65 0.66 2.07 
Pro & Anti 0.42 0.58 0.88 0.29 0.81 1.31 
Pro, Anti, & Ver. 0.59 1.08 2.48 0.65 1.30 6.90 
 
As can be seen from table 6.2, for each information treatment a significant percentage of 
individuals are of type 0=GMθ  or 0=Fθ  
nic or trans
ly distribu
meaning that these individuals are indifferent 
between GM Free and the intrage genic alternatives.  This is the first clear 
indication that by assuming uniform ted tastes the impact of GM on utility is 
overstated.  To gain a clearer picture of the estimated taste distributions, figure 6.4 
presents the estimated PDFs over the interval 10 << Ψiθ  and figure 6.5 presents the 
estimated CDFs over the interval 10 ≤≤ Ψiθ . 
From figures 6.4 and 6.5 it is clear that a uniform distribution does not 
appropriately characterize individuals' tastes for either genetic modification or foreign 
genetic content.  A uniform distribution drastically overestimates the fraction of 
individuals of non-zero type as well as the percentage of individuals of higher order types 
(i.e. types approaching one).  This arises even though the parameter α used for estimating 
these distributions is potentially less than the "true" α that characterizes the population.36  
These results raise the question as to whether previous analyses addressing the impact of 
                                                 
36 Note that from the derivation of the taste parameters that GMθ  and Fθ  are 
monotonically decreasing in α . 
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labeling (or other quality market applications) are potentially significantly overestimating 
the impact of consumer types on welfare.   
 
Figure 6.4 Estimates of Kumaraswamy PDF for 10 << Ψiθ  
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10 ≤≤ Ψiθ  Figure 6.5 Estimates of Kumaraswamy CDF for 
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Comparing across information treatments, we can see that both dislike for genetic 
modification of food and foreign genetic content in food play a role in the weakly inferior 
nature of intragenic and transgenic food products.  Neither attribute can be characterized 
as being the dominant factor.  We see that consumers do view intragenic food products 
differently and weakly superior to transgenic food products.  The effect of the 
information treatments on the fraction of individuals with 0=GMθ  or 0=Fθ  falls in line 
with expectations.  Seventeen percent more individuals who received the pro-biotech 
perspective are of type 0=GMθ
.  As well, the distribution of those with 
 as compared to those receiving the no information 
treatment 0>GMθ  is more heavily massed 
towards zero.  For those receiving the anti-biotech perspective the result is reversed, with 
14% fewer individuals being of type 0=GMθ  and the distribution being more heavily 
weighted towards one over the range 0>GMθ .  An interesting, but not unexpected result 
arises for the distribution of Fθ  by those individuals who received the pro-biotech 
perspective.  The fraction of those individuals with 0=Fθ  is actually 14% less than the 
no information treatment and the estimated distribution is fairly diffuse over the unit 
interval.  While seeming surprising, since the pro-biotech and the verifiable information 
perspectives were the only information treatments that contained specifics regarding 
intragenic and transgenic processes, it is apparent that the emphasis on foreign genetic 
material increased participants' concerns regarding this content. 
Finally, when comparing the distributions of the pro- and anti-biotech 
perspectives with and without verifiable information we can see that the 3rd party 
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information has an augmenting effect on the fraction of individuals that have 0=GMθ  or 
0=Fθ  (17% and 36% respectively).  This implies that the verifiable information acts to 
dampen the effect of the anti-biotech perspective.   
 
6.5 Welfare Estimates 
Using the estimated distributions from the empirical model and experimental 
auction data, it is now possible to evaluate welfare under the four considered government 
labeling policies.  Since the welfare functions are largely intractable and the assumed 
piecewise Kumaraswamy distribution does not have a closed form single or double 
integral over the CDF, it is necessary to evaluate welfare using numerical methods.  To 
estimate welfare under each government policy, the consumer surplus functions detailed 
in the model section are evaluated via numerical integration using an adaptive Simpson 
quadrature algorithm. 
For brevity, results are presented using parameter estimates across all of the 
information treatments (i.e. the entire auction sample), but the accompanying discussion 
relates the alternative information treatments with the presented results.  Figure 6.6 
compares welfare between policies that do and do not allow for labeling of intragenic 
products (i.e. mandatory or voluntary policy 2 vs. mandatory or voluntary 1).  Here, the 
price of the transgenic GM product is normalized to one and the relative prices of the 
intragenic GM and GM Free products are considered over the intervals [1,1.2] and [1,1.4] 
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respectively.37  Figure 6.7 compares welfare between voluntary and mandatory policies 
that do not allow labeling of intragenic foods (voluntary policy 1 vs. mandatory policy 1).  
Here, the production cost of the transgenic GM product is normalized to one and the 
transgenic compliance cost ( ) and price of the GM Free are considered over the 
intervals [0,0.05] and [1,1.4] respectively.  Finally, figure 6.8 compares welfare under 
voluntary policy 2 using the em lly estimated taste distributions with those that arise 
under the assumption of unifor ly distributed tastes.  All results in the figures are 
presented as a percentage difference in aggregate welfare under the considered policies 
and distributional assumptions and estimated assuming full consumer information (
GMt
pirica
m
1=γ ). 
As can be seen by figure 6.6, there are small welfare gains under mandatory and 
voluntary policies with the introduction of intragenic labeling.  These welfare gains are 
substantial only when the production and compliance costs for the intragenic product are 
nearly equivalent to the transgenic, but 25% (or more) lower than for the GM Free.  Only 
then is the price differential sufficiently great to induce a large percentage of consumers 
to switch to the intragenic product and yield large welfare gains.  For example, if the 
price of the intragenic product is 5% greater than for the transgenic product and 25% less 
than the GM Free there is approximately a 5% increase in welfare.  The welfare gains 
from introducing intragenic labeling is lower than one might potentially expect (or find 
under the assumption of uniform tastes) because the experimental auction revealed that a 
significant percentage of individuals are indifferent between the GM Free and GM 
                                                 
37 Prices are considered over reasonable ranges since price data does not exist for 
intragenic products. 
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alternatives.  Under information treatments that increase aversion to foreign genetic 
content in food the difference in welfare between the two policies increases. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Welfare With Vs. Without Labeling of Intragenic Products 
 
 
Comparing voluntary and mandatory policies that do not allow labeling of 
intragenic foods (figure 6.7) we find that, depending upon the cost for transgenic 
products to comply with a mandatory policy, that there is small difference in welfare.  
For example, if the compliance cost is $0.02 for the transgenic product (i.e. 2% of the 
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production cost) a voluntary policy translates into a welfare gain of over 3% when 
compared to a mandatory policy.  The welfare gain under a voluntary policy is 
monotonically increasing in the price of the GM Free product and the transgenic 
compliance cost.  Under information treatments that reduce aversion to the transgenic 
product the welfare gains are even larger.  For brevity, results comparing mandatory and 
voluntary policies that do allow labeling of intragenic foods are not shown, but the 
welfare differences are very similar to those shown in figure 6.7.  
 
Figure 6.7 Welfare Under Voluntary Policy 1 Vs. Mandatory Policy 1 
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Comparing welfare under the estimated distributions with the typical literature 
assumption of uniformly distributed tastes, figure 6.8, it can be seen that uniformity 
drastically under estimates welfare because it fails to appropriately model the significant 
fraction of individuals who are indifferent between the alternatives and the skewed 
characterizing distribution of consumers.  Similar results are found under different 
labeling policies.  Under information treatments where the share of type zero consumers 
increases or the distribution of tastes is massed towards zero, the mischaracterization of 
welfare under uniformity is greater.   
 
Figure 6.8 Welfare Under Voluntary Policy 2: Estimated Distribution Vs.  
Uniform Distribution 
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Finally, while all of the results presented here assume full consumer information 
regarding the type of genetic modification used in the production of a generically labeled 
GM food product ( 1=γ ), relaxing this assumption (i.e. 1<γ ) has an interesting effect in 
that it actually increases welfare under po of intragenic and 
transgenic products (mandatory and voluntary policies 1).  Given the model setup, 
welfare from consumption of GM products is monotonically increasing in 
licies without labeling 
γ .  This is an 
interesting case where ignorance or misinformation increases welfare.   
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
As new intragenic biotechnology engineering techniques improve and these 
products begin to enter worldwide food markets, the GM labeling and compliance 
policies of governments internationally will be forced to adapt.  In this paper a model of 
consumer demand for GM Free, Intragenic GM, and Transgenic GM food products is 
developed where consumers are characterized based upon two distinct taste parameters.  
Using experimental auction bid-price data the distribution of consumer tastes is estimated 
in order facilitate an analysis of consumer welfare under alternative labeling regimes.  
Additionally, by injecting biased and verifiable information into the experimental 
auctions allows evaluation of the shifts in the distributions of tastes resulting from these 
new perspectives.  The estimated distributions of consumer tastes unequivocally reveal 
that a uniform distribution fails to properly characterize consumers.  The welfare 
estimates clearly show that policies that differentiate between intragenic and transgenic 
food products yield greater aggregate welfare for consumers.  Furthermore, it is shown 
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that a voluntary policy is superior from a welfare perspective to a comparable mandatory 
policy. 
    Finally, the results of this paper show that while assuming uniformly 
distributed consumer tastes may not qualitatively change models of demand for quality, 
this assumption is clearly inappropriate for empirical endeavors.  At a minimum, if 
tractability is of concern, the presented results suggest that it would be prudent to model 
consumers utilizing a piecewise uniform distribution, as opposed to a standard uniform 
distribution, allowing for a significant mass of individuals to be indifferent between 
products of different qualities. 
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CHAPTER 7: DEMAND CURVE EFFECTS IN EXPERIMENTAL 
AUCTIONS: THE EFFECT OF HOLDING PRE-EXPERIMENT 
INVENTORIES  
7.1 Introduction 
Experimental auctions have become an increasingly common mechanism for 
eliciting consumers' willingness to pay (WTP).  In part, the increased prominence of 
experimental auctions derives from their theoretically demand revealing properties.  That 
is, unlike a hypothetical survey, participants have a dominant strategy to truthfully reveal 
their preferences through their bids.  Comparisons between value estimates from 
experimental auctions have shown this is indeed the case (e.g., see Fox et al., 1998; List, 
2001). 
While experimental auctions are demand revealing in theory, there has been much 
attention in the literature focusing on the “proper” design of auctions.  There has been 
discussion regarding whether participants should bid on products in repeated rounds with 
posted prices (e.g., List and Shogren, 1999; Corrigan and Rousu, 2006b), the effect of 
endowing participants with products (e.g., Corrigan and Rousu, 2006a), and the impact of 
laboratory versus market environments (e.g., Lusk and Fox, 2003). 
Across studies, one area where most experimental auction methods are consistent 
is in dealing with potential substitution or negatively sloped demand-curve effects.  These 
effects occur when participants' bids are affected through the potential of obtaining 
multiple units of a product during the auction.  Researchers usually prevent this 
possibility by having only one round of bidding (on one unit of a commodity) in the 
118 
auction serve as the "binding" round where participants can win products (e.g., Dickinson 
and Bailey, 2002; Alfnes and Rickertsen, 2003; Rousu et al. 2007). 
Although researchers have been careful to control for demand curve effects within 
experimental auction, they have ignored the potential effects on bids of inventories that 
participants may hold of products similar to those up for auction.  As previously 
mentioned, a demand-revealing auction theoretically elicits a consumers' reservation 
price for a product.  If bidders may at most win a single unit of the product, then their 
bids reflect their reservation price for a single unit.  But, the fact that bidding is on only a 
single unit does not yield the researcher any information as to whether consumers are in 
fact bidding on their 1st or nth (n>1) unit of the product.  This arises because it is 
possible that they currently posses the product through a previous transaction unrelated to 
the auction.  Hence, to the researcher it is unknown whether bids reflect reservation 
prices for the 1st or nth unit of the product. 
Omitting inventories presents problems in the standard design and analysis of 
experimental auction data.38  First, if bids by otherwise equivalent individuals with and 
without inventories are the same, experimental auctions may not properly access 
willingness to pay or demand.  Namely, it would raise the question of whether consumers 
fully consider their monetary and non-monetary endowments in the somewhat “artificial” 
market environment of the experimental auction.  Conversely, if consumers with and 
without units of the product do in fact bid differently as theory dictates, this can present a 
                                                 
38 Please note that while this chapter in particular considers the impact of quantity owned 
in the context of experimental auctions, the implications extend beyond auctions.  Other 
mechanisms commonly used to elicit preferences or valuations (e.g. stated choice 
experiments) will potentially be affected by the same issue. 
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problem for previous studies in that bids are compared from individuals at different 
points on their demand curves.  In addition, if a researcher does not know where an 
individual bidding in an auction is on his demand curve, it is not possible to distinguish 
preferences from demand curve effects.  For example, an individual who submits a small 
bid for a product could either have low preferences for the product or high preferences 
for the product, but with quantity already owned.  As illustrated in the next section, this 
has implications for the interpretation and application of auction data, particularly when 
considering non-durable commodities that are purchased on a repeated basis. 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of outside inventories on WTP in a 
random nth-price auction with fresh broccoli, tomatoes, and potatoes as commodities.  
After completing the rounds of bidding, participants were asked if they currently have 
any of the auctioned products at home.  Since the auctioned vegetables have a short shelf-
life, we propose that individuals with inventory would have lower bids conditional on 
properly controlling for other confounding factors.  Regression analysis indicates that 
there is a significant inventory or "quantity owned effect".  This result has important 
implications for the design of experimental auctions where the target is elicitation and 
analysis of willingness to pay. 
The chapter is outlined as follows.  The next section provides a simple model of 
bidding when pre-experiment outside inventories are held.  Section 7.3 describes the 
auction procedures.  Section 7.4 summarizes bids by individuals with and without 
quantity owned.  Section 7.5 presents estimates of a fixed-effects regression model.  
Finally, the chapter is concluded. 
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7.2 Model of Auction Bids 
To illustrate how product inventories can affect consumers’ bids in an 
experimental auction we present a simple model of product demand and bidding 
behavior.  Consider a representative consumer with a per unit of time monetary budget of 
Y  (e.g., a weekly food budget) to be allocated over a choice set of  goods denoted 
by 
1+N
},{ xz  where z  is a scalar and  is a vector of x N  goods.  Let ma
goods be denoted  and  respec ly.  At the tim  the auction, the consumer may 
e of the products in their resource set (i.e. products 
that have been purchased but not consumed/depleted during the time period).  For 
simplicity of , we consider an individual who (potentially) holds inventories 
only of good 
rket prices for the 
w p tive e of
potentially hold inventories of som
 exposition
z  and denote the quantity already owned as z  (where 0≥z ).  We assume 
that there is no resale market for these inventories (or equivalently that the transaction 
cost for resale is sufficiently high).  As well, we assume that a unit of a similar good that 
is purchased in an experimental auction is a perfect substitute for a corresponding unit in 
inventory.  Given the choice set of goods, market prices, product inventory, and resource 
constraints, the representative consumer solves a utility maximization problem whose 
dual representation is the following expenditure minimization problem: 
(1)  0,,),(..,min),,( ≥≥++= xzUxzzUtspxwzUpwe . 
Immediately from the optimization specification we see that if the consumer holds 
inventories ( 0>z
classic textbook representation.  Here, 
), the expenditure minimization problem departs slightly from the 
z  represents the net demand for the good (i.e. the 
e consumer would purchase,quantity of additional units th  z  is the quantity already 
121 
owned, and the sum zz +
nd functions, 
 is total demand (i.e., the aggregate quantity that would be 
consumed over an appropriate time interval).  For each commodity optimization yields 
compensated dema ),,( Upwhzz =+  and ),,( Upwhx = , and inverse 
compensated demand functions (or “WTP curves”), ),,(zw += Upzπ  and 
),,( Uwxp π= .  The expression ),,( Upzz +π  represents the price the consumer is 
willing to pay for the )( zz + ’th unit. 
 easure, we are able to express the 
consumer’s WTP for an additional unit of good 
Now, appealing to the compensating variation m
z .  Assumi
atible auction, th
they would be indiffe
ly equal to the area un
change in quantity.  A
ty z, their auction bid is 
ng that the consumer engages 
in a fully demand revealing incentive comp ey should submit a bid equal 
to the maximum amount of money such that rent between winning 
the auction or not.  This amount is simp der the inverse 
compensated demand function arising from the ssuming that the 
consumer is bidding on a single unit of commodi
(2) ∫ += 10 ),,( dzUpzzBidz π . 
The bid expression shows that product inventories can have an impact on bid levels.  
Specifically, as would be expected, given that π  is a non-increasing function in quantity, 
it follows that the bid level is non-increasing in inventory z .  Hence, we would expect 
bids by an individual with inventory who is otherwise identical to an individual without 
inventory to be smaller. 
  While from the preceding model it is clear that units held in inventory can 
decrease a consumer’s bid-price in an auction, from a researcher’s perspective the 
question remains: is this a concern?  The answer depends upon the target of the inquiry 
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and the nature of the goods being considered.  For durable goods that are infrequently 
replaced, consumers’ bid-prices conditional on inventories represents their willingness to 
pay for an additional unit in both the near and more distant future.  This is likely the 
target value a researcher studying these types of goods is seeking, and hence, assuming 
bidders do in fact consider their inventories when bidding, should receive appropriate bid 
data.   
However, for studies involving non-durable goods that degrade and are 
characterized by repeated replenishment (e.g., food items that spoil), bids will reflect 
current conditions, not the near future where inventories are consumed and potentially 
replaced (e.g., after the refrigerator is depleted and the consumer returns to the 
supermarket).  Using bids without considering the impact of inventories prohibits 
appropriate analysis of arguably the primary target of such studies, behavior in the next 
purchase scenario when inventory is depleted.39   
Furthermore, inventories present a problem when comparing bids across 
individuals.  Since those individuals with higher preferences for the auction commodity 
are the most likely to be purchasers of the product in the outside market, they are also 
more likely to be holding inventories at the time of the experiment.  For individuals with 
lower preferences, the converse is likely.  Hence, there is a greater likelihood that bids by 
those individuals who have high preferences are pushed downwards due to them being 
most probable to be holding inventories.  Therefore, high preference individuals may 
appear to the researcher as low preference individuals.  This would be most problematic 
                                                 
39 It could be argued that the potential impact of inventories on bids is more significant in 
laboratory experiments compared to field experiments given the likelihood of consumers 
holding smaller or no inventories when arriving to shop at the field experiment location. 
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for products with relatively inelastic demand curves.  Again, while this may not be a 
problem for durable goods, when considering products such as perishable food items this 
could lead to bid and welfare analyses that does not appropriately characterize “next 
period” demand. 
 
7.3 Summary of Auction Design 
 The bidding data used in this study is part of a larger project to assess consumers’ 
willingness to pay for genetically modified (GM) and GM Free foods.  Participants in the 
study were solicited from the general public by the Iowa State University Center for 
Survey Statistics and Methods.  Potential participants were invited to participate in a 
university study for $45 in compensation, but were not told beforehand the nature of the 
project.  Willing participants were given their choice between four different session 
starting times and provided with directions to the site of the experiments.  The steps of 
each experimental session are as follows. 
 After participants completed a brief questionnaire and consent forms, the session 
leader provided instructions and examples about the random nth-price auction (Shogren 
et al., 1994) which was used in the study.  Participants were further trained on the 
mechanism by engaging in a two-round practice auction.  After the training period, 
participants were randomly assigned one of five different information treatments 
containing perspectives on genetic modification.  The information treatments included 
combinations of pro-biotech, anti-biotech, and third-party perspectives on genetic 
modification.  A no information treatment was also included as a control.   
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 After participants finished reading their respective information treatments, the 
session monitor led the participants through a multi-round random nth-price auction.  
Bids were collected by the session monitor after each round and not posted until all 
bidding rounds were completed and the single binding round was announced.  In each 
round three separate products were placed up for sale: broccoli (1 lb.), beefsteak tomatoes 
(1 lb.), and russet potatoes (5 lb.).  For the purposes of this study, we are utilizing bidding 
data on GM Free labeled products and Plain labeled products (“Plain label” denotes a 
product that bore a label only detailing the product name and weight with no descriptor of 
genetic modification). 
 After completion of the bidding rounds participants were asked to complete an 
exit questionnaire.  Among the included questions, three key responses are utilized in this 
study.  For each commodity (broccoli, tomatoes, and potatoes) participants were asked if 
they (1) currently have any of the vegetable at home, (2) regularly purchase the 
vegetable, and (3) regularly eat the vegetable.  After finishing the exit questionnaire, 
winners of the auction proceeded to a separate room to purchase their products and non-
winners were free to leave. 
 
7.4 Bid Summary 
In this section, a summary of the auction participants' bids is provided.  Table 7.1 
shows the proportion of individuals who indicated that they (1) had the product at home 
at the time of the auction, (2) regularly eat the food product, and (3) regularly purchase 
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the food product.40  More than half of the sample regularly eats and purchases each of the 
three commodities.  As well, slightly more than half of the sample at the time of the 
auction had fresh broccoli and tomatoes at home, and nearly 90% of the auction 
participants had fresh potatoes in inventory.   
 
Table 7.1 Summary Statistics for Current Inventory and Habit Variables 
 
Variable Variable Definition Broccoli Tomato Potato 
Purchase 1 if regularly purchase product 0.60 0.58 0.77 
Eat 1 if regularly eat product 0.61 0.65 0.81 
Have 1 if currently have product at home 0.60 0.58 0.89 
 
Table 7.2 summarizes average bids for Plain label and GM Free food products, 
broken-down by responses to whether bidders have the product currently at home, eat and 
purchase regularly.  A null hypothesis of no significant difference in bid prices across 
responses was tested (an unpaired t-test).  Individuals who currently have the commodity 
at home have a lower average bid price for some, but not all of the Plain label and GM 
Free commodities.  For none of the food products is the mean difference in bids by those 
with and without inventory statistically different.  This result, when viewed in isolation, 
fails to confirm the expectation that individuals with quantity owned would bid less than 
individuals without quantity owned. 
When comparing average bids by individuals who eat or purchase the 
commodities with those who do not, the difference in bids is greater and statistically 
significant at the 10% significance level for Plain label and GM Free broccoli and 
                                                 
40 As would be expected, the correlation between regularly eat and regularly purchase is 
nearly one. 
126 
tomatoes.  This result is in line with expectations in that regularity of consumption and 
purchase are proxies for individual preferences for the commodities.   
 
Table 7.2 Mean Bids for Food Products 
 
  Have Eat Purchase
Product Label Yes No Diff Yes No Diff Yes No Diff 
Broccoli Plain  1.21 1.28 -0.07 1.42 0.95 0.47** 1.43 0.95 0.48** 
Tomato Plain 1.42 1.12 0.30 1.67 0.59 1.08** 1.72 0.71 1.01** 
Potato Plain 2.05 1.94 0.11 2.04 1.98 0.07 2.07 1.91 0.16 
Broccoli GMF 1.41 1.49 -0.07 1.57 1.24 0.33 1.59 1.23 0.36* 
Tomato GMF 1.52 1.29 0.23 1.77 0.78 0.99** 1.82 0.88 0.93** 
Potato GMF 2.17 2.50 -0.33 2.14 2.50 -0.36 2.17 2.34 -0.17 
(*), (**), and (***) denote variable significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
 
While the unconditional analysis of bids presented in table 7.2 does not provide 
substantial evidence as to whether inventories affect bid prices, this is not an unexpected 
result, given that other individual-specific factors affecting WTP are not controlled for.  
Regression analysis presented in the following section yields more conclusive evidence 
on the impact of inventories. 
 
7.5 Econometric Model and Estimates 
In order to isolate whether quantity owned impacts bid-prices and to control for 
other potential confounding factors, a linear fixed-effects model is estimated.  The 
dependent variable is consumers’ bid-prices stacked over the three commodities 
(broccoli, tomato, and potato) and the two labeling treatments (Plain label and GM Free).  
Fixed effects are included for each of the auctioned commodities.  The two key 
independent variables for this study are dummies for have and purchase which 
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respectively denote if the participant responded that he/she currently have the vegetable 
in inventory at home and if he/she regularly purchases the vegetable.41  Additional 
explanatory variables were included to control for other demographic and preference 
attributes that may affect bid-prices include: dummy variables for each information 
treatment (no information treatment dummy omitted), income (in thousands), gender (1 if 
female), informed (1 if participant responded as being well or extremely well informed 
about GM), opinion (1 if the participant responded as having a supportive opinion of 
GM), education (years of schooling), environmental member (1 if member of an 
environmental group), and healthiness of diet (self assessed healthiness of diet on a 10 
point scale).  Regression estimates are presented in table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 Fixed Effects Regression Results (N=342) 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Have -0.238* 0.109 
Purchase 0.384** 0.115 
Info Treatment 1 0.127 0.147 
Info Treatment 2 -0.197 0.165 
Info Treatment 3 0.456** 0.151 
Info Treatment 4 -0.374* 0.176 
Income 0.004** 0.001 
Informed 0.285 0.223 
Opinion 0.222 0.147 
Gender -0.072 0.131 
Education -0.059* 0.025 
Envi Member -0.600* 0.285 
Healthiness of Diet 0.034 0.029 
Constant 1.962** 0.432 
(*), (**), and (***) denote variable significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
 
                                                 
41 Due to the high multicollinearity between responses to regularity of “purchase” and 
“eat”, only a dummy variable for purchase is included. 
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 The coefficient estimate associated with have is negative (-0.238) and statistically 
significant at the five percent level (p=0.030).  This result shows, controlling for other 
confounding factors, that participants with product inventories acquired outside of the 
auction do submit lower bids than those individuals who do not have outside inventories.  
This result supports the hypothesis that consumers in an experimental auction, even 
conducted in a laboratory style setting, do submit bids reflecting their global willingness 
to pay - conditional on both their monetary and non-monetary endowment - as standard 
theory suggests.  In addition, this result gives further credence that despite the partially 
“artificial” nature of experiments, consumers evaluate their willingness to pay 
considering outside factors just as occurs when making decisions in a conventional 
market. 
 The coefficient for purchase is positive (0.384) and significant at the one percent 
level indicating that individuals who regularly purchase the commodity in the outside 
market are willing to pay more in the auction than those who do not regularly purchase 
the commodity.  This falls in line with expectations in that we would expect individuals 
who are regular purchasers in the outside market (i.e. individuals with a WTP greater 
than the market price) to bid more than non-regular purchasers (i.e. individuals with a 
WTP less than the market price).   
 Several additional variables, which we do not focus on here, were found to be 
significant in explaining bid-prices including income, education, environmental member, 
and two of the information treatments. 
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7.6 Concluding Remarks 
While most studies utilizing experimental auctions take care to avoid possible bid 
biases arising from substitution and negatively sloped demand-curve effects within an 
auction, this is the first study to the knowledge of the authors to consider the impact of 
demand-curve effects arising from inventories acquired outside the auction.  The 
implications of this study are a bit double-edged.  On the positive side, the estimates of 
the impact of quantity owned on bidding behavior agree with basic economic demand 
theory and indicate that participants in auctions do in fact consider their non-monetary 
endowment when placing bids on food products.  If this were not the case, it would raise 
the question of whether experimental auctions truly capture consumers' market decisions.   
  Given these demand-curve effects of inventories, problems arise in interpreting 
bids submitted in other experimental auctions.  If information about inventories is not 
solicited from auction participants, then it is not possible to distinguish where individuals 
are on their demand curve.  Hence, it is not possible to distinguish whether a low bid is 
because an individual in fact has a low WTP for the product, or simply because they are 
further along their demand curve due to inventories held of similar products.  Whether 
experimental auction bids are used for assessing market demand, policy impacts, or 
welfare effects, this uncertainty about what bids actually reflect presents a problem and 
could lead to biased or simply incorrect estimates and conclusions.   
The results of this study raise a number of potential avenues for further research.  
A common dilemma in experimental auctions is the prevalence of bids of zero.  The 
author is left asking whether for many experimental auctions that consider valuations for 
products with steep or binary demand curves if a portion of the zero bids could be 
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explained by inventories.  A second issue, not considered explicitly in this study, is what 
is the impact of substitute or complement goods that are already in a household’s 
inventory?  This is an interesting question not only because of the potential impact on 
bidding behavior, but also because it raises the possibility that researchers might need to 
assess a wide array of demand curve effects for each auctioned commodity.  Finally, one 
shortcoming of this paper is that we did not ask consumers to report the exact quantity of 
fresh vegetables held in inventory coming into our experimental auction.  While this was 
done by design over concerns regarding the vagaries of vegetable sizes and weights, 
future research might elicit this information and permit an in depth analysis of inventories 
on WTP curves. 
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CHAPTER 8: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Despite more than a decade of experience, genetic modification continues to be a 
highly controversial issue worldwide and a source of confusion among consumers.  
While, as discussed in chapter 2, many US consumers have formed strong opinions in 
favor or in opposition to GMOs, a significant percentage of consumers still have not been 
swayed and still consider themselves poorly informed about the benefits and hazards of 
GM.  Given the immense financial stakes surrounding genetic modification and the 
transformative impact of domestic and global adoption of GM on agricultural production, 
both controversial and verifiable information has the potential to significantly affect 
agricultural policy and markets through shifts in consumer attitudes towards GM.   
 While many of the controversial issues surrounding GMOs have remained 
stagnant and unresolved since their emergence (e.g., labeling, traceability), GM 
technology itself has been evolving.  Biotechnology companies have continued to 
develop new GM varieties with increasingly sophisticated attributes of interest to 
agricultural producers (e.g., insect resistance, insect protection, and herbicide tolerance), 
offering producers potentially greater and more stable crop yields.  Continuing this trend, 
intragenic engineering offers the potential to dramatically alter the agricultural landscape 
and market for foodstuffs.  Intragenics promises GM foods engineered without the use of 
outside genetic material or antibiotic markers, thereby shifting GMOs back towards the 
realm of conventional cross-bred varieties and eliminating a primary concern present in 
transgenic foods.  As well, intragenics offer the potential for foods engineered with 
attributes of direct value to consumers that simply are not feasible through conventional 
non-GM crop development methods.   
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Yet, when attempting to evaluate the potential for intragenic foods with enhanced 
consumer attributes, two key questions loom.  First, do consumers sufficiently value 
attributes such as enhanced levels of antioxidants and vitamin C if it is derived through 
genetic modification (intragenic and transgenic) and is this value sufficiently great to 
overcome the discount that consumers place on GM foods?  Second, as consumers gain 
more experience with intragenic foods and are exposed to information on the benefits and 
risks of GM, how will information affect consumers’ valuations and the market potential 
for intragenic foods?  Both of these questions are at the heart of this dissertation and are 
critical for policymakers and the various actors with a stake in GM and conventional food 
markets.   
Our results provide evidence for the first time that consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for a GM food relative to a conventional product (chapter 3).  Specifically, bid 
price data for three types of fresh vegetables collected through an experimental auction 
indicate that the additional benefit of enhanced vitamin and antioxidant outweighs the 
negative attribute of intragenic production methods, thus resulting in a premium over 
conventional vegetables.  This result indicates that, for the first time, the food industry 
may have an incentive to voluntarily label GM food products as GM (or with a 
trademark).  Chapter 6 provides estimates of the welfare gain from labeling policies that 
permit differentiation of intragenic foods from transgenic foods. 
 Yet, while the bid price data provides evidence in support for the potential of 
intragenic foods with enhanced attributes, the results presented in chapters 3 and 4 clearly 
indicate that information (controversial and verifiable) has a significant impact on 
valuations and has the potential to open or close the market on these new foods.  Given 
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the novelty of intragenic foods and the still prevalent uncertainty in general over GM 
among consumers, verifiable information by independent organizations can serve a 
valuable role in enabling consumers to make informed product purchase decisions 
(chapter 5).   
In addition to the new policy issues addressed in this dissertation, the methods and 
models employed for analysis offer several advancements for the economics literature.  
The experimental procedure utilized for soliciting consumers’ WTP extends recent 
procedural advances to control for additional factors including potential group treatment 
effects within the experiment.  Furthermore, the consideration of the impact of outside 
product inventories on bidding behavior is a previously overlooked issue.  The Bayesian 
SUR Tobit model used to assess the impact of information on WTP is new to auction bid-
price analysis.  The econometric model, with minimal researcher imposed structure, 
simultaneously addresses censoring and correlation issues.   Both issues have been 
highlighted in the literature and addressed previously through more restrictive modeling 
approaches.  The model developed to assess the impact of different labeling policies on 
consumer welfare is uniquely general.  As well, using experimental auction data to 
calibrate a vertically differentiated market model is new to the literature and is shown to 
yield richer results.  It is hoped that the methodological advancements of this dissertation 
will aid researchers in better addressing the many issues surrounding food and other 
agricultural products that are critical to consumers, producers, and policymakers. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
I.D.#__________ 
 
    
 
Welcome!  Thank you for choosing to participate in an experiment 
about decision making.  The information you provide today is a 
very important contribution to ongoing research by Iowa State 
University and Pennsylvania State University.   
 
In this folder is a packet of information that you will need during 
the session.  Once you have looked at a form during the session, 
feel free to go back and reexamine that form again if needed, but 
please do not look ahead until we reach the right point in the 
session. 
 
Please follow instructions carefully.  To ensure accuracy, please do 
not talk to any other participants during the session. 
 
We would like to emphasize that all information obtained today 
will be used only for group comparisons.  No personal or 
individual information will be divulged for any reason.   
 
Please turn to the next page, and fill out the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ref: EIV  
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Please answer the following questions by circling the appropriate choice 
or filling in the appropriate line.  Please try to answer all questions. 
 
1. Regarding genetically modified foods, how informed do you consider yourself? 
  1 = Extremely well informed 
  2 = Well informed 
  3 = Somewhat informed 
  4 = Not very informed 
  5 = Not informed at all 
 
2. How many people (out of about 300 million) do you think get sick from genetically 
modified food each year in the United States?  ____________________ 
 
3. What percentage of corn grown in the United States do you think is genetically 
modified?   
  ______% 
 
4. What percentage of potatoes grown in the United States do you think are genetically 
modified?   
  ______% 
 
5. What percentage of broccoli grown in the United States do you think is genetically 
modified?   
  ______% 
 
6. Does the government require a label on foods indicating that they contain genetically 
modified content? 
  1 = Yes 
  2 = No 
 
7. Which statement best describes your opinion towards genetically modified food? 
  1 = Strongly support 
  2 = Support 
  3 = Neutral 
  4 = Oppose 
  5 = Strongly oppose 
 
8. Please rank the following three organizations in order of who you trust most to 
provide information regarding food safety (1 = Most trusted, 3 = Least trusted).  
Please use each number (1, 2, and 3) only once. 
  ____  Leading Environmental groups (ex. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) 
  ____  Leading Biotechnology Companies (ex. Monsanto and Syngenta) 
  ____  Government organizations (ex. USDA and FDA) 
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9. Please rank the following three organizations in order of who you trust most to 
provide information regarding the healthiness of food (1 = Most trusted, 3 = Least 
trusted).  Please use each number (1, 2, and 3) only once. 
  ____  Leading Environmental groups (ex. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth) 
  ____  Leading Biotechnology Companies (ex. Monsanto and Syngenta) 
  ____  Government organizations (ex. USDA and FDA) 
 
10. Given a choice, would you prefer to receive information regarding (circle only one) 
  1 = The positive attributes of genetically modified food 
  2 = The negative attributes of genetically modified food 
 
11. Below is the title of five different newspaper articles.  Given a choice which article 
would you prefer to read (circle only one) 
  1 = “The GM threat to health, wildlife and biodiversity” 
  2 = “International scientists raise concerns over genetically modified food” 
  3 = “Debate rages over genetically modified crops” 
  4 = “GM crops lead to savings, less use of pesticides for farmers” 
  5 = “GM food is answer to poverty and hunger” 
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Please do not turn the page until 
instructed by your monitor. 
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Once again, we would like to thank you for participating in this 
study today. 
 
Today we will be holding auctions of some common products.  
Details for how the auction works will be provided shortly. 
 
Because we are trying to determine values for different products, 
we ask that you please refrain from communicating with the other 
participants.  If you have any questions, the monitors can assist 
you. 
 
145 
How the Auction Works 
 
We are going to hold today what is called an nth price auction.  For those of 
you who have participated in auctions before, please note that the nth price 
auction is slightly different than what you may have encountered.  The 
auction works as follows: 
 
1. Examine the products to be auctioned 
 
Before we ask you to bid on a product, we will let you come up to the 
front of the room and examine the products that you will be bidding 
on. 
 
2. Write down your bid for the products 
 
After examining the products, write down what you would like to bid 
for each of the products being auctioned on a provided “bid sheet”. 
 
3. Choosing of the nth price 
 
Once everyone has bid, we will determine what will be called the “nth 
price”.  Everyone who bids higher than this price will win the 
product, and pay the nth price. 
 
(Your monitor will go through an example of this) 
 
4. Determining who wins the auction 
 
(Your monitor will go through an example of this) 
 
Please note that in this auction it is always in your best interest to bid your 
true value for a product.  Unlike many auctions in which you might bid 
less than your true value to try to get a deal, this auction does not reward 
that.  This is because you do not necessarily pay your bid price, but you pay 
the nth price that is randomly chosen.  Likewise, it is not in your interest to 
bid more than you are truly willing to pay because you may have to pay 
more than you wanted to for the product. 
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Short Quiz on the nth Price Auction Format 
 
Please note, this sheet will not be collected 
 
1. The people who win will always pay the amount they bid for a product. 
  1 = True 
  2 = False 
 
2. If you have the 4th highest bid and the randomly drawn nth price is the 2nd, 
you will win the auction. 
  1 = True 
  2 = False 
 
3. I might get to pay less than my bid for a product, but I will never have to 
pay more than my bid for a product. 
  1 = True 
  2 = False 
 
4. If the binding price that is randomly drawn is the 7th price, how many 
people win the good? 
  4 
  5 
  6 
  7 
  8 
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Practice Auction 
 
To make sure everyone is comfortable with how the nth price auction works 
we will have two rounds of practice bidding.  
 
Since some of the products in the two rounds are similar, only one of the two 
practice rounds will be “binding”.  By “binding” we mean that only one of 
the two practice rounds will be selected as the round where people will win 
goods and pay money for them (i.e. only one round “counts”).  The round 
that is binding will be randomly selected by a computer and will be revealed 
after the second practice round.  Since you do not know which round will be 
chosen, it is in your best interest to bid your true value for the products in 
both practice rounds.   
 
These two rounds are practice so no goods will actually be purchased and 
no money will be exchanged. 
 
 
Practice Bidding Round 1 of 2 
 
Step 1 - Examine the 3 products 
 
 Examine the products in practice round 1  
 
Step 2 - Write down your bid for the 3 products 
 
 Please fill out your bid sheet for all 3 products 
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Practice Bidding Round 2 of 2 
 
Step 1 - Examine the 3 products 
 
 Examine the products in practice round 2  
 
Step 2 - Write down your bid for the 3 products 
 
 Please fill out your bid sheet for all 3 products  
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Step 3 – Determine the binding round (computer generated) 
 
A computer randomly determines which of the two rounds of bidding 
will be binding. 
 
Step 4 – Determine the nth price for each product (computer generated) 
 
A computer randomly determines the nth price for each of the three 
products in the binding round. 
 
Step 5 – Announcement of the auction winners for each product 
 
If this auction was real, the winners in the binding round would 
exchange money for the goods in the room next door. 
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Auction 
 
We are about to begin the real auction.  In this auction there will be 4 rounds 
of bidding.  Only 1 round of the 4 will be binding.  In each round there will 
be 3 products.  The products may or may not be the same in each round.  
Remember, please bid on each product in each round with your true value. 
 
Please take a few minutes and read the information on the following 3 pages. 
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The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from 
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group. 
 
General Information 
 Genetic modification (GM) takes genes from one organism and places then into another.  
The process lets scientists manipulate genes in an unnatural way.  Inadequate safety testing of 
GM plants and food products has occurred.  Humans and the Earth are being used as guinea pigs 
for testing whether “Frankenfoods” are safe.  GM foods should be banned because their effect on 
consumers and the environment is unknown and potentially catastrophic!  Genetic modification is 
one of the most risky things being done to your food sources today and should be stopped before 
more damage is done.   
 
Scientific Impact 
 All genetic modifications of plants are risky.  All GM techniques are relatively new and 
no one can guarantee that consumers or the environment will not be harmed.  The biggest 
potential hazard of GM foods is the unknown.   
 
Human Impact 
 Genetically modified foods could pose serious risks to human health.  Some foods 
contain allergens, and the potential exists for allergens to be transferred into a GM food product 
that no one would suspect.  For example, if the genes from a peanut were transferred into a 
tomato, and someone who is allergic to peanuts eats this GM tomato, he could display a peanut 
allergy.  
 Another problem with transgenic foods is a moral issue.  Many GM techniques transfer 
genes across species.  We believe it is morally wrong to alter life forms on such a fundamental 
level. 
  
Financial Impact 
GM foods are being pushed onto consumer by big businesses which only care about their 
own profits and ignore possible negative side effects.  These groups are actually patenting new 
life forms they create with plans to sell for profits.  Studies have shown that GM crops may even 
get lower yields than conventional crops. 
 
Environmental Impact 
 GM foods could pose major environmental hazards.  Little testing of GM plants for 
environmental impacts has occurred.  One potential risk of GM crops is their impact on wildlife, 
including wild species of plants and insects.  A study showed that one type of GM plant killed 
Monarch butterflies.  
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that become resistant to 
new naturally occurring toxic substances engineered into plants to kill pests—insects and 
worms—or to make a plant resistant to a particular herbicide application.  The target pests that 
get exposed to these new GM crops could quickly develop tolerances and wipe out many of the 
potential advantages of GM pest resistance.   
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The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification provided by a 
group of leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto, Pioneer and Syngenta. 
 
General Information 
 Genetically modified (GM) plants have the potential to be one of the greatest discoveries 
in the history of farming.  GM crops have lowered food production costs by improving insect and 
disease resistance and weed control in plants.  New genetic engineering techniques could 
dramatically enhance consumer benefiting attributes of food such as vitamins, antioxidants, 
flavor, and shelf life.  These improvements to plant quality can only be attained through GM, not 
conventional breeding. 
The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and places them into 
another.  There are two distinct types of GM used by biotechnology companies.  Transgenic GM 
transfers genes between two unrelated organisms, for example from soil bacteria to corn.  
Intragenic GM involves transferring genes between two breeds of the same organism, for 
example, from wild species of corn to a commercial variety of corn. 
  
Scientific Impact 
 Both transgenic and intragenic techniques are used to produce food products that are 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Intragenic modification is a genetic 
technique for significantly speeding up the conventional process of plant cross-breeding, which 
has been undertaken by farmers and plant breeders for thousands of years.  Many industry groups 
believe intragenics should require minimal FDA testing because no foreign genes or proteins are 
added to the GM plant.  We have only seen the tip of the iceberg of the future potential of GM for 
improving worldwide health and nutrition through enhanced plants. 
 
Human Impact 
 The potential exists for GM to dramatically enhance traits that have direct value to 
consumers, such as increased vitamins and antioxidants, more flavor, longer shelf life, lower 
pesticide use, and reduced cost of production.  Superior GM plants will help reduce worldwide 
malnutrition and improve the healthiness of foods.  The FDA has approved GM food for human 
consumption, and Americans have been consuming GM foods for a decade.  While every food 
(modified or not) poses some risks, there has never been a documented case of a person getting 
sick from GM food. 
 
Financial Impact 
 With the introduction of enhanced nutrition, antioxidants, shelf life, flavors and other 
consumer-desired attributes using GM technology, consumers will for the first time enjoy the 
direct benefits of genetic engineering.  GM plants have reduced farmers’ costs, which mean lower 
food prices.  Worldwide the number of hungry people is declining.  GM technology is helping to 
feed the world and improve worldwide nutrition. 
 
Environmental Impact 
 Genetic modification of plants has the potential to be one of the most environmentally 
helpful discoveries ever.  GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce 
chemical insecticide application by 50% or more.  GM weed control is providing new methods to 
control weeds, which are a problem in no-till farming. This means greater crop yields and less 
environmental damage. 
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The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group consisting 
of a variety of individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified foods including: scientists, 
professionals, religious leaders, and academics.  These parties have no financial stake in GM 
foods.   
 
General Information 
The process of genetic modification (GM) takes genes from one organism and places 
them into another.  There are two distinct types of GM used by biotechnology companies.  
Transgenic GM transfers genes between two unrelated organisms, for example from soil bacteria 
to corn.  Intragenic GM involves transferring genes between two breeds of the same organism, 
for example from wild species of corn to a commercial variety of the crop.  Hence, intragenic 
modification has much in common with conventional plant breeding.   
 
Scientific Impact 
 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standard for GM food products is based on the 
principle that they have essentially the same ingredients, although modified from the original 
plant.  Almost all GM crops meet the FDA’s substantive equivalent requirement.  Hence, they do 
not require special testing before commercial marketing can occur.   
  
Human Impact 
 Many scientists see intragenics as having real potential for enhancing consumer attributes 
of plants such as dramatically increasing vitamin and antioxidant levels, extending shelf life, and 
reduced chemical pesticide application without concerns about gene transfer across species.  
These improvements to plants are only possible using genetic modification and not conventional 
breeding. 
All foods present a risk of an allergic reaction to a small fraction of the population.  No 
FDA approved GM food poses any known unique human health risks, but when genes are 
transferred across species, a new allergen is possible.  This is more likely with transgenics than 
intragenics.  While GM crops can result in higher yields and enhanced nutrition, there is no 
consensus whether GM foods have or will reduce worldwide hunger.  
Many people have moral or religious objections to GM.  Some groups see intragenics as 
being more acceptable because genes are transferred between two breeds of the same species.   
 
Financial Impact 
 GM seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek profits.  For farmers 
to switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from making a change.  Consumers must also see 
benefits from consuming GM foods—lower price or enhanced consumer attributes.  However 
GM technology may lead to changes in the organization of the agri-business industry and 
farming.   
 
Environmental Impact 
 The long-term effects of GM on the environment are largely unknown.  Bioengineered 
insect resistance has reduced farmers’ applications of environmentally hazardous insecticides, but 
resistance to this bio-control system will increase over time.  More studies are occurring to help 
assess the impact of bioengineered plants on the environment.  Some studies reported harm to 
Monarch butterflies from GM crops, but other scientists were not able to recreate the results.  
 Enhanced consumer attributes, such as vitamins, antioxidants, and longer shelf life due to 
intragenics pose no known environmental hazards. 
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Bidding Round 1 of 4 
 
Step 1 - Examine the 3 products 
 
 Examine the products in round 1  
 
Step 2 - Write down your bid for the 3 products 
 
 Please fill out your bid sheet for all 3 products 
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Bidding Round 2 of 4 
 
Step 1 - Examine the 3 products 
 
 Examine the products in round 2  
 
Step 2 - Write down your bid for the 3 products 
 
 Please fill out your bid sheet for all 3 products 
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Bidding Round 3 of 4 
 
Step 1 - Examine the 3 products 
 
 Examine the products in round 3  
 
Step 2 - Write down your bid for the 3 products 
 
 Please fill out your bid sheet for all 3 products 
  
164 
 
 
Please do not turn the page until 
instructed by your monitor. 
 
165 
Bidding Round 4 of 4 
 
Step 1 - Examine the 3 products 
 
 Examine the products in round 4 
 
Step 2 - Write down your bid for the 3 products 
 
 Please fill out your bid sheet for all 3 products 
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Step 3 – Determine the binding round (computer generated) 
 
A computer randomly determines which of the four rounds of bidding 
will be binding. 
 
Step 4 – Determine the n PthP price for each product (computer generated) 
 
A computer randomly determines the n PthP price for each of the three 
products in the binding round. 
 
Step 5 – Announcement of the auction winners for each product 
 
Step 6 – Post auction questionnaire 
  
Please fill out the questionnaire on the following page.  Once you 
have completed the questionnaire, please return your information 
packet to the session monitor. 
 
Step 7 – Auction winners exchange money for goods 
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Please answer the following questions by circling the appropriate choice 
or filling in the appropriate line. 
 
1. What is your gender? 
  1 = Male 
  2 = Female 
 
2. What is your age? ______ 
 
3. What best describes your marital status? 
  1 = Married 
  2 = Single with live-in partner 
  3 = Single 
  0 = Other 
 
4. How many people live in your household? ______ 
 
5. How many children in each age group are living in your household? (if you have no 
children, enter zero for all age groups) 
  0-3 years old    ______ 
  4-6 years old    ______ 
  8-12 years old   ______ 
  13-18 years old ______ 
  Older than 18 ______ 
 
6. What city and state do you live in? 
  City ____________________ 
  State ____________________ 
 
7. What is the highest level of schooling that you have completed? 
  1 = Some high school 
  2 = Graduated from high school 
  3 = Some college 
  4 = 2 year college degree 
  5 = 4 year college degree 
  6 = Beyond 4 year college degree 
 
8. What is your racial-ethnic background? 
  1 = Hispanic 
  2 = White (non-Hispanic) 
  3 = African-American 
  4 = Asian-American 
  5 = Native American 
  0 = Other (please fill in)  ____________________ 
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9. What was your total household income (before taxes) in 2006? 
  1 = Under $10,000 
  2   = $10,000-$14,999 
  3   = $15,000-$19,999 
  4   = $20,000-$24,999 
  5   = $25,000-$29,999 
  6   = $30,000-$34,999 
  7   = $35,000-$39,999 
  8   = $40,000-$49,999 
  9   = $50,000-$59,999 
  10 = $60,000-$74,999 
  11 = $75,000-$99,999 
  12 = $100,000-$124,999 
  13 = $125,000-$149,999 
  14 = Over $150,000 
 
10. What was your religious affiliation when you were young, say age 12? 
  1 = Baptist 
  2 = Catholic 
  3 = Jewish 
  4 = Lutheran 
  5 = Methodist 
  6 = Muslim 
  7 = Other 
  8 = No religion when young 
 
11. Are you actively engaged in farming? 
  1 = Yes 
  2 = No 
 
12. Have you ever been actively engaged in farming? 
  1 = Yes 
  2 = No 
 
13. What best describes your current work industry? 
  1   = Professional (such as a physician, dentist, attorney, or teacher) 
  2   = Management, business, and finance 
  3   = Construction and extraction/mining 
  4   = Installation, maintenance, and repair 
  5   = Transportation and material moving 
  6   = Sales and related 
  7   = Farming, fishing, and forestry 
  8   = Production/manufacturing 
  9   = Service (such as motel or restaurant work) 
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  10 = Housework or Retired 
  11 = Unemployed 
 
14. Are you a member of an environmental group? 
  1 = Yes 
  2 = No 
 
15. When purchasing new food items, how often do you read labels? 
  1 = Always 
  2 = Often 
  3 = Sometimes 
  4 = Rarely 
  5 = Never 
 
16. Are you a vegetarian or vegan? 
  1 = Yes 
  2 = No 
 
17. Do you smoke? 
  1 = Yes 
  2 = No 
 
18. Do you exercise regularly, i.e., 3 or more times per week of moderate or vigorous 
activity for 30 minutes or more per each episode? 
  1 = Yes 
  2 = No 
 
19. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being unhealthy and 10 being very healthy, how healthy 
is your diet? ______ 
 
20. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being unhealthy and 10 being very healthy, how do you 
consider your physical health?  ______ 
 
21. Whom do you most trust to provide you with information on food safety? (fill in 
blank)    
  ____________________ 
 
22. Whom do you least trust to provide you with information on food safety? (fill in 
blank)  
  ____________________ 
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23. How safe do you think Intragenic GM is compared to Transgenic GM? 
  1 = Much Less safe 
  2 = Less safe 
  3 = About as safe 
  4 = More safe 
  5 = Much more safe 
  9 – I don’t know 
 
24. How safe do you think Intragenic GM food is compared to GM Free food? 
  1 = Much Less safe 
  2 = Less safe 
  3 = About as safe 
  4 = More safe 
  5 = Much more safe 
  9 – I don’t know 
 
25. Please circle the products that you purchase regularly. (circle all that apply) 
1 = Broccoli 
2 = Tomatoes 
3 = Potatoes 
 
26. Please circle the products that you eat regularly. (circle all that apply) 
1 = Broccoli 
2 = Tomatoes 
3 = Potatoes 
 
27. Please circle the products that you currently have in your home. (circle all that apply) 
1 = Broccoli 
2 = Tomatoes 
3 = Potatoes 
 
 
